Psychology, economics and incentives. by Biel, P.R.
Psychology, Economics and Incentives
Pedro Rey Biel
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Thesis submitted as requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD.) in Economics
May 2005
Supervisors: Prof. Tilman Borgers and Prof. Steffen Huck
1
UMI Number: U602431
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U602431
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Abstract
This PhD. Thesis deals with the effects that psychological phenomena may have on the 
incentives of agents participating in economic interaction. In particular, I focus on how 
individuals’ preference for certain distributions of welfare among others may affect their effort 
and other strategic decisions in a variety of contexts. The thesis consists of five chapters. The 
first one introduces the study. The next two chapters are theoretical and study the effects that 
aversion to inequity may have on effort decisions. The last two chapters are experimental and 
show evidence on when welfare comparisons may distort the way experimental subjects play 
simple games.
Chapter 2 studies optimal contracts when employees are averse to inequity as modelled by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A “selfish” employer can profitably exploit preferences for equity 
among his employees by offering contracts which create inequity when employees do not meet 
the employer's demands. I derive the optimal contract under such circumstances and discuss 
conditions for inequity aversion to affect the optimal output choice. Similar results are 
obtained for other types of distributional preferences such as status-seeking or efficiency 
concerns.
Chapter 3 studies the mechanics of “leading by example” in teams and it is joint work with 
Steffen Huck. We show that leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents dislike 
effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what 
type of leader benefits a team most.
Chapter 4 discusses a laboratory experiment in which subjects played constant sum normal 
form games and stated beliefs about the frequencies of play by their opponents. Contrary to 
previous experimental evidence, the results show that game-theoretical predictions work 
reasonably well: 80% of actions coincided with the Nash equilibrium, subjects were good at 
predicting the action which was played with highest frequency and 73% of actions were best 
responses to stated beliefs. The chapter argues that game-theoretical predictions might work 
well in constant sum games because distributional preferences may not be a factor influencing 
subjects’ decisions in these games.
Chapter 5 shows a follow-up experiment in which we study the robustness of the results in 
Chapter 4 ’s experiment to sequential play in games with the same payoff matrix as the games 
in the previous chapter. Although we suspected that sequentiality may trigger some 
psychological phenomena that may lead subjects to deviate from equilbirium, we find that in 
our constant sum games the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions work well.
Overall, we conclude that distributional preferences and other types of psychological 
phenomena have important economic consequences when they affect individuals' incentives. 
However, as important as it is to acknowledge the effects of psychologial phenomena it is to 
identify the type of situations in which they change predictions from standard economic 
theory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the last 30 years, one of the most lively debates in Microeconomics has been 
about the acceptance of Behavioural and Experimental Economics. Until recently, 
most of economic research assumed tha t people are primarily motivated by material 
incentives and make decisions in a rational way. However, an increasing amount of 
research inspired by psychological phenomena and aided by experimental evidence has 
helped to revise these assumptions. The award in 2002 of the Nobel Prize in Economics 
to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith confirmed tha t there was much to be gained 
in Economics from broadening the motivations tha t may affect individuals’ incentives 
when engaging in economic interaction.
This PhD. Thesis studies the effects of removing the assumption tha t individuals 
are only motivated by their “own” monetary incentives. In particular, we study how 
im portant incentive problems are affected when some of the economic agents not only 
care for their own monetary rewards, but also for the distribution of welfare among 
others. Our motivation comes from the increasing amount of experimental data that 
has been explained by other regarding preferences and by the various attem pts to 
model those preferences. Our strategy is two-fold: We first take one of the most 
prominent modellizations of “distributional” preferences, the model of inequity aver­
sion by Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt, and study its theoretical effects in one of the 
classical problems of incentive theory, which is how to exert effort from agents in work 
environments. We study two situations, one in which a principal has to iexert effort 
from several agents (Chapter 2), and one in which there is no principal and two agents 
decide how to produce some joint work (Chapter 3). We conclude tha t the fact that 
agents may care for the reward other agents get for their effort or possibly for the 
effort other agents exert, has im portant economic consequences and we analyze their 
implications. Once we have studied some of the theoretical effects of this particular 
modellization of distributional preferences, we go back to experiments (Chapters 4
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and 5) in order to provide a first step in the wider research programme of identifying 
the class of games in which standard Game Theory is a good predictor of individuals’ 
behaviour and, in particular, under which circumstances other regarding preferences, 
both distributional and intentionally driven, do not influence laboratory play.
The theoretical and experimental chapters of this thesis are also linked by the 
timing in which decisions are made, While in chapters 2 and 4, individuals take 
actions simultaneously, in chapters 3 and 5 they do it sequentially. This may have 
implications if individuals care for others’ welfare. If actions are taken simultaneously, 
agents may be more responsive to the distribution of welfare among agents than to the 
motivations of other agents’ actions which causes th a t distribution, as others’ actions 
are not observed at the time of taking one’s own decisions. If, on the other hand, 
actions are sequential, second movers may respond more to the intentions (and their 
effects on the final distribution of welfare) signalled by first movers’ actions. Thus, 
first movers may take into account tha t other consecutive movers may respond to the 
intentions signalled by their actions. Therefore, the timing of decisions may influence 
the way individuals care for others’ welfare in the sense tha t they may emphasize 
whether agents care only for the “distribution” or also for the “reciprocal” effect of 
their choices. This issue has been central in modelling other regarding preferences. 
We discuss this issue further in the following chapters.
We here summarize the contents of the remaining chapters:
Chapter 2 studies optimal contracts when employees are averse to inequity as 
modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A “selfish” employer can profitably exploit 
preferences for equity among his employees by offering contracts which create inequity 
when employees do not meet the employer’s demands. We derive the optimal contract 
under such circumstances and discuss conditions for inequity aversion to affect the 
optimal output choice. Similar results are obtained for other types of distributional 
preferences such as “status-seeking” or “efficiency” concerns.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Steffen Huck. We study the mechanics of “leading 
by example” in teams and show that leadership is beneficial for the entire team when 
agents dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously 
and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most.
Chapter 4 discusses a laboratory experiment in which subjects played constant sum 
normal form games and stated beliefs about the frequencies of play by their opponents. 
Contrary to previous experimental evidence, the results show tha t game-theoretical 
predictions work reasonably well: 80% of actions coincided with the Nash equilibrium, 
subjects were good at predicting the action which was played with highest frequency
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and 73% of actions were best responses to stated beliefs. The chapter argues that game- 
theoretical predictions might work well in constant sum games because distributional 
concerns may not be a factor influencing subjects’ decisions in these games.
Chapter 5 shows a follow-up experiment in which we study the robustness of the 
results in Chapter 4’s experiment to sequential play, by designing an experiment in 
which subjects play sequential games which shared the same payoff m atrix as the games 
in the previous chapter. Although we suspected tha t sequentiality may trigger some 
psychological phenomena tha t may lead subjects to deviate from the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium, we find tha t in these games the subgame perfect equilibrium 
prediction works even better than the Nash equilibrium prediction in the simultaneous 
games.
Overall, we conclude that there is clear evidence tha t individuals care for other 
individuals’ welfare and tha t this has important economic implications because it 
affects individuals’ incentives. However, as important as it is to acknowledge the 
effects of psychological phenomena it is to model correctly how these other regarding 
preferences affect incentives in different situations and to identify the type of situations 
in which they change predictions from standard economic theory. We here only focus 
on the effects of a particular type of other regarding preferences in contract theory 
situations, but this is just one of the many environments in which they can be applied. 
Likewise, we here offer a first step into the identification of games for which game theory 
is a good predictor of behaviour and is not influenced by other regarding preferences.
Chapter 2
Inequity A version and Team  
Incentives
2.1 Introduction
One of the most striking results from interview studies with firm managers and 
employees (Agell and Lundborg (1999), Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell and Kam- 
lani (1997)) is that employees report to care for the well being of their co-workers 
and not only for their own. In particular, employees compare co-workers’ salaries and 
performance in the firm with their own. Bewley (1999) shows tha t 69% of firms’ man­
agers interviewed offer formal pay structures because they can create internal equity, 
which they believe employees care for. Asked why internal equity among employees is 
relevant for them, 78% of managers answered tha t it was im portant for morale and 
internal harmony and 49% responded tha t internal equity was key for job performance. 
This chapter aims to capture how managers should structure reward schemes when 
their employees care for the distribution of payoffs among their co-workers in a simple 
model.
We discuss how contracts can exploit distributional preferences to the manager’s 
advantage. Our main result is tha t a “selfish” principal can devise schemes which 
exploit agents’ preference for equity by offering them more equitable outcomes when 
managers’ demands are met than when they are not. The reason is tha t equity affects 
the employees’ incentives to work hard and thus, it affects job performance. Following 
Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) seminal paper, optimal contracts must account for 
everything employees care about. When agents care for equity the principal has two 
instruments at his disposal: monetary rewards and equity. By paying rewards which 
generate more equity when employees perform the effort level desired by the manager 
than when they do not, the manager does not need to create as much incentives for
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employees to meet his demands and thus, he can elicit the desired effort levels paying 
lower rewards than would have been possible had the agents not been inequity averse. 
Finally, because it may be relatively cheaper to provide incentives for each agent to 
work, the optimal level of production might change.
Distributional preferences and fairness considerations are one of the most frequent 
explanations of subjects’ behaviour in a wide variety of experiments.1 In prominent 
experimental work, Fehr and Schmidt (2000)2 have argued tha t fairness lead principals 
to write incomplete contracts which implement less severe incentives than conventional 
theory would predict. We develop a simple model in which a principal has to design 
a reward scheme for two agents who dislike inequity in the way envisaged by F&S. 
However, contrary to F&S, the principal in our model is not distributional concerned 
and agents do not care for the principal’s welfare, but only for the other agents’ 
and their own. That is, in F&S the comparison of utilities among individuals is 
vertical (employers compare their welfare to their employees’ and vice-versa) while in 
this chapter it is horizontal (employees compare their welfare only among themselves 
and the Principal only cares for his own payoffs). Horizontal comparisons among 
agents seem intuitive. It is natural to assume that welfare comparisons are enhanced 
by repeated interaction and tha t employees at the same hierarchical level interact 
more frequently among themselves than with their superiors. Additionally, it could 
be argued tha t employees performing the same task have better information about 
each agents’ cost of effort and find it easier to learn about co-workers’ rewards than 
those of their superiors, making welfare comparisons among employees more accessible. 
Finally, sociologists have argued tha t individuals rarely have altruistic feelings for 
others tha t have direct authority over their actions.3 Thus, utility comparisons seem 
more meaningful among employees on the same hierarchical level than on different 
levels,4
We have chosen the F&S (1999) utility function as a reduced form of social pref­
erences due to its prominence. W ith simple parameter transformations we can obtain 
similar results for other types of distributional preferences which might be relevant 
in the workplace.5 We later discuss distributional preferences such as status seeking
1 See, for example, Blount and Bazerman (1996), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Engelmann and 
Strobel (2004).
2 We use F&S in the following to refer to these authors.
3 See Homans (1950) for a summary.
4 For example, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) express doubts on which variables would be 
used to compare employees and employer’s utilities. In particular, they ask how meaningful is to 
compare employees’ salaries with firm’s profits or the value of the firm’s shares.
5 In particular, our main result would hold for the models proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), 
Bazerman, Loewenstein and Thompson (1989), Andreoni and Miller (1998), Cox and Friedman (2002), 
and the model without intentions by Charness and Rabin (2002).
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and efficiency concerns. Notice tha t we do not discuss more complicated forms of so­
cial preferences which include reciprocal behaviour and intentions.6 These preferences 
could play a role in optimal contract design if we studied repeated interactions in the 
context of the firm. However, with reciprocal preferences it would be crucial to study 
the reaction by agents to threats of inequity by the principal. But this reaction would 
imply tha t employees care for the intentions of the employer, meaning tha t vertical 
considerations would play a role from which we want to abstract.
Our model is very stylized. First, we focus on incentive compatibility, not on 
participation. We assume that the participation constraint does not bind and thus 
both agents work for the firm. In particular, we normalize the utility of being in the 
firm to zero and we assume that the utility derived from not being in the firm is below 
this value. As we do not explicitly model an outside option its utility could take any 
value. We simply assume it is lower than when working in the firm. This could be 
justified for different reasons: search costs of finding a different job, good matching 
with employers, specific human capital, disutility of unemployment or the existence 
of minimum rewards. But in particular, notice that if agents are still inequity averse 
when taking the outside option, utility when leaving the firm could be lower than 
inside the firm, as agents would obtain disutility for other agents left behind. As the 
reference group in the outside option is unclear and it is probably context dependent, 
we omit the analysis of the participation constraints by assuming they do not bind. 
Our results are thus limited to this case. Another possible interpretation of our model 
is that the rewards in the model are not agents’ wages but a bonus offered to perform 
an extra activity. Thus, while the wage would take care of the participation constraint, 
the extra bonus provides incentives to perform an extra effort. In tha t view, our results 
should be interpreted as implying tha t bonuses might not need to cover employees’ 
cost of performing an extra effort when they feel envy or guilt towards their peers. 
This interpretation is close to empirical effects observed under real team and relative 
performance contracts (Bandiera et al., (2004)).
Second, we do not consider an uncertain production environment. In our model 
output is deterministic and informative about the effort level performed by each agent. 
We want to show how inequity aversion in itself changes the optimal contract, with­
out adding uncertainty. In a paper independently written at the same time as this 
chapter, Itoh (2004) uses a model where output is uncertain and shows tha t inequity 
aversion calls for optimal contracts to specify both agents’ rewards under all possible 
circumstances, which also occurs in our model. However, Itoh’s mechanism is different 
from ours. In his model, each agent undertakes a different project and the principal 
writes the contract such tha t both agents always perform high effort. More equal (or
6 For good surveys on social preferences see Sobel (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (2002b).
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more unequal) rewards are used in Itoh’s paper to compensate for the risk of one of the 
agents’ projects failing. In our study, inequity aversion determines whether it is opti­
mal or not to form teams in which both agents perform high effort and we show how 
unequal rewards must be offered off-equilibrium to optimally exploit inequity aversion. 
Both approaches are complementary.
Other papers have simultaneously studied inequity aversion in the contest of the 
firm. Englmaier and Wambach (2002) study the interaction between an inequity averse 
agent who compares himself with a selfish principal. Grund and Sliwka (2002) study 
welfare comparisons in tournaments. Cabrales and Calvd-Armengol (2002) use in­
equity aversion among employees to justify skill segregation. Huck and Rey Biel (2002) 
look at teams formed by inequity averse agents when there is no principal.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model. 
Section 2.3 characterizes the optimal contract when agents have standard preferences. 
Section 2.4 characterizes the optimal contract when agents are inequity averse. Section
2.5 discusses optimal contracts when distributional preferences take other forms, such 
as status seeking and efficiency concerns. Section 2.6 concludes. The Appendices 
contain the proofs and show two relevant examples.
2.2 The M odel
There are a Principal and two agents «, j  G {1,2} with i ^  j .  Agents can either work 
or not work. If both agents work, production is normalized to 1 (joint production). If 
only agent i works, production is qi, where 0 < qi < 1 (individual production by agent 
i). If no agent works, production is 0. Output is observable. Effort is verifiable and 
contractible.
The cost for each agent of working is c* > 0 . The cost of not working is normalized 
to 0. A complete contract specifies the rewards offered to both agents for all possible 
output levels. In order to standardize notation, assume the principal offers rewards 
{wi,W 2 } to agents 1 and 2 respectively when both agents work, {u>{, w \}  when agent 
1 individually works and {u^i, when agent 2 individually works. If no agent works, 
rewards are zero.7
The structure of the game is as follows: the Principal offers rewards for all possible 
production levels, agents decide simultaneously whether or not to  work and, once pro­
duction is realized, promised rewards for the output level produced are paid. Following 
Ma et al. (1988) we look at the contract such that the implemented production level 
is the unique equilibrium of the game played by the agents.8 As the game is 2x2, the
7This is implied by assumptions (Rl) and (R2) below.
8 We do so in order to avoid the problem in Demski and Sappington (1984) that given an optimal
2. Inequity A version and Team Incentives 17
contract that implements a unique equilibrium makes the game played by the agents 
dominance solvable.9
The Principal seeks to maximize its profit, tha t is, production minus rewards 
paid.10 Given the minimum rewards needed to be paid in equilibrium to implement 
each production level and the productivity parameters (<& and q ), the Principal de­
signs the contract that implements the output level which maximizes its profit. Two 
different specifications for the agents’ utility functions will be considered in Sections
2.3 and 2.4. These specifications will be explained later.
The structure of the game is known by the principal and the agents and, in par­
ticular, they both know the rewards offered, the production level each agent achieves 
if working individually and each agents’ cost of effort. Agents cannot communicate 
among themselves.
Assume the following.
(C) The sum of working agents’ costs of effort is smaller than the output
produced.
0 < ci <  qi,
0 <  c2 <  q2, 
ci +  C2 <  1.
(R l) Agents’ Limited liability: Negative rewards are not possible.
1 o w \,w i,W i > 0,
w2,w \ ,w l  > 0.
(R2) Rewards are paid from output produced.
W\ + W2 < 1,
w \ + w \ < 91,
w \ + w l <
contract there may exist another pair of equilibrium strategies whose outcome, from the agents’ point 
of view, pareto dominates the equilibrium outcome which the principal wants to implement and thus, 
the contract may not implement the optimal output level.
9 As we will see below, in all but one case, equilibrium uniqueness does not require to pay in 
equilibrium a higher sum of rewards than required to obtain the optimal output level as one of the 
possible equilibria of the game played by the agents. Rewards offered off-equilibrium, however, may 
differ depending on whether the equilibrium implemented is unique or not.
10 Assuming the prize of production is one and all production is sold.
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Assumption (C) implies that there always exists a surplus above the cost of effort 
performed. Assumption (R l) is a limited liability constraint restricting how much the 
principal can monetarily punish agents for not performing effort. Assumption (R2) 
is a budget constraint for the Principal. Notice tha t for contracts to be credible, 
assumptions (R l) and (R2) must also hold for rewards offered off the equilibrium of 
the game played by the agents.11
2.3 O p tim al con tract w ith  stan d ard  agen ts
In this section we derive the optimal contract when agents are standard. Standard 
agents maximize their “direct utility” which is equal to the reward they are offered 
minus the cost, of effort they perform. Below we show each agents’ direct utility in the 
game depending on the actions taken by both agents and the rewards offered by the 
Principal.
Work
Agent 1
Not Work
We first solve for the optimal contract necessary to implement each production 
level and then, given the optimal rewards, we derive conditions for each production 
level to be optimal. Although the solution of this problem is straightforward, we solve 
it here as reference for the following section.
2.3.1 Optim al contract to  im plem ent individual production w ith  stan­
dard agents
We here find the optimal contract to implement individual production by agent 1 
as the unique equilibrium of the game played by the agents.12 The problem is the 
following:
11 As it will be clear below, we im pose budget constraints off-equilibrium to show the interesting  
interplay between creating inequity off-equilibrium via envy  or guilt. W ithout budget constraints, the 
Principal could offer infinite rewards to one agent off-equilibrium, m axim izing the other agent’s envy  
when not performing the optimal production level.
1JThe optim al contract to im plement individual production by agent 2 is symmetric.
Agent 2
Work Not Work
u \  -  c , . w , - c* w t ' -  c, w 3l
Uf2, UP2 -  c2 oo
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-The principal maximizes its profit:
M a x qi — w\ — w\
subject to:
- Assumptions (Rl) and (R2).
- Agent 1 prefers to work when agent 2 does not work: w\ — c\ > 0 .
- Agent 2 prefers not to work when agent 1 works: w\ >  w2 — c2.
For the game to  have a unique equilibrium with the lowest total reward cost paid 
by the principal, the following constraints are also necessary:
- Agent 2 strictly prefers not to work when agent 1 works: w\ > w2 — c2.
- Agent 1 strictly prefers to work when agent 2 works: w\ — c\ >  w \ .
- Agent 2 strictly prefers to work when agent 1 does not work: w^ — c2 > 0.
The objective function and the restrictions are linear. Thus, the solution is straight­
forward:
wi £ (ci, 1 -  w2} w2 e  [0, c2),
w\ =  ci w\ =  0,
w \ G [0, wi -  ci) w\ e  [c2, q2 -  w \)
The optimal contract is such tha t in equilibrium, the agent who individually works 
is exactly compensated for his cost of effort (rcj =  ci) while the agent who does not 
work is paid no reward {w\ =  0). The principal’s profit in the unique equilibrium of 
the game is then equal to q\ — c \ . Off-equilibrium rewards do not affect the principal’s 
profits and thus, they can take any value in the intervals shown.
2.3.2 O ptim al contract to  im plem ent joint production w ith  standard  
agents
We here find the optimal contract to implement joint production as the unique equi­
librium of the game played by the agents. The problem is the following:
-The principal maximizes its profit:
M a x  1 — w\ — w2
subject to:
- Assumptions (R l) and (R2).
- Both agents prefer to work when the other agent works: Wi — Ci > w? for i , j  =  1,2, 
* 7^  3-
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For the game to have a unique equilibrium with the lowest to tal reward cost paid 
by the principal, the following constraints are also necessary:
- Let wi — Ci > wj and wj — Cj > Wj then w\ — Ci < 0  and uP- — cj > 0.
Again, the objective function and the restrictions are linear so the solution is 
straightforward:
Wi  =  C i + £
W\  G [0, Ci) 
w{ =  0
for i , j  = 1,2, i ^ j .
Notice that for joint production to be the unique equilibrium, it is necessary to 
add a negligible positive quantity e —► 0 to one of the agents’ equilibrium rewards. 
As it happened with individual production, in an equilibrium with joint production 
agents are exactly compensated for their cost of effort.13 Rewards offered off the 
equilibrium of the game are such tha t agents do not deviate from the unique level of 
production the principal finds optimal to implement.14 The principal’s profits in the 
unique equilibrium of the game are equal to 1 — c\ — C2 -
2.3.3 Optimal production level w ith standard agents
Given tha t in equilibrium agents are paid a reward exactly equal to their cost of effort 
when they work, the principal decides the optimal production level by comparing its 
profits when joint production is implemented (1 — c\ — C2) with its profits when individ­
ual production by the agent with highest productivity net of his cost is implemented 
(Qi — Ci for qi — ci >  qj — Cj and i , j  =  1 ,2 , i  ^  j) .  The conditions for each level of 
production to be optimal are:
- Individual Production by agent 1 if and only if q\ — c\ > <72 — Q2 and q\ > 1 — C2 ,
- Individual Production by agent 2 if and only if q\ — c\ <  q2 — C2 and <72 >  1 — c i,
- Joint Production if and only if q\ < 1 — C2 and q2 < 1 — C\ .
Figure 1 draws these conditions.
13 We assume e to be small enough such that profits and conditions for joint production to be optimal 
are not affected.
14 Notice that the “most natural” contract, paying both agents a reward equal to their cost of effort 
when they work and offering no reward to an agent who does not work, does not implement a unique 
equilibrium in the subgame, as no production would also be an equilibrium.
W i  =  Ci■Ji
w) =  0, 
wj 6  (Cj,qj\,
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Individual production by 
a g e n t  2
Joint
Production
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agent 1
... .'.l/.-.'....:..1
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Figure 1: Optimal output level with standard agents.
2.4  O ptim al con tract w ith  in eq u ity  averse agents
In this section we derive the optimal contract when agents are inequity averse. We 
follow F&S’s (1999) model of inequity aversion by adapting their utility function to 
our context with two agents. Inequity averse agents’ utility function is U f ,s where:
U fs = Ui — a  max [Uj — 17,:, 0] — (3 max [Ut — Uj, 0] for i , j  = 1,2, i /  j ,
where, as before, Ui is each agent’s “direct utility” and is equal to rewards offered 
minus the cost of effort performed.15 
Assume the following:
(UI) Agents dislike inequity:
a  >  0 ,
0 > 0 .
(U2) Agents care m.ore for their own direct utility than for inequity:
a  < 1 and (3 <
1 ’W hile F&rS’s original formulation refers to  agents comparing “payoffs” , other authors using their 
preferences in our context assume that only wages enter into welfare comparisons but not the costs 
of effort (Grund and Sliwka (2002), Itoh (2004)). Our results hold with this alternative specification  
although contract design is different and more interesting issues appear when costs of effort enter 
the comparison. Ultimately, this is an empirical question that may be context dependent. A first 
experim ental study of this issue is Konigstein (2000) who confirms that welfare comparisons are 
context dependent.
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Assumption (UI) imposes inequity aversion. Agents derive disutility from direct 
utilities being unequal. In the following, a  refers to negative inequity aversion or envy 
(dislike to being worse off than your peers), while (3 refers to positive inequity aversion 
or guilt (dislike to being better off than your peers). We assume tha t parameters 
a  and j3 are the same among agents for simplicity.16 Assumption (U2) implies tha t 
agents care more for their own direct utility than for the comparison with the other 
agent’s direct utility. F&S allow for a  > 1. We assume a  <  1 to show tha t even 
if inequity aversion is not dominant, its effects on the optimal contract design can 
still be substantial. Notice tha t (3 < ^ is also necessary for own direct utility to be 
dominant. Otherwise, agents would be willing to transfer rewards to the other agent 
ex-post. Additionally, F&S impose (3 < a , which we do not for generality.
Below we show each agent’s utility in the game depending on the actions taken 
and the rewards offered by the principal to both agents. Notice than when agents are 
inequity averse, agent i ’s direct utility is an externality in agent f  s utility.
Work
Agent 1
Not Work
In the following subsections we study how the principal can exploit this externality 
to its advantage. We proceed as before, first solving for the optimal contract for each 
production level and then discussing the conditions for each production level to be 
optimal.
2.4.1 Optim al contract to  im plem ent individual production w ith  in­
equity averse agents
As in the previous section, we derive the contract which implements individual pro­
duction by agent i when both agents are inequity averse. Define ICCI™* for i = 1,2 
as the constraints tha t make individual production by one agent incentive compatible 
and IC C \ndU as the constraints required for individual production to be the unique 
equilibrium of the game played by the agents. The problem is the following:
16 We focus on asymmetries in productivity parameters instead than on social preferences because 
they should be more easily observable and measurable.
Agent 2
Work Not Work
iy,-c,-amax[u;a-c, - u^ +CpO ]-|3nm[uj1-c1-u'.l+ca,0], u;1,-Cf-atnax[tt;a1--uJ11+c ^Oppmaxtu^-c, -u y ,0],
wx^ -cu m x [w 1-ct -  wa+c2,0 ]-Pmax[tua-c,-u>1+c1I0] wa1-amax[wx1-ct- w a1,0 ]-Pmax[u;a1-c,-uj11,0]
wta~Omax[w^-ca-  u^OpPmaxfu^-u^c^O], 0 ,
w /-  ca -amax[u;1Mql:H-ca,0 ]-Pmax[tua3-ca-u;1a,0]
0
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-The principal maximizes its profit:
M ax qi — w\ — Wj
subject to:
- Assumptions (R l), (R2).
- (IC Q ™*): w\ — Ci — amax[«;- -  w\ +  Q, 0] -  (3max[w] -  Q -  wlj,0 \ >  0.
- (ICCljnd): wlj -  am ax[«j] -  a  -  Wj,0] -  (3max[wj -  w\ +  q , 0] >
Wj — Cj — a  max[w{ — Ci — Wj +  Cj,0] — (3 max[wj — Cj — Wi + Ci, 0].
For the game to have a unique equilibrium with the lowest total reward cost paid
by the principal, the following constraints are also necessary:
- The inequality in condition (IC C jnd) is strict.
- (IC C \ndu): Wi — C{ — a  max[wj — Cj — Wi + c*, 0] — (3 max[u>i — <% — Wj + Cj, 0] >
w\ — cumaxfur? — cj — 0] — /? max[ir- — Wj +  Cj, 0].
- (IC C jndU): uPj — Cj — am ax[u^ — wi +  Cj,0] — (3max[u^ — Cj — w {,0] > 0 .
We describe a property of the solution to this problem in the following Proposition.
P ro p o s itio n  2.1 To implement individual production when agents are inequity averse 
rewards paid in the equilibrium of the game played by the agents are the same as with 
standard agents (w\ = Ci and Wj = 0).
Intuitively, the agent who individually works in the equilibrium of the game 
must prefer to work than not to work, given tha t the other agent is not working. 
Due to budget constraints (R2), agents are not paid when they both do not work 
and thus, the utility of both agents when they both do not work is the same and 
equal to zero. Inequity generates disutility and because there is no inequity when 
both agents do not work, it is optimal not to create inequity when only one agent 
works (w\ — Ci — Wj). Given tha t rewards cannot be negative (Assumption (R l)), the 
minimum rewards needed to be paid such that agent i prefers to individually work 
than not to work are w\ = Ci and Wj = 0 and there is no inequity in equilibrium. For 
the game to have a unique equilibrium, rewards offered off-equilibrium, i.e., when both 
agents do work or when agent j  individually works need to satisfy the inequalities given 
by ICC*™1, IC C f 1^  and IC C j 1^ . These can be satisfied for different combinations 
of the off-equilibrium rewards tha t do not affect rewards paid in equilibrium. The 
proof of Proposition 2.1 rewrites these conditions in a more compact form. Notice 
however, as an example, tha t if off-equilibrium all agents were offered no reward, i.e.,
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w\ = W2 =  w? = =  0, the game would not have a unique equilibrium, as no
production would also be an equilibrium. For the equilibrium to be unique under the 
lowest reward cost for the principal, it is necessary tha t working is a dominant strategy 
for the agent who individually works in equilibrium (agent i) and thus, IC C lndU needs 
to hold. I t is also necessary that the agent who does not work in equilibrium (agent 
j)  prefers to individually work than not to work when the other agent does not work 
and thus, ICC'%?uSJ is also required.
2.4.2 O ptim al contract to  im plem ent joint production w ith  inequity  
averse agents
Define I C C fp  as agent I s  incentive compatibility constraint for joint production to 
be an equilibrium of the game (not necessarily unique) and IC C fPU as the constraints 
required for the equilibrium to be unique corresponding to agent i = 1,2. The problem 
is the following:
-The principal maximizes its profit:
M ax  1 — Wi — Wj
subject to:
- Assumptions (R l), (R2).
- (I C C fp ): W{ — Ci — a  max[tuj — cj — Wi +  q , 0] — {3m ax [^  — q  — Wj +  Cj, 0] >
wI — am ax[iuj — Cj — w\] — /?max[wj — w^ +  Cj],
for i , j  G {1,2} with i ^  j.
For the game to  have a unique equilibrium with the lowest total reward cost paid 
by the principal, the following constraints are also necessary:
- Let the inequality in (IC C fp ) for agent i be strict, while for agent j  be weak.
Then:
(IC C (PU): w\ — a  — a max[u;} -  w\ +  c*, 0] — (3max[w)J -  c* — Wj, 0] < 0 ,
{I C C jPU): wi — Cj — am ax[wi — urj +  Cj, 0] — (3 max[u7? — Cj — w{, 0] >  0.
We solve this problem in Proposition 2.4. But first, Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 state 
general results tha t describe the worst possible punishment for each agent when they 
do not work. By punishing agents when they do not work, agents’ IC C fp s are relaxed 
and rewards paid in equilibrium can be low. First we look at the reward offered to 
the agent who does not work tha t maximizes his punishment when the other agent 
individually works (w?).
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P ro p o s itio n  2.2 To generate the worst possible punishment to an agent who does not 
work when agents are inequity averse, it is optimal to offer zero rewards to the agent 
who does not work while the other agent individually works (wj = 0).
The intuition behind this result is th a t due to limited liability (R l), rewards offered 
cannot be negative, and due to (U2) agents care more for their direct utility than for the 
comparison with the other agent, thus the disutility of an agent shirking is maximized 
when he is offered no reward.
We now look at the reward offered to the agent who individually works off equi­
librium tha t maximizes the punishment of the shirking agent.
P ro p o sitio n . 2.3 To generate the worst possible punishment to an agent who does 
not work when agents are inequity averse, it is optimal to offer extreme rewards to the 
agent who individually works (agent i). I f  the potential effect of envy on the shirking 
agent (j) is relatively high (a(qi — a )  >  j3ci), agent i must be offered all the output he 
individually produces (w\ = qi). If, in contrast, the potential effect o f guilt is relatively 
high (a(qi — cf) < 0Ci), agent i must be offered no reward when he individually works 
(w\ =  Oj.
Agent j  derives disutility both from envy and guilt, but not from both at the 
same time. The punishment from envy is maximized when the other agent is offered 
all available output {w\ = qi), and thus the maximum disutility generated by envy 
is equal to  a(qi — q ). The punishment from guilt is maximized when the other 
agent is not offered any reward when he performs costly effort (w\ =  0). Thus the 
maximum disutility generated by guilt equals (3ci. Therefore, the relevant comparison 
is a(qi — Ci) =  /?q. Thus, using Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 the envious agent j  obtains 
minimum utility when he does not work and agent i works because not only he does 
not get any reward (by Proposition 2.2), but experiences the maximum feasible envy 
as agent i is paid the maximum available reward. On the other hand, the guilty agent j  
obtains minimum utility when he does not work because not only he is paid no reward 
but he also experiences the maximum feasible guilt because agent i is performing a 
costly effort and is paid the lowest feasible reward, which given (R l) is zero.
Notice tha t without budget constraints and limited liability, the potential to max­
imize the punishment from envy and guilt would be unlimited. The principal could 
threat an agent who does not work by offering the other agent an infinite reward when 
he individually works (to maximize envy) or offer an infinite monetary punishment 
(to maximize guilt). We assume (R l) and (R2) to restrict attention to limited and 
credible threats of inequity.
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In the conditions that determine whether envy or guilt maximize the punishment 
to the shirking agent, not only do the inequity aversion parameters (a: and (3) enter, 
but also the costs of effort relatively to productivity. Thus, it is easy to reinterpret 
these conditions in terms of costs of effort. Intuitively, if the cost of effort of the agent 
individually working off the equilibrium is low (a  — > 0 ), the potential to  punish the 
shirking agent due to guilt is low. Agent j  does not feel very guilty when leaving 
agent i to work individually because working is not very costly for agent i. But, in 
contrast, agent j  would feel very envious if agent i is offered a high reward when he 
individually works, as the net effect after subtracting the low cost of effort would be 
high. By rewarding individual work as high as possible (limited by the amount of total 
output produced) the principal maximizes the punishment from envy. In contrast, if 
working is relatively costly (cj — > qi), the principal maximizes punishment from guilt 
by offering no reward to the agent who individually works.
We finally look at the optimal contract to implement joint production. The follow­
ing Proposition 2.4 is the main result of this chapter and shows the optimal rewards 
for all output levels when joint production is implemented as the unique equilibrium 
of the game. Proposition 2.4 incorporates results from Propositions 2.2 and 2.3.
P ro p o s itio n  2.4 To implement jo in t production when agents are inequity averse, the 
optimal contract is as follows:
1. An agent who does not work is offered no reward (wj = Wj = 0).
2. Case a) I f  the maximum feasible punishment for both shirking agents is generated 
via envy, both agents are offered all available output when they individually work (w\ = 
qi and ur? =  qj).
Case b) I f  the maximum feasible punishment for one shirking agent (agent i)  is 
generated via envy and for the other agent (agent j ) is generated via guilt, then one 
agent is offered all available output when he individually works (wj = qj) while the 
other agent is offered no reward when he individually works (w\ =  0).
Case c) I f  the maximum feasible punishment for both shirking agents is generated 
via guilt, then one agent is offered all available output when he individually works 
(Wj = qj) while the other agent is offered no reward when he individually works (w\ = 
Q). Which agent is offered all available output is determined by the relative maximum  
effect of guilt and envy for each agent.
3. Indifference between working and not working when the other agent works 
uniquely determines the rewards agents are paid in equilibrium (wi and Wj).
The intuition for this result is as follows. First, following Proposition 2.2 an agent 
who does not work when the other agent individually works is offered no reward
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(wj = Wj = 0). This minimizes agents’ direct utility when they shirk, providing 
more incentives for them to work. Second, the utility of a shirking agent can be 
further minimized by creating inequity through the reward offered to the agent who 
individually works. Following Proposition 2.3 the shirking agent obtains minimum 
utility when the agent who individually works is offered extreme rewards, i.e., either 
all available output (w\ = qi) or no output at all (w\ =  0). This is determined by 
whether a(qi — q ) ^  (3ci.
In cases a) and b) in Proposition 2.4, it is optimal to maximize the punishment to 
the shirking agent and thus, extreme rewards are offered to the agent who individually 
works. In case c) it is not optimal to maximize the punishment to the shirking agent as 
the equilibrium of the game played by the agents would not be unique. No production 
would be also be an equilibrium in which the utility of both agents would pareto 
dominate the utility when they both work and thus, the principal would not be certain 
tha t such contract would implement joint production when it is optimal to do so. The 
expression for the rewards paid in equilibrium in each of the three cases is shown in 
the proof of Proposition 2.4, although we here explain it graphically. Below we see 
the three cases in more detail.
Case a) shows the optimal rewards paid when it is optimal to exploit both agents’ 
envy when they shirk (w\ = qi and wj = qj). Equilibrium wages are obtained by 
equating the utility of each agent when both agents work to  the utility of each agent 
when they shirk given tha t the other agent individually works. 17 Indifference curves 
are drawn in Figure 2 below as combinations of Wi and Wj such that agents’ utility 
when they both work is the same as when they shirk and the other agent works. The 
principal seeks to  maximize profits and thus, chooses equilibrium wages such tha t both 
agents’ prefer to work than not to work (which occurs in the shaded area in Figure 2) 
and such tha t the sum of equilibrium wages is the minimum possible. Given the slopes 
of the indifference curves defined by (U l) and (U2), this occurs at the unique point at 
which both agents’ indifference curves intersect. Notice th a t whether this point is on 
either side of the 45° line depends on which agent suffers more from inequity aversion 
when the other agent individually works (in this case, whether qj — Cj =  qi — Ci). 
Figures 2 and 3 show both cases. This has an immediate interpretation: the agent 
who suffers more from envy when shirking is the agent who obtains less direct utility 
in equilibrium.
1 7  As it happened with standard agents, one of the agents receives a negligible extra reward of e for 
the equilibrium to be unique.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium rewards when envy dominates for both agents and
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Case b) shows the optimal rewards paid when it is optimal to exploit agent 1 s envy 
and agent j 's  guilt, and thus, it is optimal to offer all available output to agent j  when
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he individually works (ur = q3) and no reward to agent i when he individually works 
iw\ — 0). Again, equilibrium wages are obtained at the intersection of both agents’ 
indifference curves. Figure 4 shows the case were a(q3 — c7) > da, and thus, agent 
i suffers more from envy when he individually shirks than agent j  suffers from guilt 
when he individually shirks. Therefore, equilibrium wages are on the left hand side of 
the 45° line implying that in equilibrium agent i obtains less direct utility than agent 
j .  A symmetric graph can be drawn for the case a(q, — Cj )  < (3c,.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium rewards when envy dominates for agent i. guilt dominates for
agent j  and a(q3 — c7) > (3a,.
Finally, we look at case c). When a(q, — a) < (3a, and a{q3 — cj) < f3cj, the 
maximum punishment from guilt on the shirking agent dominates the maximum pun­
ishment from envy for both agents. Thus, the punishment to the shirking agent is 
maximized via guilt., by offering both agents a reward equal to zero when they indi­
vidually work {w\ = w°- =  0). However, notice that this would imply that both agents 
would prefer not to work when the other agent is also not working, turning no pro­
duction into an equilibrium of the game played by the agents. Therefore, one of the 
rewards offered to an individually working agent has to be changed for the equilibrium 
to be unique under the lowest total reward cost for the principal. Notice that it is 
optimal to continue offering extreme rewards, in this case, no reward is offered to one 
of the agents when he individually works while all the available production is offered
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to the other agent when he individually works.38 Thus, off equilibrium, one agent 
will feel the maximum possible effect of envy while the other will feel the maximum 
possible effect of guilt.
The choice of which agent is offered all the available output when he individually 
works depends on the difference between the maximum possible effect of exploiting 
each agent’s envy and guilt. In particular, it is crucial to compare a(qj — Cj) = ficj and
>o(g? — Cj) = (3cj. The principal, in order to maximize profits, chooses off-equilibrium 
rewards such that the sum of the rewards paid in equilibrium is the lowest possible. 
Figures 5 and 6 below show the “optimal” indifference curves (drawn at the level of 
utility for which each agents’ guilt is exploited off-equilibrium) and the “suboptimal" 
indifference curves (drawn at the level of utility for which each agents’ envy is exploited 
off-equilibrium). Profits are maximized at one of the two intersections between an 
‘“optimal’’ indifference curve and a “suboptimal” one. This is determined by which of 
the two points is intersected by the lowest possible iso-profit function (1 — w7 — W j ) .  In 
Figure 5. both points are on the same side of the 4-5° line, meaning that no m atter if 
agent Vs envy or guilt is exploited off equilibrium, agent j  obtains more direct utility 
in the unique equilibrium of the game than agent i. Figure 6. draws the case where 
depending on which agents’ envy or guilt is exploited, one agent would be better off 
than the other in the equilibrium of the game played by the agents.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium rewards when guilt dominates for both agents and agent j
obtains higher direct utility.
’^Notice that when maximum guilt cannot be generated due to the equilibrium not being unique, 
it is optima] to go to the other extrem e and generate the m aximum possible envy.
2. I n e q u i ty  A v e rs io n  a n d  T eam  In c e n tiv e s 31
«r <b
i
/
/
/
/  7
-c{ ~(a /fi)(q l - c j  j  
L /  /
'
t /
/
/
/
/ 9rq , /
a -c  1
/ -
b .  i - .  /  t  /  /
?  T* N 
/  /
/ /
X  /  \
.-'I - * w, - c, 
(p/a)q * ’
__  __  __  _  Agent i f  optimal indifference curve
Agent j « optimal indifference curve 
Aaent i t  xuboptimal indifference curve
_____________  A gent je  xuboptimal indifference curve
#  Equilibrium wages (agent is  envy exploited) 
O Equilibrium wages (eigent j s  entry exploited)
Figure 6: Equilibrium rewards when guilt dominates for both agents and it depends 
which agent obtains higher direct utility.
Finally, using the results of Proposition 2.4 we conclude the following:
C oro lla ry  2 . 1  The principal obtains higher profits when implementing joint produc­
tion with inequity averse agents than with standard ones.
Intuitively, the principal could always implement joint production by exactly com­
pensating both agents for their cost of effort when they work, and offering them no 
reward when they do not work. The reason is that in equilibrium, when both agents 
are exactly compensated by their costs of effort, there is no inequity and thus, trans­
formed utilities are the same as direct utilities. However, the principal can do better 
than exactly compensate the costs of effort, and thus, gain higher profits by paying 
a lower total sum of rewards. Following Propositions 2.2 to 2.4 , the principal can 
generate inequity off the equilibrium of the game such that inequity averse agents' 
utilities are lower than standard agents' direct utilities. Thus, by paying agents a 
reward smaller than their cost of effort but maintaining more equity in equilibrium 
than off-equilibrium. joint production is optimally implemented at a lower total cost 
for the principal than with standard preferences.
Notice that each agents' equilibrium rewards are not necessarily lower than in the 
standard case, but the sum of the two rewards paid is. This does not mean that 
equity is maximized when joint production is implemented nor that rewards paid in 
equilibrium are the same for both agents. Rewards paid just need to be sufficiently
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close for both IC C fp s to hold a t the lowest total reward cost in equilibrium for the 
principal.
2.4.3 Optimal production level w ith  inequity averse agents
Once we have shown how the optimal contract is designed to implement each produc­
tion level, we look at the conditions for each output level to be optimal. Notice tha t 
from previous results it is obvious tha t whenever the conditions for joint production 
to be optimal with standard agents are satisfied ($  <  1 — Cj for i, j  = 1 , 2 , i ^  j  ) it 
is still optimal to implement joint production when agents are inequity averse. The 
reason is tha t while the total sum of rewards needed to be spent in equilibrium to im­
plement individual production is the same with standard and inequity averse agents, 
from Corollary 2.1 the total sum needed to implement joint production is lower with 
inequity averse agents. Thus, it is possible that under same values for the produc­
tivity parameters, it may be optimal to implement individual production by standard 
agents while it may be optimal to implement joint production with inequity averse 
agents. Obviously, changes of equilibrium implemented from individual production by 
one agent to individual production by the other agent are not possible.
The proof of Corollary 2.1 shows the three possible rewards paid in equilibrium 
depending on conditions in Proposition 2.4. We here show the conditions for the 
principal to find optimal to implement joint production under the three possible sets 
of equilibrium rewards paid when agents are inequity averse:
rr ... _  „ a 2 f e  - a ) ~  ~  ! ) f e  -  Cj)   j   _  _ , aP(qj  -  Cj) -  a ( l  +  a)( q { -  a)
~LtWi~ Q a + ( l - / ? )  and Wj ~ Cj+ <* + ( 1 - / 3 )  ’
, . . • , , . a ( l  +  2a)(qi  -  a)  +  a ( l  -  2/3)(qj -  Cj)t hen joint  production is opt imal  when qi >  1—Cj  --------- ----------— —----------------   —
If m- -  .  a/?Ci +  « ( l - / 3 ) f e - c , )  _  o l f e - c ^ - K l  +  oOci
< * + ( 1 - / 3 )  w ,-c3+ a  +  (1 _ (9)
. . .  . . .  - 1 1  i ( 1 +  2a)/3ci +  a ( l  — 2/3)(qj — Cj)
t hen jo in t production is optim al when qi >  1—Cj-|-------   — ----------
If w -  c. I +  Q) f e - 9 ' )  and w. _  a 2f e - C j )  +  /?(l-/3)a
* - ^ +  <* +  ( 1 - / 3 )  a  +  (1 — /3)
a ( l  +  2a)(qi  -  Cj) +  /3( 1 -  2(3)cj
then joint production is optimal when qi > 1—c
a  + ( 1 - /? )
- Otherwise, the principal implements individual production by the agent for which 
qi — Ci is highest.
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The Appendix contains a numerical example showing how the optimal contract 
changes when, under same productivity parameters, it is optimal to implement in­
dividual production with standard agents and joint production with inequity averse 
agents. The Appendix also contains a second example which shows th a t even if the 
optimal production level does not change, the loss in profits the principal incurs when 
he does not take into account inequity aversion is far from negligible. This example 
is symmetric as we assume qi = q2 = 0.5 and c\ =  C2 =  0.4. Under those parame­
ter values it is optimal to implement joint production when agents are standard and 
thus, it is still optimal to implement joint production when agents are inequity averse. 
The loss for the principal is defined as the difference in its profits (production minus 
rewards paid) between offering a contract tha t accounts for inequity aversion and a 
standard contract to inequity averse agents as a proportion of the total joint produc­
tion (normalized to 1 ). This loss is an increasing function in the envy ( a) and guilt 
(/3) parameters. In the example, the principal’s loss can be up to 40% of the total 
output produced.
2.5 Status and Efficiency seeking Preferences
It can be argued tha t in some contexts, other types of distributional preferences might 
be more relevant than inequity aversion. In particular, in very competitive firms, 
agents might not dislike inequity but instead they might enjoy it, at least as long as it 
is the other agent who is worse off than them. Such agents will not feel guilt but spite 
when being better off than their peers, while they will still feel envious when being 
worse off. We call these agents “Status Seeking” , interpreting having higher status 
as being higher in the ranking of agents’ welfare, i.e., as being better off than other 
agents.
In other contexts in which each agent contributes a lot to  total production, agents 
might feel disutility when shirking because the total amount of output, and thus, the 
total amount of rewards available to be distributed among agents, gets smaller when 
they shirk. We call these agents “Efficiency Seeking” , interpreting efficiency as the 
sum of agents’ welfare net of the costs of effort.19
These distributional concerns have been captured by other forms of utility func­
tions .20 However, it is worth noticing that by simply changing the range of values 
parameters a  and f3 in the F&S utility function can take, it is possible to look at the 
array of possible purely distributional concerns in a unified model. We now use this
1 9  In fact, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) find in a comparative test of distributional preferences that 
in the laboratory most data are better explained by efficiency concerns than by other distributional 
preferences such as inequity aversion.
20See Charness and Rabin (2002) for a summary.
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re-parametrization of the F&S model to explore its consequences in optimal contract 
design. Notice that, the problems we solve are the same as in Section 2.4, although 
solutions change when we allow for different parameter values.
2.5.1 Reward D esign w ith Status Seeking Preferences
Assume now tha t a  6' [0,1), f3 < 0 and \/3\ < 1. This means that agents are still 
averse to disadvantageous inequity but like advantageous inequity. The following two 
propositions cover the key issues of contract design when agents are status seeking.
P ro p o sitio n  2.5 To implement individual production when agents are status seeking, 
rewards paid in the equilibrium, of the game are the same as with standard agents 
(w\ = Ci and w'j =  0j.
As it happened with inequity averse agents, the optimal contract to implement 
individual production implies paying the agent who individually works (i ) a reward 
exactly equal to his cost of effort (c,) and paying no reward to the shirking agent. 
The reason is that in the right hand side (RHS) of IC C \Tld there is no production and 
thus, both agents are paid zero and no agent is ahead. One could argue tha t since 
agent i likes being better off than his peer, it would be easier to provide incentives 
for agent i to work by making him better off than agent j  when agent i individually 
works. However, given that it is still optimal to pay no reward to agent j  when he 
does not work (due to (Rl) the principal cannot pay him less), the only way to make 
agent i better off than agent j  is by rewarding agent i above his cost of effort, which 
cannot be optimal. Thus, as it happened with inequity averse agents, status seeking 
preferences cannot be used to implement, individual production with lower rewards 
than with standard preferences.
We now look at the optimal contract to implement joint, production.
P ro p o s itio n  2.6 To implement joint production when agents are status seeking the 
sum of rewards paid in equilibrium is lower than with standard agents. The optimal 
contract is as follows:
Wi =  C i -
w i = Qi 
w! =  0
Wj  =  Cj + a f 3 ( q :j  - C j  ) - a (  1 + a ) ( q j  - c , )tj .7 / U\JTLa+(l—/3)
for i , j  = 1 ,2 , i ^ j .
Notice that to implement joint production, the only way to use inequity off the 
equilibrium of the game is by generating disutility via envy on the agent who shirks,
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and thus it is optimal to offer no reward to the agent who shirks and all individual 
output to the agent who individually works. Therefore, only envy is used in this case. 
The reason is tha t spite provides utility to the shirking agent, making his I C C f p  more 
difficult to hold. Rewards paid in the equilibrium of the game are defined by case a) 
in the proof of Proposition 2.4. The graphical representation is the same as in Figures 
2 and 3. Now things are even better for the principal. As agents like to be better off 
than each other, the reward paid in equilibrium to the agent who is best off is lower 
than with inequity aversion.21 Notice that as in case a) in Proposition 2.4, the agent 
who suffers more from envy off-equilibrium is the one who will optimally be worse off 
in the equilibrium, i.e., if qj — Cj > qi — ci then the optimal Wi and wj are such that 
Wj — cj > Wi — Ci. Finally, notice tha t with status seeking agents when joint production 
is implemented, both agents are paid in equilibrium a reward lower than their cost of 
effort.
Following results in section 2.4.3, the principal finds it optimal to  implement joint 
production when qi > 1 — Cj +  for i, j  = 1 ,2 , i ^  j. Other­
wise, the principal implements individual production by the agent for which qi — Cj is 
highest.
2.5.2 Reward D esign w ith Efficiency Seeking Preferences
Assume now tha t a  < 0, /? € [0,1/2), and \a\ <  \/3\. This implies tha t agents care for 
the weighted sum of direct utilities, putting more weight on each own’s direct utility 
than on the other agent’s direct utility. This leaves the possibility for the principal 
to exploit efficiency seeking preferences. The following two Propositions cover the key 
issues of contract design when agents are efficiency seeking.
P ro p o s itio n  2.7 To optimally implement individual production when agents are effi­
ciency seeking, the sum of rewards paid in the equilibrium of the game is the same as 
with standard agents (w\ +  w%j = Ci)
Intuitively, the agent who individually works in equilibrium (agent i) must prefer 
to work than not to work given that agent j  does not work. When both agents do not 
work rewards are zero and thus, agent i should obtain positive utility when working for 
his ICCl™1, to hold. However, the only way to use tha t agent i is efficiency concerned to 
implement an equilibrium in which he individually works and paying a lower reward 
than his cost of effort is by offering “more efficient rewards” , i.e., a total sum of 
rewards tha t adds up to more than agent z’s cost of effort. This is a contradiction. 
Thus, individual production cannot be implemented with a to tal sum of rewards paid
2 1  The expression is the same but, given the parameter values, it takes a lower value.
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in equilibrium lower than the cost of effort of the agent who individually works. Notice 
tha t with efficiency seeking agents equilibrium rewards are not necessarily equal to the 
cost of effort of the agent who individually works, although the sum of rewards paid 
must be equal to it.
We now look at the optimal contract to implement joint production.
P ro p o s itio n  2.8 To optimally implement joint production when agents are efficiency 
seeking the sum of rewards paid in equilibrium is lower than with standard agents. The 
optimal contract is as follows:
Wi =  Ci +  Q + f l _ e ) Ci > C i  W j  =  Cj -  <  ch
w\ =  0 Wj = 0,
u?i =  0  uPj =  Cj,
for a  > cj.
Notice that, contrary to  previous sections, now extreme rewards (all production or 
no production at all) axe not offered to all agents off the equilibrium of the game. In 
particular, agent j  is offered a reward equal to his cost of effort when he individually 
works (url =  Cjf). The reason is tha t offering the most inefficient rewards off equilib­
rium, i.e., no reward to all agents off equilibrium, the equilibrium of the game would 
not be unique. Notice tha t if w\ = Wj = w? =  Wj =  0, then no production is clearly 
an equilibrium of the game, as agents obtain the same rewards when they both do 
not work than when they individually work and there is more efficiency when they 
both do not work, as rewards are the same and equal to zero but no agent performs 
costly effort. To obtain uniqueness, it is necessary to  offer a reward tha t compensates 
one agent for his cost of effort when'he individually works, in order for him to prefer 
to work than not to work, given th a t the other agent is not working. The choice of 
which agent is offered a reward equal to his effort cost when individually working is 
determined by agents’ costs of effort. Notice that Proposition 2.8 says tha t the agent 
who has a smaller cost of effort (agent j )  is the one th a t must be offered a reward equal 
to his cost of effort when he works. The reason is that, by offering a reward equal to 
zero to the agent with highest cost {w\ =  0 ), the principal creates more inefficiency 
off-equilibrium and thus, he can implement joint production as the unique equilibrium 
of the game with the lowest possible total sum of rewards paid. Also notice tha t the 
agent with the highest cost is paid in equilibrium a reward higher than his cost of effort 
(wi =  Ci +  > Ci as j3 < 5 , |a  <  5 I), while the other agent is paid a reward
sufficiently lower than his cost of effort (wj = Cj — Q <  Cj), such tha t the total
sum of rewards paid in equilibrium is lower than the sum of both agents’ cost of effort
(W{ +  W j < Q  +  C j ) .
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Finally, it is optimal to implement joint production when agents are efficiency 
concerned whenever 1 — Cj +  Q > qi and 1 — Q +  Q > qj for Ci > Cj. If
these conditions are not satisfied, the principal implements individual production by 
the agent for which qj — Cj is highest.
2.6 Discussion
We have shown how distributional preferences change optimal contracts in a simple 
principal-agent setting where agents have already entered the firm. The sum of opti­
mal rewards paid to implement joint production are lower than with standard agents 
and the optimal level of production can change. Therefore, the principal can exploit 
distributional preferences to  obtain higher profits.
Notice tha t our results are collusive proof as the contract determines tha t the game 
played by the agents has a unique equilibrium. Equilibrium Uniqueness is im portant 
since exploiting distributional preferences to the principal’s advantage implies tha t 
both agents would be worse off when they both work than when they do not. Thus, 
if the equilibrium was not unique, agents could coordinate on not working to avoid 
being exploited by the principal. Notice also that since agents care more for their own 
rewards than for equity, our results are also collusive proof to ex-post transfers among 
agents.
Despite its simplicity, our model provides a new rationale for team and relative 
performance contracts in contexts with no informational asymmetries. In both these 
types of contracts, agents are threatened with welfare inequities when some employees 
work harder than others. In team contracts, when a member of the team shirks, the 
team ’s performance is less successful and thus, other members of the team who work 
hard do not see their efforts rewarded, for which the shrinking agent might feel guilty. 
Therefore, agents might decide not to shirk even if rewards offered to them are low in 
order to avoid feeling guilty for the members of the team who work hard. In relative 
performance contracts, when an agent does not work hard he will be ranked low, and 
thus, he will be worse off than higher ranked agents, for which he may actually feel 
envious. Thus in competitive contexts it may not be necessary to offer such high 
rewards when agents are envious of each other and compete not to be ranked lower 
than their peers. Thus, welfare comparisons among peers can be used by the employer 
to provide incentives to work hard. Our results can be interpreted as showing when it 
is optimal to use team or relative performance contracts, depending on how employees 
compare to their peers.
Our model highlights tha t behavioural Contract Theory can be useful to study 
issues of organization in the firm. Both the Human Resources Literature and the
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Personnel Economics Literature have studied these issues before.22 The contribution 
of our study is tha t it indicates how those comparisons among agents can be affected 
by the design of the contract. Our model suggests tha t optimal contracts depend on 
the strength of welfare comparisons. If tha t is the case, it may be possible to affect 
the strength of those comparisons in the workplace. We have here assumed everything 
was given and common knowledge. However, in real firms the employer might be able 
to influence which information is easily available to his employees, once it has been 
clarified which variables enter employees’ welfare comparisons in different contexts. In 
particular, decisions such as whether to make salaries publicly available to co-workers 
or not, or the allocation of office space (which might affect the observability of effort 
by co-workers) could be illuminated by issues here discussed. Although in many firms 
rewards are kept secret23 and employees work in separate and closed offices, we have 
here provided a factor that in some cases may push towards the opposite direction.
22See Lazear (1995).
23Even if Bewley (1999) reports that 87% of managers interviewed think that their employees know 
each others’ wages.
Chapter 3
Endogenous Leadership in 
Teams
3.1 Introduction
In a recent experimental study Gachter and Renner (2003) illustrate the mechan­
ics of “leading by example” . In a team of agents one team member acts as leader by 
choosing his effort prior to all others. Gachter and Renner observe tha t the leader’s 
effort influences the effort choice of all team members. The higher the leader’s effort, 
the higher the effort of the other team members. Strikingly, this holds even though 
there are no monetary incentives tha t would induce such complementarities. Never­
theless, team members moving at the second stage follow the example set by their 
leader—which, in fact, reduces their monetary payoff.2 Consequently, “bold” leader­
ship, i.e., exerting high efforts as a first mover, can be beneficial, both for the leader 
and the team as a whole.
In this chapter we suggest a way of modeling such leadership mechanics and show 
how leadership can arise endogenously. Our model is driven by the assumption that 
some agents might dislike effort differentials. For obvious reasons we shall call such 
agents, who have a tendency to be influenced by their peers, “conformists” . A ten­
dency of agents to match efforts of their peers has been documented in various recent 
empirical studies. For example, Falk and Ichino (2003) document peer effects in a 
controlled field experiment and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2004) observe strong 
peer effects among fruit pickers.
In team production tha t we study here conformism turns out to be a two-edged 
sword. While it tends to reduce efforts of highly productive agents it tends to increase
1 This chapter is joint work with Steffen Huck.
2  Remarkably, Gachter and Renner make this observation even for one-shot games.
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the efforts of less productive agents. Nevertheless, we can show tha t teams always ben­
efit (weakly) from exogenously imposed or endogenously arising leadership. Material 
output and payoffs are higher in the presence of a leader.
Furthermore we show that endogenous leadership arises if and only if there is at 
least one team member who is a conformist and we analyze whose leadership is most 
desirable. Interestingly, it turns out that, everything else being equal, team output is 
maximized if the least productive agent takes on the role of team leader. Moreover, if 
agents vary in their degree of conformism, team output is maximized if a comparative 
non-conformist is leader.
Previous theoretical attem pts to model leadership have invoked asymmetric infor­
mation. In Hermalin’s (1998) model leaders have private information about the team ’s 
productivity and, thus, can signal the team ’s productivity by their effort choice. While 
this is an extremely plausible model, it cannot explain Gachter and Renner’s data 
where information is symmetric and, indeed, complete.
This note is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce two simple static 
models with two agents where the timing of agents’ effort choices is exogenous. We 
show tha t sequential moves, i.e., having a leader always increases outputs as long as 
there is at least one conformist in the team. Furthermore, we demonstrate the main 
comparative statics results in this section. In Section 3.3 we allow for endogenous 
timing, following the modelling approach of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We show 
that, whenever at least one agent is a conformist, agents will indeed choose effort 
sequentially, increasing team output. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Exogenous tim ing
Consider two agents i =  1 , 2  who produce some joint output tha t they share equally. 
Each agent chooses some effort Xi > 0. For simplicity, let the output, y, be linear in 
efforts, i.e.,
y = 2{k\X\ +  k 2 x 2 ) (3.1)
where ki > 0 is agent z’s constant productivity .3 4 Also for simplicity, we assume tha t 
the physical cost of exerting effort is quadratic such tha t agent z’s material payoff is 
given by
*i =  |  (3.2)
Materially efficient production is therefore reached if agents choose x f FF =  2ki
3  One might argue that team production is more likely to occur when efforts are complementary.
However this complicates the algebra while our main qualitative results remain robust.
4 Notice that in Gachter and Renner (2004) k\ — fo-
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which, as we know from Holmstrom (1982) and will see in some detail below, they will 
not do with standard preferences. The efficient total output is y E F F  = 4 ( k 2 +  k 2 ).
In our model, an agent’s utility depends on his material payoff and may depend on 
the difference between the agent’s effort and the effort of his peer. More specifically, 
let
Ui =  7Ti -  ^{Xi  -  Xj)2 (3.3)
where (Xi — Xj)2 measures effort differences and bi >  0 measures agent z’s degree of 
conformism .6 Standard preferences are obtained as a special case of (3.3) for bi = 0.
3.2.1 N o leadership: Sim ultaneous moves
Now suppose that efforts are chosen simultaneously at some given point in time. Taking 
first-order conditions we can derive agent z’s best-reply function as
Xi(Xj) =  ^ 2 .  (3.4)
1 + bi
It is easy to see that efforts are strategically independent only for bi =  0, the standard 
case. However, with conformism efforts become strategic complements. Solving the 
two simultaneous equations we compute equilibrium efforts as
s i m  k i O-  +  b j )  4 - k j b i  . . . / „  -v
x i =  r r n r  ' for z =  1,2 and z ^  J. (3.5)
1 +  bi +  bj
Analyzing the comparative statics we find that
j t S I M  r f ^ S I M
sign —j —  =  -s ig n  —-1- -  =  sign ( k j  -  h )  (3.6)
cLuj, j
In words, the more productive agent’s effort is decreasing in his own conformism 
and increasing in the other agent’s conformism and vice versa for the less productive 
agent. The intuition for this result is simple. In order to reduce differences in efforts, 
agents adjust their effort choice towards the efforts of others. Thus, the more produc­
tive agent lowers his effort. And the more conformist he is the more he will lower it.
6In this environment, similar utility functions can be justified with other social preferences, for 
example, a variant of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequity aversion. In their model agents receive 
a utility penalty that depends linearly on the difference between agents’ material payoffs. Since
7rj — 7r_j =  |  (xj —xf )  and (xj  — Xi)2 = our “non-conformism penalty” can be obtained from
their inequality penalty by normalizing with respect to total effort and taking the square. However, in 
more complex environments conformism and this form of inequity aversion do not necessarily coincide. 
Notice also that conformism, as we model it here, does not depend on symmetry. Agents care about 
choosing similar actions despite poetentially different productivities. In a richer model, the degree of 
conformism could also depend on how similar or different agents are. In the context of a principal-agent 
problem such an approach is taken, for example, by Hehenkamp and Kaarboe (2004).
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On the other hand, the less productive agent increases his effort. Again the size of 
this adjustment is increasing in the degree of his conformism.
Total equilibrium output is easily calculated as
s i m  _  2 * 1 ( 1  +  62) +  k % ( l  +  fri) +  (61 +  b 2 ) k \ k 2  
I  +  61 +  62
Again we can take first derivatives in order to analyze the effect of conformism on 
output. It is easy to see (and, in fact, follows immediately already from (3.6)) tha t
dySIMsign =  sign ( k j  -  k i ) .  (3.8)
dbi
In words, total output is increasing in the less productive agent’s conformism and 
decreasing in the more productive agent’s conformism. Notice tha t any (moderate) in­
crease in output implies increased material efficiency. If agents are equally productive, 
conformism has no effect on production in the simultaneous-move equilibrium.
3.2.2 Exogenous leadership: Sequential m oves
Let us now assume th a t agents decide about their efforts sequentially, the second mover 
knowing the first mover’s choice.8 Notationwise, let agent 1 be the first mover and 
agent 2  the second mover. Solving by backwards induction it is obvious tha t agent 2 
has to choose his effort according to (3.4), i.e., x 2(aq) =  • Anticipating this,
the first agent maximizes
U, -fc.xi I k} 2+b2Xl 1 -r2 6lfri fc2+i>2Xl 2
! -  1 1 +  2 1 +  62 2 1 2 l  +  f>2 ( '
Solving the first-order condition we obtain
x S E Q  _  f c i ( l  +  h ) 2 +  k 2 ( b i  +  62 +  62)
1 (1  +  62 ) 2 +  6 i  ^ ;
and, accordingly, along the equilibrium path
SEQ _  k2 +  62^^ 
I  +  62
and
ySEQ = 2(k !x fBQ + k2x$EQ). (3.12)
8This does not necessarily require that agents work at totally separated times. Rather it might be
that the first agent starts a little earlier than the second and that there is some inertia when efforts 
are exerted over time. In fact, when efforts are exerted over time there will always be an element of 
sequentiality as long as agents can observe what others are doing. Assuming two periods and a simple 
leader-follower structure is just a convenient way of capturing this.
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We have seen above tha t under simultaneous moves with conformism, the more 
productive agent has an incentive to reduce his effort while the less productive agent 
has an incentive to increase his effort. Let us refer to this as the pure conformity effect 
It still applies here. But with sequential play there is a second effect to which we refer 
as the commitment effect Since efforts are strategic complements, the first mover 
knows tha t by increasing his effort he will also increase the effort of the second mover. 
This implies tha t his return on effort is greater than under simultaneous moves. This 
commitment effect is always positive. However, if the more productive agent moves 
first, his level of conformism must not be too great because otherwise the negative 
conformity effect can outweigh the positive commitment effect.
The relative sizes of the pure conformity and commitment effects are crucial for a 
comparison of output under simultaneous play and output under sequential play. The 
intuition we gained from above tells us tha t sequential play will be particularly good 
if the two effects are aligned, i.e., when the less productive agent moves first (because 
he will increase his effort due to both the conformity and the commitment effect). 
However, the actual comparison of outputs,
SEQ SI M  U (^1 +  fclfo +  &2&2) (fr l& l +  &2&2 +  fo )  / 0 1 0 ^
V ~ y  = h  ( l  +  2b2 +  4  +  b1) ( l  +  bl  +  b2) ( 3 ' 1 3 )
shows, since all parameters are positive, tha t the commitment effect always exceeds 
the conformity effect as long as the second mover shows a minimal tendency toward 
conformism . 10
Examining (3.13) also reveals that, everything else being equal, it is always better 
for the team if the less productive agent moves first. For agents with equal (or similar 
productivity) it is, furthermore, better when the one who is more independent (that 
is, less conformist) moves first. 11
R e su lt 1  Output with leadership always (weakly) exceeds output under simultaneous 
play. I f  the second mover is prone to conformism this holds strictly. Moreover, 
fo r  agents equally prone to conformism, the less productive agent is preferable 
as leader. Finally, for equally productive agents, the agent who is less prone to 
conformism is the leader who maximizes output.
10For equal productivities, ki =  =  k  (the case of Gachter and Renner, (2003)) this becomes
bi+^ 2 bt+b5+i ~ Hence> while there is no effect of conformism with equal productivities and simultane­
ous moves, our model does predict positive effects of leadership in a sequential-move game even if 
productivities are identical.
1 1  The first claim can be easily established by substituting in (3.13) by fci +  6 and then taking 
the first derivative w.r.t. 6. For the second claim one can simply normalize productivities to 1 and 
then evaluate (3.13) as 6 2  bl+2 %+ia+1-
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3.3 Endogenous tim ing
In the absence of a firm owner and principal who implements a leadership structure, 
it seems unclear how the agents themselves should decide about the order of moves 
and the issue arises whether agents are able to achieve the benefits of sequential play. 
Of course, they might be able to engage in some bargaining prior to choosing their 
efforts. But if they are able to reach binding agreements, the free rider problem should 
disappear in any case. Thus, we here outline what will happen in the probably more 
realistic and more interesting case when they cannot reach binding agreements.
A natural way to find an answer to this question is to model the agents’ problem 
as a game with endogenous timing. Here we adapt Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) 
framework which studies the emergence of Stackelberg leadership in (market) games. 
Let there be two periods, t = 1,2. In the first period, agents either exert some effort 
or decide to wait. This happens simultaneously. In the second period agents who 
have decided to wait, learn what happened in t = 1 and then choose their effort. 
Applying backward induction, we find, similar to Hamilton and Slutsky, that there 
are three subgame perfect equilibria, one symmetric and two asymmetric ones. In the 
symmetric SPE, both agents choose x f IM in t =  1. In the two asymmetric SPE, one 
of the agents chooses x f E® in t = 1 while the other waits and chooses x ^E(^  in t = 2 . 13
14
As Hamilton and Slutsky, we can deselect the first symmetric equilibrium because 
it is in weakly dominated strategies. Simply notice that if the other player chooses 
an effort in t =  1 , an agent is always weakly better off by waiting since he can then 
play the best reply against this effort in t =  2. Moreover, if the other waits, waiting 
too is equally good as playing x f IM in t = 1 as in both cases, both agents eventually 
choose x f IM. Hence, waiting can never be worse than playing x f IM in t = 1 and is 
sometimes better. Thus, we should expect one of the two asymmetric equilibria where 
agents move indeed sequentially.
We refrain from selecting a unique solution . 15 Instead we observe that, with en­
dogenous timing, agents will always achieve (weakly) higher output than when forced 
to play simultaneously. (This follows immediately from the first part of Result 1 
above.)
R esu lt 2 I f  the timing of effort choices is endogenous and at least one agent is a 
conformist, agents will choose their efforts sequentially which strictly increases
1 3  Off the equilibrium path, agents simply play best replies.
1 4  To see that the latter are indeed equilibria notice that the agent who moves first picks his best 
point on the other agent’s response function. Thus, x f E<? is a best reply to the other’s waiting strategy.
1 5  For Hamilton and Slutsky’s game, Van Damme and Hurkens (1999) provide a unique solution 
applying Harsanyi-Selten style equilibrium selection arguments.
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material efficiency.
Notice tha t we assume tha t the leader-follower structure emerges because agents 
maximize utility and not their material payoff. However, as we see in Result 2 this will 
also increase their material payoffs. Thus, we see that, when timing is endogenous, 
teams with at least agent who is a conformist have a substantial advantage over teams 
where agents have standard preferences. In contrast to standard agents, agents with 
positive 6 ’s will benefit from the endogenously emerging leader-follower structure.
3.4 Incom plete information
So far, we have always assumed that both, agents’ productivities as well as agents’ 
degrees of conformism, axe commonly known. This is obviously a heroic assumption 
and the question arises whether or not the results are robust if there is some incomplete 
information. Since, arguably, productivities are much easier to observe in the setting 
tha t we have in mind, the more pressing question is what would happen if agents 
have to face some uncertainty about their partners’ degree of conformism. While a 
full-fledged analysis of this problem would go far beyond the scope of this chapter we 
did analyze the robustness of our results for the special case of equal productivities k 
(which is, in fact, the setup of Gachter and Renner, (2003)) and two possible values 
of 6 , zero and a strictly positive b. The common prior attaches probability p  to the 
latter type, and 1 — p  to the former (the standard type of economic theory).
W ith equal productivities we know tha t conformism has only bite if agents move 
sequentially and this, of course, remains true in the presence of incomplete information: 
both agents simply choose Xi =  k when they move simultaneously. W ith sequential 
moves the analysis becomes slightly more tedious but remains essentially straightfor­
ward. The analysis is greatly simplified through the observation tha t the type of the 
first mover is completely irrelevant for the second mover who only cares about the 
first mover’s action. Hence, signalling is not an issue and there is a unique sequential 
equilibrium, (algebraic results are contained in the Appendix.) Also, for p  —> 1 this 
equilibrium converges to the equilibrium of the game with complete information where 
bi =  62 =  b. W hat is more, output under sequential moves again exceeds output under 
simultaneous moves, for all parameters.
The analysis of the game with incomplete information and endogenous timing is 
a little more elaborate but it turns out tha t the results we obtained above do again 
carry over. (See also the appendix.) In particular, there are sequentially rational 
equilibria with endogenous leadership. However, now there are two possible types 
of such equilibria—equilibria where, say, agent 1 moves first regardless of his b and
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agent 2  waits regardless of his 6 (or vice versa) and equilibria where the decision when 
to move is a function of b. It turns out that both types of equilibria coexist. First 
of all, the equilibria of the complete information case where leadership depends on 
the identity of agents are robust. In the game with incomplete information there are 
always asymmetric equilibria where, say, agent 1 moves first and agent 2 waits. In 
addition, there is also a symmetric equilibrium where high types with b =  b move first 
and low types with 6 =  0  wait. Of course, in this equilibrium where the conformists 
become leaders and complete non-conformists followers, production is just as under 
simultaneous moves. Due to the insensitivity of the (endogenous) follower, there is 
neither a conformity nor a commitment effect. And the more desirable symmetric 
outcome where the non-conformist becomes the endogenous leader and the conformist 
the follower is, as it turns out, not an equilibrium. The reason for this is tha t a 
conformist has an incentive to deviate and move first since there is a chance that the 
other agent is a conformist, too, who can be stipulated to work harder i f  the deviating 
agent decides to lead by example.
The bottom line is that, in this simple model of incomplete information, endoge­
nous leadership is predicted to arise but will only be beneficial for the team if agents 
coordinate on one of the asymmetric equilibria where the first agent leads regardless 
of his type.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have illustrated a model that captures the mechanics of “leading 
by example” documented in recent experiments (Gachter and Renner, (2003)). The 
model takes as its central assumptions one of the key results of Gachter and Renner’s 
study, namely tha t agents exhibit a substantial degree of conformism, i.e., a tendency 
to reduce effort differentials even if this is costly for them. We show that with such 
conformism leadership is always beneficial for the team. Moreover, we show tha t 
leadership need not be imposed exogenously. When at least one agent is prone to 
conformism, leadership will, in fact, arise endogenously. Moreover, we show that, 
somewhat counterintuitive, teams should select the least productive agent as leader. 
This is because then the incentives induced through a pure conformity effect and a 
commitment effect are aligned. Finally, for equally productive agents, it is better for 
the team to have a “free spirit” , i.e. somebody who is less prone to conformism, as 
leader.
Chapter 4
Equilibrium  Play and B est 
R esponse to  (Stated) Beliefs in 
C onstant Sum Gam es
4.1 Introduction
A substantial portion of the experimental literature shows tha t game-theoretical 
predictions do not work well in the laboratory, even when the games played are very 
simple. 1 This is particularly true if subjects play games for the first time without 
previous experience. However, first time behaviour is crucial to model a vast number 
of economic situations which are not repeated, and it helps to  understand what peo­
ple bring into strategic settings. First time behaviour is also im portant to whatever 
learning occurs in repeated games. A natural question is to identify the class of games 
for which game theory predicts well when games are played for the first time and the 
reasons why it might fail in other games.
We aim to contribute to this question by looking at play and beliefs about oppo­
nents’ play in simple but non-trivial games with similarities to others in which current 
experimental evidence shows that game theory predictions do not work so well. In 
particular, we study two-player 3x3 constant sum normal form games with unique 
equilibria in pure strategies and with different number of rounds of iterated deletion 
of (strictly) dominated strategies necessary to  reach the Nash equilibrium. We obtain 
tha t in this class of games game theory predicts subjects’ behaviour better than in 
previous experiments and we discuss the relation of our results with previous literature
1For example, see Gtith, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), Camerer and Weigelt (1988), Och 
and Roth (1989), Cooper et al (1990), Brandts and Holt (1992). For an extensive survey, see Kagel 
and Roth (1995).
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in which the theory predictions are not so successful.
For simple games with unique pure strategy equilibria, experimental evidence is 
not conclusive. While in 2x2 repeated games equilibrium play has found substantial 
support (McCabe et al. (1994), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994)), in games with more 
than two strategies for each subject and no possibility of learning equilibrium pre­
dictions start to fail. Stahl and Wilson (1995) found equilibrium compliance rates 
of 68% in 3x3 games with three rounds of dominance solvability. However, Broseta, 
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2001) obtain in 2x3 games with three rounds of deletion 
of dominated strategies to reach equilibrium or with no dominated strategies equi­
librium compliance rates ranging from 11% to 28%. For 4x4, 5x5 and 6x6 repeated 
games, the evidence is even more negative (Brown and Rosenthal (1990), Rapapport 
and Boebel (1992), Mookherjee and Sopher (1997)). Thus, choosing 3x3 games with 
different numbers of rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies may be a good 
starting point to disentangle the reasons why game theory loses its predictive power 
in games with more strategies available to players.
Our experiment is closely related to a previous experiment by Costa-Gomes and 
Weizsacker (2004), who found low rates of compliance with equilibrium predictions, 
low frequency assigned to  the belief that opponents would play equilibrium actions and 
low consistency between actions and belief statements, in the sense tha t the percentage 
of actions that were best responses to stated beliefs was low. Our results clearly differ 
from theirs, which may be caused by our games being constant sum and also to some 
procedural changes we made with respect to their experiment: payoffs were represented 
by single-digit numbers, there was no conversion rate between experimental currency 
and monetary payoffs, and the procedure to  elicit beliefs was different. Below we 
explain why these changes may have made a difference.
First, as we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, one of the causes why game theory 
predictions may not work well in the laboratory may be tha t subjects have distribu­
tional and/or efficiency concerns. A possible reason for such concerns is th a t even if 
laboratory play may be completely anonymous, when games are played for the first 
time subjects may bring preconceptions on how to behave in strategic situations from 
previous real life experience tha t may cause divergences between equilibrium predic­
tions and observed behaviour in experiments.2 We choose to  study constant sum 
games because, on a theoretical level, behaviour in them  should not be affected by 
distributional and efficiency concerns. Efficiency concerns should not be an issue since 
subjects’ payoffs always add up to the same amount, no m atter which actions are 
chosen. Theoretically, distributional concerns should not affect behaviour as long as
2 See Binmore (1998).
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subjects care more for their own payoffs than for those of others.3 This is because 
subjects with distributional concerns would have to give up the same units of payoffs 
th a t would go to their opponent in order to increase their opponents’ payoffs. On the 
other hand, this theoretical result seems counter-intuitive.4 In constant sum games 
all strategic behaviour refers to how to distribute a pie of a given size and thus, how 
fair the distribution is should m atter to subjects with distributional concerns.5 Of 
these preconceptions, a natural one is that, everything else equal, subjects should get 
equal shares.6 Therefore, whether it is feasible to equally split payoffs or not, may 
have an influence on how subjects play constant sum games. We investigate whether 
distributional concerns influence subjects’ choices in constant sum games and whether 
results are affected by equal splits being feasible. We find tha t subjects’ behaviour is 
quite close to equilibrium and that it does not m atter whether equal splits are feasible 
or not.7
A second issue related to games being played for the first time is whether subjects 
have formed meaningful beliefs about how their opponents will behave.8 Although it is 
not necessary for subjects to hold beliefs about opponents’ play for observed behaviour 
to  coincide with equilibrium predictions,9 it may help us to disentangle the reasons why 
subjects play or do not play according to game theory predictions in the laboratory. 
Therefore, we study if subjects are able to correctly predict their opponents’ play and 
if their actions are consistent with their beliefs, in the sense tha t actions chosen are 
best replies to beliefs held. Experiments allow us to study this question by eliciting 
beliefs. We can distinguish between choice-based methods of eliciting beliefs (in which 
experiments axe designed such that actions taken by subjects reveal information about 
beliefs)10 and direct elicitation procedures (in which subjects are directly asked how
3Camerer et al. (1998).
4 And in particular there is ample evidence that this result is not satified by Dictator Game data.
5 There is at least one type of constant sum games where social preferences seem to affect how 
subjects play games: Dictator games. Becasue dictator games are sequential and more similar to the 
games in the following chapter, we discuss them further in Chapter 5.
6This has been observed in several experiments, for example in ultimatum games (Gttth et al, 
(1982)).
7 Previous research on contsant sum games has focused on whether subjects’ frequencies of play 
in repeated constant sum games coincide with the probabilities with which subjects should play the 
one-shot mixed equilibria. Most results have been negative (Rapapport and Boebel (1992), McCabe et 
al. (1994), Mookherjee and Sopher (1997) and Walker and Wooders (2001)) although O’Neill (1987) 
and Binmore et al. (2001) are more positive. The discussion has focused on how data for mixed 
strategy equilibria should look like.
8 Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) define “beliefs” as subjective probabilities about 
uncertain events.
9 And in particular, in constant sum games the Nash Equilibrium strategies coincide with Minimax 
and Maximin strategies, for which subjects only need to calculate their “safe” strategy, with no need 
to predict their opponents’ strategy.
10See for example, Stahl and Wilson (1994), Nagel (1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) or, more 
recently, Branas and Morales (2003).
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they think their opponents will play games).11 We combine both methods and we 
actually check for consistency between actions chosen and beliefs stated.12 Our results 
show tha t in fact subjects were reasonably accurate at predicting opponents’ actions 
and th a t most choices were best responses to stated beliefs.
When beliefs are elicited directly, it is crucial to elicit them in a meaningful manner 
tha t subjects can understand. First, some authors, starting with Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973), express doubts on whether subjects can quantify their beliefs. Second, 
even if subjects may be able to  quantify their beliefs, they might find some form of 
processing quantitative beliefs more meaningful than others. In this sense, following 
Gigerenzer (2000, 2002), we elicited beliefs by asking about frequencies of play by a 
pool of subjects instead of asking about probabilities of a single action chosen by a 
single opponent as it is frequently done.13 This difference may be important when 
subjects only choose once in each game.
Having Elicited beliefs allows us to compare our results with previous research 
in which beliefs are used to study the degrees of complexity with which individuals 
are able to play games. We explicitly designed our games to be able to  discriminate 
equilibrium behaviour from behaviour predicted by models varying in the degree of 
cognitive complexity that subjects are assumed to be able to process. Although depth 
of reasoning is a complex issue, these models approximate subjects’ sophistication to 
whether they axe able to best response to their beliefs about opponents’ play and 
whether they form those beliefs anticipating tha t opponents may also behave strate­
gically. Thus, they define the first degree of depth of reasoning as best responding to 
believing opponents choose their actions according to a uniform distribution and from 
them onwards higher degrees of depth are defined as best responding to the assump­
tion tha t the opponent has the immediately lower degree of depth than one-self. In 
our games, we find tha t the equilibrium prediction clearly outperforms these models 
of depths of reasoning, both for the aggregate of subjects over all games and for a wide 
majority of individuals.
An alternative way to study cognitive complexity is to associate it with the number 
of rounds of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies subjects are able to 
perform. Thus, we designed our games such tha t they differed in the number of 
rounds of iterated elimination of dominated strategies tha t were necessary to reach 
the equilibrium outcome. We compare subjects’ behaviour across games differing in 
the necessary number of rounds and we conclude tha t this was not a straightforward 
measure of how complex games were for subjects.
11 See McKelvey and Page (1990), Offerman et al. (1996) and Nyarko and Schotter (2002).
12 Costa-Gomes and Weizs&cker (2004) previously combined both methods of belief elicitation in 
normal form games.
13McKelvey and Page (1990), Offerman et al (1996), Costa-Gomes and WeizsScker (2004).
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the 
experimental design and procedures. Section 4.3 contains the results and the main 
descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 concludes. The Appendices contain the instructions 
and we also show the games.
4.2 Experim ental Design and Procedures
4.2.1 Experim ental Design
Subjects were presented with a series of ten 3x3 Constant Sum Normal Form Games 
with Unique Equilibrium in Pure Strategies. For each of the ten games, they were 
asked to perform two tasks: they had to choose an action (between “UP” , “MIDDLE” 
or “DOWN” ) and they had to report how many of the players on the other subjects’ 
role they thought would play each of the three actions available ( “LEFT” , “CENTRE” 
and “RIGHT” ).
We constructed a 2x2 design according to two criteria. The first criterion was 
the order in which subjects had to perform the two tasks. In treatments BABAF 
and BABAU (to which we will generically refer as BAB A treatments), subjects were 
asked for each game, first to state their Beliefs (B) and then to chose an Action (A), 
after which, they moved on to the next game. In treatments ABF and ABU (to 
which we will generically refer as AB treatments) subjects first chose an action in 
the ten games, without knowing what the second task would consist of, and then, 
after answers for all actions were collected, they were presented again with the ten 
same games and asked to state their beliefs about opponents’ play. Comparing the 
BABA and AB treatments allows us to study whether eliciting beliefs before playing 
the games influences behaviour.
The second criterion was whether an equal split of payoffs was feasible in each 
of the games. As the games were constant sum, the sum of payoffs both subjects 
could earn was always the same and equal to £12, no m atter the strategies chosen by 
both players. In treatments BABAF and ABF (to which we will generically refer as 
F treatments) an equal split of payoffs was feasible in one of the cells of all the games 
subjects played. Payoffs were designed such tha t both subjects would get £6 if they 
both took the strategy leading to this cell being chosen in each particular game. In 
treatm ents BABAU and ABU (to which we will generically refer as U treatments), 
payoffs in all games were substituted in this cell by a more unequal split, such tha t 
one subject would get a payoff of £7 and the other a payoff of £5. For example, in 
Game 4R below, payoffs when Row subjects chose MIDDLE and Columns subjects 
chose LEFT were £6 for both subjects in the F treatments, while they were £5 for
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Row subjects and £7 for Column subjects in the U treatments. The location of the 
cell and the changes in payoffs from the F to the U treatments were designed such 
tha t it did not affect neither the predictions of the six behavioural models we study 
nor the degrees of strict dominance solvability, such that in some games it was the 
Row player who got a better than equal split of payoffs in the U treatm ents while 
in other games it was the Column player and such tha t subjects would get a higher 
payoff in this cell in some games (lower in other games) than in the Nash equilibrium 
outcome. Notice also tha t although the cell in which the equal split was feasible 
sometimes was in one of the subjects’ equilibrium strategies it was never included in 
both subjects’ equilibrium strategies, and therefore such cell never coincided with the 
Nash equilibrium outcome. Comparing the F and U treatments allows us to study 
whether the feasibility of an exact equal split influenced behaviour, which may be an 
indication of subjects’ concerns for fairness in constant sum games.
Game 4R (U Treatment) Colum Game 4R(F Treatment) Column
Row
Left Centre Reft Left Centre Refit
Mp 8 10 11 Ufc> 8 10 11
4 2 1 4 2 1
7 1 8 Row 6 1 8
Mdde Mdde
5 11 4 6 11 4
5 4 2 5 4 2
Down Dowi
7 8 10 7 8 10
4.2.2 Experim ental Procedures
The experiment was carried out with pen and paper in the ELSE laboratory during 
April 2004. Subjects were recruited by e-mail using the ELSE database, which consists 
of UCL undergraduate and graduate students. As we are interested in behaviour played 
without previous experience, we only targeted subjects who had not participated in 
previous game experiments and whose field of study indicated tha t they would not be 
familiar with Game Theory and Economics. 14
Our experiment consisted of four sessions with twenty subjects per session. In each 
session, ten subjects were randomly assigned “Row” roles in all ten games, while the
1 4  Although we targeted unexperienced students, it turned out ex-post that 3 of our 80 subjects had 
taken introductory courses in Game Theory. However, neither their behavior in the experiment nor 
their explanations of their behavior in a post-experiment questionnaire were more “game theoretic” 
than their peers’ so we did not exclude them from the sample.
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other ten subjects were assigned “Column” roles. However, no subject was aware of 
their role (nor other subjects’ roles) as games were presented to all players from the 
point of view of row players. Neutral language was used by calling subjects “You” and 
their opponents “Participants in the other group” .
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned seats and were asked to read some 
preliminary instructions, which described a strategic decision situation and the 3x3 
payoff m atrix associated with its normal form representation . 15 Then subjects were 
required to pass an Understanding Test where they had to demonstrate tha t they 
knew how to map players’ actions in a game to outcomes, and outcomes to players’ 
payoffs. Subjects were told that those who failed the test would act as “assistants” 
in the experiment. However, no subject failed the test in any treatm ent and so the 
over-recruited subjects were asked to assist the experimenter. 16
The experiment consisted of ten games. In the BAB A treatments subjects first 
read the instructions on stating first order beliefs and choosing actions and how they 
would be rewarded for these two tasks. Then subjects stated beliefs and chose actions 
for all ten games with no feedback. Subjects stated beliefs by writing down how 
many of the 1 0  subjects in the opponents’ role they believed would chose each of their 
three possible actions in each game. In the AB treatments, subjects first read the 
instructions about how to choose their actions, and then played those games (Part 
I). After Part I, answer sheets were collected and subjects read the instructions on 
beliefs. Next, they stated their beliefs for all 10 games (Part II ) . 17 This procedure 
guaranteed that in the AB treatments, when subjects played the games, beliefs had 
not been mentioned. Finally, all answer sheets were collected. This procedure made 
sure tha t all subjects played all games before any feedback had been given. While 
payments were calculated subjects were asked to fill in an anonymous questionnaire, 
then subjects received their payments in private and left. 18 The Appendix reproduces 
the instructions for the BABA treatm ents .19
For each game subjects played they were randomly and anonymously paired with a 
different participant from the other group. Subjects never learned who their matched
1 5  The strategic situations were called “Tables” in the instructions.
1 6  All subjects were informed of this.
1 7  Games were presented in random and different order to each subject to control for (possible) 
non-feedback learning. We varied the games and the order in which they were presented to prevent 
subjects from developing preconceptions about games’ strategic structures and to help us discriminate 
between the different models of behavior we study.
1 8  The purpose of the questionnaire was two-fold: it gave us time to calculate payments (with the 
help of an Excel sheet pre-programmed with the matching of subjects) and it provided information 
about subjects’ fields of study, previous experience in experiments and comments on how they took 
their decisions.
1 9  The text in the instructions for the AB treatments was practically the same. The only difference 
was in the order in which instructions were received.
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participant in each game was, neither the action which was taken by their matched 
participant or any other participant in any game. Games were also presented in random 
and different order to all subjects. To ensure tha t subjects were motivated both to 
choose preferred actions and to state true beliefs, they were paid according to their 
answers in both tasks as follows. At the end of each session, a number from 1 to 10 
was selected from a bingo urn. This number indicated for which of the 10 games all 
subjects would be paid for both tasks .20 To reward actions, subjects were paid exactly 
the amount of pounds indicated by the number in the lower left corner of the cell 
chosen as a result of their action and the action chosen by their matched opponent in 
the particular game selected with the bingo urn .21
W ith respect to payments for stated beliefs, subjects were paid according to a 
Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) which rewarded accuracy between predicted frequencies 
of play of each action and the frequencies with which each of the three actions available 
were actually played by the 1 0  opponents in the game selected .22 The QSR was 
designed such tha t subjects could earn comparatively less money with their belief 
statements than with their action choices (Maximum of £2 and £11 respectively). Had 
payoffs for both tasks been similar, risk averse subjects would have found incentives to 
take actions that were not best responses to their stated beliefs in the aim to average 
payoffs.
Subjects were paid the sum of a £5 fixed fee, plus their earnings for choosing 
actions and stating beliefs. Average payments were £12.78 (around $20 at the time). 
Each session lasted one hour and subjects were allocated forty minutes to perform 
both tasks in the ten games.23
2 0  We paid subjects for one random game instead of for an aggregated measure of their answers in all 
10 games to be able to maintain the one to one relationship between outcomes and payoffs. Avoiding 
conversion rates may help clarifying incentives, which may be particularly important in experiments 
in which beliefs on other subjects’ behavior are elicited. As we discuss below, risk aversion did not 
seem to have been a problem.
21A British pound corresponded to 1.85 American dollars at the time of the experiment. Our design 
allowed us to provide reasonably high incentives while keeping one or two digit numbers to represent 
payoffs and avoiding conversion rates from experimental currency to monetary currency.
2 2  Notice that when subjects are asked to predict the frequencies of play of a finite population of 
subjects, QSRs are not necessarily incentive compatible as subjects’ average expectation of play of 
each action might not necessarily be equal to one of the possible empirical distributions over the finite 
set of opponents’ actions. In any case, expected payoff maximizers can do no better by stating different 
beliefs than their true beliefs and given our results we think the problem is minor. For a discussion 
on QSRs see Offerman, Sonnemans and Schram (1996), Offerman and Sonnemans (2001) and Selten 
(1998). The particular QSR we used, along with an intuitive explanation for subjects highlighting that 
understanding the maths of the rule was not essential, can be found in the Instructions (Appendix A).
2 3  In the AB treatments, 20 minutes were allocated for each of the two parts.
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4.2.3 The Games
We classify our games according to whether they are dominance solvable or not. Eight 
of our games are dominance solvable. Of these, we classify them according to the num­
ber of consecutive rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies needed 
to reach the unique Nash equilibrium. Games 1R and 1C are dominance solvable with 
one round of dominance to reach the equilibrium for one of the players (Row in 1R, 
Column in 1C) and two rounds of dominance for the other player. Games 2R and 
2C are solvable with two rounds for one player (Row in 2R, Column in 2C) and three 
rounds for the other. Games 3R and 3C are solvable with three rounds of dominance 
for one player (Row in 3R, Column in 3C) and two for the other, although the first 
deletion of strictly dominated strategies is simultaneous for both players. Games 4R 
and 4C are solvable with four rounds for one player (Row in 4R, Column in 4C) and 
three rounds for the other. Finally, Games NR and NC are not dominance solvable 
and have no strictly dominated actions .24 In the U treatm ents, Games 1 R, 2R, 2C 
and 3R had additional weakly dominated strategies, apart from the strictly dominated 
ones.
We chose one-digit numbers to represent payoffs.25 The sum of Row and Column 
players’ payments in all cells of all games was 12.26 The ten games were designed such 
tha t the equilibrium did not correspond to the same combination of actions by two 
players in more than two games.
We selected 3x3 games in which the prediction of how subjects would play would 
not be trivial. Accordingly, we designed the games such tha t we were able to discrim­
inate Nash Equilibrium choices27 from the choices predicted by five other models that 
have proven to be at least partially successful in previous studies on depths of reason­
ing .28 These models are named LI, L2, L3, D1 and Maximax. LI predicts tha t each 
subjects’ action is a best response against the belief tha t the opponent is playing each 
action with equal probability. L2 predicts a best response against the belief that the 
opponent is playing according to LI and L3 predicts a best response to the believing 
the opponent plays according to L2. D1 predicts a best response against a uniform
2 4  Out of the six possible types of 3x3 constant sum games with unique pure strategy equilibria, 
we covered all but one possible case according to their degree of strict dominance solvability. The 
remaining case has a dominated strategy for one of the subjects and it is not dominance solvable.
2  5  We did so because if subjects really chose their actions as a best response to their beliefs, cal­
culating such best response in terms of expected payoffs may have been more difficult if numbers 
representing payoffs were large, and we did not want to discourage such type of behaviour.
2 6  Numbers 10 and 11 were used in a few games to make it possible to discriminate models of 
behavior. Number 0 was not used to avoid behavior being possibly caused by aversion to getting no 
payoff.
27Simply referred as “Equilibrium”, from here onwards.
28Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Broseta, Costa-Gomes and Crawford 
(2001), Costa-Gomes and WeizsScker (2004), WeizsScker (2003) and Goeree and Holt (2004).
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belief over the opponents’ undominated actions. Maximax predicts the action that is 
part of the action profile leading to the player’s highest possible payoff in the game.29 
The Appendix contains the games, indicating the predictions of each of the six models, 
the round in which a dominated strategy is deleted and the payoffs that were changed 
to create the F and U treatments.
4 .3  E xp erim en ta l R esu lts
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 below presents the main descriptive statistics for each game when grouping all 
treatments and subject roles. We report, for each of the ten games, the percentage of 
equilibrium actions taken, the percentage of frequencies assigned to opponents’ choos­
ing equilibrium actions and the percentage of best responses to stated beliefs. A first 
look at results shows that roughly 80% of actions taken were according to equilibrium, 
that subjects believed the equilibrium action would be played with highest frequency 
(although with lower frequency than it was actually played), and that subjects actions 
were best responses to the distribution of stated beliefs in 73% of the cases. Frequen­
cies were similar across games and the number of rounds of iterated dominance does 
not seem to affect percentages in a clear cut manner. However, notice that in the 
two games which are not dominance solvable (NR and NC) the equilibrium and best 
response frequencies show percentages that were lower than in the other games. This 
is particularly true for the percentage of best responses.
G a m e
E q u i l i b r i u m
A c t i o n s
E q u i l i b r i u  m 
B e l i e f s
B e s t  
R e s p o n s e  t o  
S t a t e d  
B e l i e f s
N*  R o u n d s  
11 e r a t e d  
D o m i n a n c e  
( R o w ,  C o l u m n )
1 R 7 6 . 2 5 5 8 . 5 8 0 1 .2
1 C 7 5 5 9 . 3  7 5 7 5 2 .1
2 R 8 2 . 5 5 5 . 8  7 5 8 3 . 7 5 2 ,3
2 C 8 1 . 2 5 5 1 . 1 2  5 7 1 . 2 5 3 ,2
3 R 8 2 . 5 6 4 . 7 5 7 7 . 5 3 ,3
3 C 8 6 . 2 5 6 3 . 1 2 5 7 7 . 5 3 ,3
4 R 8 7 . 5 5 9 . 6  2 5 8 2 . 5 4 ,3
4 C 7 8 . 7 5 5 9 8 0 3 ,4
N R 7 2 . 5 5 2 . 8  7 5 4 7 . 5 N o
N C 7 3 . 7 5 5 1 . 5 5 5 N o
A v e r a g e 7 9 . 6  2 5 5 7 . 5  7 5 7 3
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (percentages).
J 'Stahl and W ilson (1994) use a more sophisticated version of these models. According to their 
definition, L2 is a best response to a belief distribution which assigns positive weights to a portion of 
the population choosing actions randomly (L0) and the remaining portion to subjects best responding 
to uniform beliefs (LI). The reason to define the zero-level of rationality as an equal probability to  
play each possible strategy, and thus define degrees of rationality from there on, remains open.
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The results of the informal questionnaire subjects answered after the experiment 
shows tha t a high percentage (95%) of the subjects who answered this questionnaire 
claimed to have taken their actions strategically, i.e., taking into account what their 
opponents would choose. Also, a high percentage of subjects (92%) claimed that they 
believed their matched participants would choose strategically, i.e., they would take 
into account the choice themselves made. Notice that in this questionnaire there were 
no monetary incentives for tru th  telling and that as subjects’ answers were relatively 
vague, it was difficult to classify the level of strategic sophistication subjects claimed 
they had used from their answers. Therefore, in the following we use subjects’ actual 
choices in the experiments and we compare the performance of different models tha t 
assume subjects’ different level of strategic sophistication are able to predict subjects’ 
choices and beliefs about how opponents would play.
4.3.2 Treatm ent Effects
In this section we study whether the different treatments in our design had an effect 
on subjects’ choices or beliefs stated. In particular we study two questions: 1) whether 
eliciting beliefs immediately before actions had any effect on actions played or beliefs 
stated and 2 ) whether allowing for equal payoff splits changed behaviour.
We start with the first question. There are several reasons why we may think tha t 
belief elicitation prior to choosing actions can affect play. F irst, eliciting beliefs may 
make beliefs a more salient aspect of game play than they would otherwise. Second, 
asking subjects what they believe their opponents will do may cause subjects to predict 
the behaviour of their opponents more accurately than they otherwise would and thus, 
they may best respond more frequently to their stated beliefs. Third, when subjects 
are rewarded both for their stated beliefs and their actions, risk averse subjects could 
state their beliefs in a way tha t insures them against ex-post strategic mistakes (and 
vice-versa), so that strategy choices and belief statements could become mutually 
endogenous. Finally, rewarding beliefs subsidizes using beliefs to choose actions versus 
other procedures tha t might have been used when the rewards are not offered. Most of 
previous studies have found no effect of eliciting beliefs prior to  actual play30 although 
a recent article by Rustrom and Wilcox (2004) reports some effects. We study this 
question by comparing the actions chosen and the beliefs stated in the BABA against 
the AB treatments.
First we look at actions chosen. We use Fisher’s Exact Probability Test (FEPT) 
for count data31 which tests if differences in observed proportions of actions chosen 
between two treatments might be expected by chance. The null hypothesis (two-tailed)
30See Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and Costa-Gomes and WeizsScker (2003).
3developed by Fisher (1935), Irwin (1935) and Yates (1934).
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is that there is no difference in the probability of playing each strategy generating the 
observed proportion of play of each strategy in each treatm ent .32 As with all statistical 
tests in this thesis, we used the free software R (2003) to perform FEPTs.
We conduct FEPTs separately for each game. We first compare subjects’ aggregate 
actions for each player role (Row or Column) in each of the ten games between the 
BAB A and the AB treatments (without aggregating the F and U treatments). Out of 
the 40 possible comparisons, we can never reject the null hypothesis tha t the underlying 
probability is the same at the 5% significance level.33 34 We then perform a stronger 
test by pooling the data for the F and U treatments35 and again compare aggregate 
actions across players’ roles between the BABA and the AB treatments. There is no 
p-value smaller than 5% so we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no effect of 
the order of tasks performed in the aggregate actions.
Our next step is to test if the order of tasks affected subjects’ belief statements. 
We collapse each agents’ belief statements into one of four categories: for each of the 
three actions all the stated beliefs tha t assigned more than half of the frequency to 
an action were classified in the same category (thus creating three categories), and 
the last category comprises all the beliefs that do not assign more than half of the 
frequency to any of the three actions opponents can take. Again, this allows us to 
create a contingency table and use FEPTs to  test for differences in belief statements 
between BABA and AB treatm ents .36
When comparing subjects’ aggregate belief statements for each player role in each 
of the ten games between treatm ents BABA and AB treatments (without aggregating 
the F and U treatments) we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in all 
comparisons. When we perform a stronger test by pooling the F and U treatm ents we 
can only reject it once (p-value equal to 0.003 for Row subjects in Game NC). Thus, 
we conclude the following:
Result 1 The order in which subjects performed both tasks did not affect 
behaviour.
3 2  Although less common than the Chi-square test, Fisher’s test requires less data in each category 
to be correctly calculated. Chi-square tests would require at least five subjects playing each action 
in each treatment which, given that most subjects chose the same actions, was not satisfied in our 
games. The main assumption required for both of these tests is independence between observations 
of the games in each treatment.
3 3  Although FEPT is specifically designed for small samples it is still not a very powerful test with 
only ten observations in each treatment. For example using this test, we cannot reject that distribution 
of answers (3,2,5) in one treatment is the same as the distribution (1,7,2) in another treatment at the 
5% significanc level. However, we can reject that it is different than (1,8,1). The power of the test 
increases with the number of observations.
3 4  Qualitative results of all FEPTs in this section are the same at the 10% signicance level.
3 5  This is allowed by results below.
3 6  This procedure was previously used by Costa-Gomes and Weizs&cker (2004).
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We now study whether the feasibility of equal payoff splits had an effect on be­
haviour. We proceed similarly as before by carrying out FEPTs for both actions and 
stated beliefs under the null hypothesis tha t there was no difference across treatments 
in the probability of playing (or stating) the observed proportions of play (or beliefs 
stated) of each action.
When comparing aggregate actions between the F  and the U treatments for each 
player role (without aggregating the BABA and the AB treatments), no p-value is 
smaller than 5% out of 40 comparisons. When we pool the BABA and AB treatments 
and we compare the F and U treatments across player roles, only one out of the 
20 possible p-values is smaller than 5% (p-value equal to 0.006 for Row subjects in 
Game 4C), which indicates tha t there is no significant effect. We also performed 
Mann-Whitney tests under the null hypothesis that the median of the distribution of 
games in which subjects chose the strategy containing the equal split was not different 
between the F and U treatm ents at the 5% significance level. Both when we aggregate 
the BABA and the AB treatm ents and when we do not, we could never reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, we conclude tha t actions chosen were not affected by whether equal 
splits were available or not .37
Moving on to beliefs, we created a contingency table using the four categories 
mentioned before to classify beliefs stated and we performed FEPTs comparing same 
games under the F and U treatm ents to test for effects of equal splits on subjects’ 
beliefs. We obtain no p-value smaller than 0.05 for the 40 comparisons when we do 
not aggregate treatments with respect to the order of tasks. When we do aggregate 
them, only one of the 20 possible p-values is smaller than 0.05 (p-value of 0.0189 for 
Column subjects in Game NC), which indicates tha t there is no effect of the feasibility 
of equal splits. We also performed Mann-Whitney tests comparing the distribution of 
average frequencies assigned to  the strategy which contained the equal payoff splits 
between the F and U treatments, again for each game and player role. We could never 
reject the null hypothesis tha t the median of the distribution of frequencies assigned 
to the strategy containing the equal split was not different at the 5% significance 
level, both when aggregating the BABA and AB treatments and when not. Thus, we 
conclude the following:
Result 2: Behaviour was not affected by the feasibility o f equal splits.
Small payoff differences between the equal and unequal split might explain Result 2. 
It would be worthwhile to study robustness to higher payoff differences. An alternative
3 7  Same results were obtained for the null hypothesis that the feasibility of equal splits did not affect 
the median of the distribution of the number of games in which subjects played the equilibrium action 
neither of the number of games in which they best responded to their stated beliefs.
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explanation is tha t the equal split was feasible (or not) in all the games subjects played. 
As subjects were only paid for one of the games, our experiment resembles the strategy 
method, in which a weakening of the “equal split effect” has previously been observed 
(Giith et al. (2001)). In any case, and admitting these caveats, our results show that 
there are circumstances in which subjects do not change their behaviour whether equal 
splits are feasible or not when deciding how to share pies of given sizes.
Given that we have obtained tha t the different treatm ents did not have an effect 
on subjects’ choices or beliefs stated, we use results 1 and 2  to pool the data across 
treatments. For the remainder of the analysis we will report statistics on pooled data, 
although we will refer to the different treatments when required.
4.3.3 A ctions
In this section we study subjects’ actions and their compliance with dominance, iter­
ated dominance and equilibrium predictions.
Subjects almost never played strictly dominated strategies. Each subject could 
have played a strictly dominated strategy in five of the ten games He/She played. 
However only 21 out of the 800 actions taken were strictly dominated (2.65% of the 
total actions chosen and 5.25% out of the possible dominated actions). Dominated 
actions were taken in only a few games and for specific player roles: 8  dominated 
actions were taken by Row subjects in Game 1R, 4 by Column subjects in Game 1C, 
6  by Column subjects in Game 3R and 3 by Column subjects in Game 4C. Only one 
subject (Column subject 1 in treatm ent BABAF) chose more than one dominated 
strategy across the ten games played (she chose dominated strategies in Game 1 C and 
in Game 3R).
Now we look at dominant strategies. Only Games 1R and 1C had a dominant 
strategy for one of the players (DOWN for Row subjects in 1R, RIGHT for Column 
subjects in 1 C). Out of the 80 subjects who had a dominant strategy in one of these 
games, 6 8  (85%) chose the dominant strategy. The 12 subjects who did not choose the 
dominant strategy all chose the same strategy across player roles (MIDDLE for Row in 
1R, LEFT for Column in 1C) which accounts for 57% of the total of dominated actions 
chosen over all games. Although the action chosen by these 1 2  subjects coincided in 
all cases with the one tha t had the equal split cell in the F treatments, this action was 
actually chosen more times in U treatments than in F treatm ents (seven times against 
five). Also notice tha t LEFT in Game 1C, was not only strictly dominated by the 
dominant strategy (RIGHT), but also by the other dominated strategy (CENTRE). 
Row subjects’ dominated choices may have been explained by a desire to have certainty 
over own payoffs, as when choosing the dominated action, Row subjects would obtain
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the same payoff no m atter what their opponents’ choices were. Column subjects’ 
dominated actions are more difficult to explain.
We now look at whether the number of rounds of iterated deletion of dominated 
strategies in each game affected the percentage of actions according to equilibrium 
taken. Table 2 shows the percentage of compliance with equilibrium predictions for 
each game by subject role.
G a m e R o w  S u b j e c t s C o l n u i
Su  b j e c t s
A II 
S a  b j e c t s
N * R o u n d s  
I t e r a t e d  
D o b  i n a n c e  
( R o w ,  C o l u m n )
1 R 80 7 2 . 5 7 6 . 2 5 1 , 2
I C 60 90 75 2,  1
2 R 95 70 8 2 . 5 2,  3
2C 75 8 7 . 5 8 1 . 25 3,  2
3 R 9 2 . 5 7 2 . 5 8 2 . 5 3,  3
3 C 8 7 . 5 8 7 . 5 8 6 . 2 5 3,  3
4 R 8 7 . 5 8 7 . 5 8 7 . 5 4,  3
4 C 6 7 . 5 90 7 8 . 7 5 3,  4
N R 9 2 . 5 5 2 . 5 7 2 . 5 N o
N C 7 2 . 5 75 7 3 . 7 5 N o
A v e r a g e 81 7 8 . 5 7 9 . 6 2 5
Table 2: Percentage of equilibrium actions by game and subject role.
On average, subjects played equilibrium actions in 79.625% of the cases. Notice 
that there is no clear pattern between the number of rounds of iterated deletion of 
dominated strategies required to reach the equilibrium and the percentage of equi­
librium actions played. For example, games 1R arid 1C show a lower percentage of 
equilibrium actions than games 3C or 4R. We also noticed that the lowest percentage 
of equilibrium play occurred in the non-dominance solvable games (NR and NC). We 
created contingency tables with the number of subjects who played equilibrium ac­
tions in each of the games (aggregating both subject roles) and performed McNemar’s 
tests'58 under the null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant difference 
in the proportion of compliance with equilibrium between each pair of games. We 
do not find statistically significant differences between games at the 5% level, when 
we group both subject roles.39 When we do not, some differences are significant, for 
example between Row subjects in game 2R and NC, but no clear pattern emerges.
38 In the following, we use M cNemar’s to exploit the statistical power derived from having the same 
subjects playing across different games. When this is not fulfilled, we use Chi-square tests.
39 This creates seven categories: subjects who reach the equilibrium strategy in 1 round of iterated  
deletion, 2 rounds, 2 rounds with simultaneous deletion in the first round, 3 rounds, 3 rounds with  
simultaneous deletion in the first round, 4 rounds and non dom inance solvable. Notice that not all 
these categories have the same number of subjects, but that the Chi-square test allows us to do this 
comparison.
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Thus the degree of iterated dominance needed to reach equilibrium is not a straight­
forward measure of the proportion of equilibrium play and thus, this may indicate 
tha t if subjects really reasoned in game theoretic terms, deleting more rounds to reach 
the unique equilibrium is not a good indicator of how complex these games were for 
subjects.
Overall we conclude:
Result 3: Subjects almost never played strictly dominated strategies and 
played equilibrium strategies in 80% of the cases. The number of rounds of 
necessary deletion of strictly dominated strategies to reach the Nash equilib­
rium was not a clear indicator of the percentage with which the equilibrium 
strategies were played.
We now compare how well the equilibrium model predicted actions taken in com­
parison to  other models. Table 3 shows the percentage of actions taken tha t were 
predicted by the standard equilibrium model, together with the percentage rates pre­
dicted by each the other five models described in section 4.2.3.
G a m e Equ i l ib  r ium L1 L2 L3 D 1 M axim ax
1 R 7 6 . 2 5 5 1 . 2 5 76 .2 5 7 6 . 2 5 7 6 . 2 5 5 1 . 2 5
1C 75 62 .5 75 75 75 47 .5
2R 82 .5 17.5 62 .5 82 .5 62 . 5 17.5
2C 8 1 . 2 5 5 6 . 2 5 8 1 . 2 5 8 1 . 2 5 5 6 . 2 5 16 . 25
3R 82 .5 3 8 . 7 5 82 .5 82 .5 8 2 . 5 3 8 . 7 5
3C 8 6 . 2 5 4 8 . 7 5 51 .2 5 8 6 . 2 5 8 6 . 2 5 13 .7 5
4R 87 . 5 50 87 .5 87 .5 87 .5 12.5
4C 7 8 . 7 5 6 1 . 2 5 7 8 . 7 5 7 8 . 7 5 6 1 . 2 5 17.5
NR 72. 5 6 6 . 2 5 22 . 5 6 2 . 5 6 6 . 2 5 2 1 . 2 5
NC 7 3 . 7 5 50 4 6 . 2 5 1 1 . 25 50 15
A v e r a g e 7 9 . 6 2 5 5 0 . 2 5 6 6 .3 7 6 6 . 7 5 7 0 . 3 7 5 2 5 . 1 2 5
Table 3: Percentage of equilibrium actions predicted by each model.
Equilibrium outperforms the predictions of the other models in all games.40 Al­
though the games were intentionally constructed to highlight differences between mod­
els’ predictions, it is noticeable th a t the two models tha t have been most successful 
in previous research on depths of reasoning perform clearly worse across all games 
than the standard equilibrium (LI predicts 50.25% of the actions, while L2 predicts
4 0  Equilibrium also outperforms each of the other models in all games when subject roles are not 
pooled.
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66.375%).41 Of the models analyzed, the one that comes second in predicting the 
aggregate of actions is D l, with a percentage of 70.375%. D1 predicts the same action 
as Equilibrium for five of the ten games. In the five games were the predictions of 
both models are different, Equilibrium outperforms D l in all games, with an overall 
success rate of 77.75% against 49.35%.
Notice however, that LI has strong predictive value for non Equilibrium actions. 
The action that coincided with the LI prediction was the one which was chosen with 
at least second highest frequency in all 10 games for both subject roles. Additionally, 
out of the 163 actions that were not taken according to Equilibrium, 98 (60.12%) 
were taken according to LI. As a reference, only 43 (26.38%) of the non Equilibrium 
actions taken coincided with L2, with lower percentages for the other models. Thus, 
most subjects wrhen they did not choose the Equilibrium action, they chose the action 
tha t gave them the highest expected payoff against a uniform distribution of play 
by their opponent (LI). This gives some support to LI as a decision model when 
subjects do not know what to choose and do not have any particular beliefs on how 
their opponents will choose.
We now look at individual behaviour. First, table 4 shows the cumulative dis­
tribution function (CDF) of the percentage of subjects who played at least a certain 
number of games according to each models’ predictions. We observe that while 20% of 
the subjects played according to the Equilibrium prediction in all ten games, at most 
only 1.25% of the subjects played in all ten games according to any of the other models 
here studied. Also notice that 70% of the subjects chose at least 8 actions according 
to the Equilibrium model.
N •
P r e d i c t i o n s
E q u i l i b r i u m L 1 L 2 L 3 D 1 M ax l m ax
1 0 2 0 1 .2 5 1 . 2 5 0 1 .2 5 0
9 4 3 . 7 5 3 .7 5 2 .5 3 .7 5 1 6 .2 5 0
8 7 0 1 0 2 7 .5 3 1 . 2 5 3 7 . 5 1 .2 5
7 8 1 .2 5 1 6 . 2 5 6 1 .2 5 5 5 7 0 3 .7 5
6 8 7 .5 3 6 . 2  5 7 8 . 7 5 7 6 . 2  5 8 5 6 . 2 5
5 9 6  .2 5 6 5 8 7 .5 9 1 . 2 5 9 5 8 .7 5
4 9 8 .7 5 8 7 .5 9 3 .7 5 9 8 . 7 5 9 8 .7 5 1 5
3 9 8 . 7 5 9 5 9 8 .7 5 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 8 . 7 5
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 . 7 5
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 5
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Table 4: CDF Of the percentage of subjects who play at least a number of times
according to models’ predictions.
11 N otice that L2 predicts the same outcom e as Equilibrium in six games, while LI does not predict 
the same outcom e as Equilibrium in any game. Thus, we should not infer that L2 captures behavior 
better than LI. L3 coincides with Equilibrium in all but Games NR and NC, where it performs 
significanty worse.
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Second, we classified subjects according to the model whose predicted action sub­
jects chose in the highest number of games. Table 5 shows the percentage of subjects 
who could be classified according to each model category. First, there were 56 out of 
the 80 subjects tha t could be clearly classified to a model according to this criterium. 
i.e., who responded the highest number of times according to only one model. Of 
these, 69.6% of subjects were classified as “Equilibrium” . There are 24 subjects who 
could not be classified in this manner, as there were ties between various models. This 
is the reason why the sum of percentages of columns “Ties” and “Overall” adds up to 
more than a hundred percent. In any case, 87.5% of the subjects who tied between 
two models, chose the highest number of actions according to “Equilibrium” and some 
other model, while only 50% did it according to “L I” and another model. In the 
column “Overall” , we add up both the clear cases and the ties to conclude that 75% 
of the 80 subjects can be classified as “Equilibrium” , while only 26.25% of subjects 
can be classified as D l. Other models show lower percentages. Finally, we show in 
parenthesis the average number of games in which subjects classified in each model 
category chose actions according to each model. Notice that this average measures the 
intensity with which subjects were classified with respect to each model and thus, it 
shows that subjects classified in each category were quite consistent with the model 
in which they were classified.42
Classification Clear Cases Ties Overall
Equilibrium 69.6 (9.05) 87.5 (7.86) 75 (8.63)
LI 5.36 (9.33) 8.33 (6.5) 6.25 (8.2)
L2 5.36 (8.66) 41.66 (7.2) 16.25 (7.53)
L3 1.78 (9) 25 (7.33) 8.75 (7.33)
D l 16.07 (8.66) 50 (8.08) 26.25 (8.34)
Maximax 1.78 (8) 8.33 (6.5) 3.75 (7)
Table 5: Classification in models to which subjects respond most times.
Thus, we conclude:
Result 4: Equilibrium, captures actions played by subjects better than the 
alternative models, both a,t the individual and. aggregate levels.
Although we cannot discard that there may be other models tha t capture behaviour 
better than those studied here or that, as we have seen, a small percentage of players’
1JHad subjects chosen actions randomly they would have answered on average in 3.3 games according 
to each model and, given the structure of the games, the average intensity of subjects classified in 
each category would have been 5.1.
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behaviour might be better captured by one of the other models presented here, it is 
clear tha t Equilibrium is a good predictor of actions taken for the particular class of 
games we study in this experiment.
Below we check if subjects also believed tha t their opponents would play according 
to Equilibrium.
4.3.4 Stated Beliefs
In this section we study subjects’ stated beliefs about opponents’ frequencies of play. 
We study whether subjects expected their opponents to play dominated strategies, 
whether they expected them to comply with the equilibrium prediction and we also 
check the accuracy of the frequency predictions with respect to the frequency of actions 
chosen.
Subjects believed their opponents would play dominated actions with higher fre­
quency than they actually did. Over all games, subjects assigned 6.575% of frequency 
to dominated actions (13.15% of the possible frequency tha t could be assigned in the 
five games with dominated actions for each role subject) while dominated actions were 
played in 2.625% of the cases (5.25%).
On average, subjects expected their opponents to play the Equilibrium action with 
the highest frequency in each game, although the frequency with which Equilibrium 
was played was higher than the frequency with which subjects believed it was going 
to be played. We will refer to these as “conservative beliefs” , following Huck and 
Weizsaeker (2001).
Overall, subjects assigned on average 57.6% of frequency to their opponents playing 
the equilibrium action. Frequencies assigned to equilibrium play were disperse. The 
lowest average frequency assigned to equilibrium play is 35.2% by Row subjects in 
Game 1 R to Column players’ action. The highest, 81.7% by Column subjects in the 
same game. Notice tha t Row subjects have a dominant strategy in this game, so 
these results indicated tha t most Column subjects did expect Row subjects to play 
the dominant strategy, while Row subjects where uncertain of how Column subjects 
would choose, as Column subjects did not have dominated strategies. Results in game 
1 C extend this intuition, although percentages are less clear cut.
Table 6  shows the average frequency assigned to Equilibrium actions by game and 
subject role. We do not observe any straightforward pattern between the number of 
rounds of iterated elimination of dominated strategies required to solve for the Equi­
librium and the frequency of beliefs of Equilibrium play stated. However, it is still the 
case tha t when aggregating subject roles, in games NR and NC the frequency assigned
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to equilibrium actions is lower than in most of the other games (although not lower 
than in 2C). Performing Wilcoxon tests under the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences in the median of the distribution of frequencies of beliefs assigned to equi­
librium actions between pairs of games, we obtain statistically significant differences 
at the 5% level between on the one hand games 1C, 1R, 3R, 3C, 4R and 4C and on the 
other games 2C, NC and NC.44 When we performed Wilcoxon tests for each player 
role, we obtained several statistically significant differences, although there was not a 
clear pattern between the number of rounds of iterated dominance and the frequency 
assigned to equilibrium actions by opponents.
G a m e R o w  S u b j e c t s C o lu m n 
S u b j e c t s
A II 
S u b j e c t s
N° R o u n d s  I t e r a t e d  
D o m  i n a n c e  
( R o w ,  C o l u m n )
1 R 3 5 . 2 5 8 1 . 7 5 5 8 . 5 1 . 2
1 C 6 8 . 7 5 50 5 9 . 3  7 5 2 ,  1
2 R 4 5 . 2 5 6 6 . 5 5 5 . 8  7 5 2 , 3
2 C 5 7 . 2 5 4 5 5 1 . 1 2  5 3 ,  2
3 R 6 3 . 2 5 6 6 . 2 5 6 4 . 7  5 3 . 3
3 C 5 3 7 3 . 2 5 6 3 . 1 2 5 3.  3
4 R 5 3 6 6 . 2 5 5 9 . 6 2 5 4 , 3
4 C 6 7 . 7 5 5 0 . 2  5 5 9 3 . 4
N R 4 5 . 5 6 0  .2 5 5 2  8 7 5 N o
N C 4 9 . 5 5 3 . 5 5 1 . 5 N o
A v e r a g e 5 3 . 8 6 1 . 3 5 7 . 5  7 5
Table 6: Average frequency assigned to equilibrium actions.
We now look at how the Equilibrium model for beliefs performs in the aggregate 
with respect to the other five models we are considering. Table 7 shows the frequency 
assigned to the predictions of the six models for each of the games. We observe a 
clear pattern: although in all the games the highest frequency was assigned accord­
ing to the Equilibrium model (but in the already mentioned Game 1R where the LI 
model performs slightly better), the percentage of predictions captured by each model 
are much closer when we look at belief statements than when we look at actions. In 
particular, contrary to what happens with actions, the average percentage of frequen­
cies matched with Equilibrium model predictions (57.6%) and the average percentage 
matched with the D l model predictions (55.4%) are very close. Notice also that the 
order in which each of the models is successful is practically the same with beliefs 
stated as it happened with actions (although with beliefs L3 outperforms L2).
'^The distribution of the median of game 2R was also statistically  different than the distribution of 
the median of games 3R and 3C.
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Game Equilibrium L I L2 L3 D l Maximax
1R 58.50 61.25 58.50 58.50 58.50 61.25
1C 59.38 51.38. 59.38 59.38 59.38 42.38
2R 55.88 33.00 56.13 55.88 56.13 33.00
2C 51.13 49.75 51.13 51.13 49.75 36.63
3R 64.75 44.38 64.75 64.75 64.75 44.38
3C 63.13 49.75 36.75 63.13 63.13 23.38
4R 59.63 49.63 59.63 59.63 59.63 30.63
4C 59.00 54.25 59.00 59.00 54.25 31.25
NR 52.88 49.00 29.63 19.13 49.00 28.00
NC 51.50 39.88 40.75 22.13 39.88 26.38
Average 57. 58 48. 23 51.56 51.26 55. 44 35. 73
Table 7: Frequencies stated matched by models’ predictions.
We thus conclude:
Result 5: While Equilibrium still captures belief statements better than the 
other models studied here, differences with other models are smaller than 
with actions.
The lower predictive value of the Equilibrium model and the small differences 
between the predictive value of competing models in belief statements seems to be 
caused by a tendency to conservatism in belief statements already observed in previous 
experiments (Huck and Weizsacker (2001), Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2004)). This 
tendency is also reflected in the low percentage of belief statements tha t assigned 
frequency one to all ten opponents playing one particular strategy (11.125%). However, 
tendency to conservatism does not mean that subjects assigned equal frequency to their 
opponents playing each of their three available actions. The percentage of uniform 
belief statements is only 5.875%, much lower, in fact, than the percentage of belief 
statements that assigned zero frequency to at least one of the opponents’ actions (42%). 
Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2004) argue that the higher percentage of zero-belief 
statements than uniform beliefs is a reason to discard the hypothesis that the tendency 
to conservative beliefs might be caused by risk aversion. They argue that since QSRs 
punish large mispredictions, risk averse subjects would avoid losses by making roughly 
uniform belief statements, which subjects did not make in most of the cases. However, 
notice tha t even a highly risk averse subject would state zero beliefs to two of his 
opponents’ actions if he was sufficiently certain about the actions tha t all opponents 
would take in a particular game. The reason for conservatism seems to be different. 
Given the high percentage of Equilibrium actions played, and the lower expectations 
1 ‘Defined as statem ents that assigned frequency of 3 to two actions and 4 to the other one.
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of opponents playing Equilibrium, it seems that subjects genuinely believed that their 
opponents would play Equilibrium less frequently than they did.
We now study the accuracy of belief statements by comparing stated frequencies 
with the frequencies with which each action was actually played in each game. As 
belief statements were conservative we should not expect them to be very precise. 
Before looking at precision we assess accuracy of belief statements in the aggregate 
by looking at whether subjects predicted the “structure of frequencies” correctly. We 
define correct structure of beliefs as subjects assigning highest frequency to the actions 
which were played with highest frequency and assigning lowest average frequency to 
the actions which were played with lowest frequency. Table 8 compares, for each 
game and subject role, the average frequency with which each of the three actions was 
played by subjects, with the average percentage of stated frequency assigned by the 
opponents to those same actions. It is noticeable tha t for all but three comparisons, 
aggregate average beliefs get the “structure of frequencies” played correctly.45
Ga me Row Actions Column Beliefs
UP action M IDDLE  
action
DOW N
action
UP Belief M ID D LE
Belief
D O W N
Belief
G a m e 1 R 0 20 80 3 15.25 81.75
Gam e 1C 5 35 60 16 34 50
Gam e 2R 95 5 0 66.5 20.25 13.25
G am e 2C 25 0 75 42.25 12.75 45
G am e 3R 92.5 2.5 5 66.25 8.25 25.5
Gam e 3C 0 85 15 6.25 73.25 20.5
G am e 4R 0 12.5 87.5 5.5 28.25 66.25
C am e 4C 67.5 32.5 0 50.25 40.75 9
G am e NR 2.5 92.5 5 18.25 60.25 21.5
G am e NC 2.5 72.5 25 16.25 53.5 30.25
Column Actions Row Beliefs
G a m e 1 R 22.5 5 72.5 40.75 24 35.25*
Gam e 1C 2.5 7.5 90 11.5 19.75 68.75
Gam e 2R 30 0 70 45.75 9 45.25*
Gam e 2C 5 87.5 7.5 11.75 57.25 31
Gam e 3R 15 72.5 12.5 27.25 63.25 9.5
Gam e 3C 0 12.5 87.5 20.25 26.25 53
Gam e 4R 87.5 0 12.5 53 14 33
Gam e 4C 90 2.5 7.5 67.75 21.75 10.5**
G am e NR 7.5 52.5 40 16.75 45.5 37.75
G am e NC 5 20 75 22.5 28 49.5
Table 8: Comparison of the percentage with which actions were played with
percentages of belief frequencies assigned.
1 ’The difference between frequencies assigned in those three games was, however, very small. These 
games are indicated in Table 7 with a star (*). The double star (**) in game 4C indicates that the 
order of beliefs with which the second and the third actions were played was inverted.
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However, when looking at each subject individually, we observe that the patterns 
of aggregate behaviour do not translate well into individual behaviour across games. 
Table 9 shows the cumulative distribution function of the percentage of subjects who 
assigned the highest frequency to the correct action, as well as the lowest frequency at 
least in a number of games. It also reports the percentage of subjects who predicted 
the correct and the opposite structure of frequencies of actions in at least a number of 
games. Table 9 shows that subjects were good at assigning highest frequency to the 
actions which was played with highest frequency, but they were not so good in ranking 
the two other actions.
N u m b e r  o f  
G a m e s
H ig h e s t  
F r e q u e n c y
L o w e s t
F r e q u e n c y
S a m e
S t r u c t u r e
O p p o s i t  e 
S t r u c t u r e
1 0 1 0 0 0 0
9 2 5 1 . 2 5 0 0
8 3 6 . 2 5 5 1 . 2 5 1 . 2 5
7 5 0 I 5 5 2 .5
6 7 5 3 1 . 2 5 8 . 7 5 3 . 7  5
5 8 7 . 5 5 3 . 7 5 1 8 . 7 5 6 . 2 5
4 9 2 . 5 7 0 3 5 1 2 .5
3 9 5 8 8 . 7 5 5 0 2 3 . 7 5
2 9 6 . 2  5 9 8 . 7 5 7 6 . 2 5 3 2 . 5
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 9 0 7 1 . 2 5
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Table 9: CDF of the percentage of subjects who predicted the structure of actions by 
their oponents at least in a number of games.
While 75% of the subjects assigned highest frequency in six or more games to the 
action that was played with highest frequency, only 8.75% of the subjects did, at the 
same time, assigned the lowest frequency to the action that was played with lowest 
frequency in those six or more games, and thus, answered with the same structure 
of frequencies of beliefs as their opponents played. Very few subjects assigned the 
ranking of frequencies in the opposite order as they were played by their opponents 
(32.5% of the subjects made this mistake two or more times). Also, 28.25% of belief 
statements assigned the same frequency to the two actions tha t were not believed to 
be played with highest frequency.40 Figure 1 shows the scatter plot for each game of 
the frequency of stated beliefs for each action against the frequency with which those 
actions were played. The tendency is clearly increasing, supporting the evidence that, 
on average, subjects assigned higher frequency to actions that were played with higher 
frequency.
Ul These cases do not qualify for either the “Same structure” or the “Opposite structure” categories.
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Figure 1: Average Frequency of Actions and Average Frequency assigned.
Finally, we look at the precision of belief statements. The average mean square 
error for the predictions of Row subjects about the frequencies of play of Column 
subjects was 2.49. while for Column subjects was 2.16. Random belief statements 
would have generated average mean square errors of 3.3 for Row Subjects and 4.1 for 
Column Subjects. We will use the average mean square errors in the next section to 
associate accuracy of predictions and best response behaviour. We conclude:
Result 6: Subjects were good at predicting the actions that were played with 
highest frequency by their opponents, although stated beliefs tended to be 
"conservative".
4.3.5 Best R esponse of A ctions to  Stated Beliefs
We finally look at the consistency of stated beliefs and actions at the individual level. 
We check for consistency by checking whether actions chosen by each subject were best 
replies to the same subject's stated beliefs (BR). We define best replying behaviour 
as choosing the action that gives the highest expected payoff given the distribution 
of beliefs stated. According to this definition, best replying implies that subjects' 
utilities only depend on own monetary payoffs and that subjects are risk neutral. 
Results below show that a majority of subjects satisfied this definition. Given that 
subjects were better at identifying the action which was played with highest frequency 
than the frequencies of the other two actions, we also check whether actions taken 
were a best response only to the action assigned the highest frequency (BR Max F).4'
First, as it would be obvious from previous results, subjects clearly best responded 
to their stated beliefs more often than they would have had they chosen their actions 
randomly. Kolmogorov-Smirnoff Goodness of Fit Tests comparing the empirical CDFs
4 ‘As  there are only three actions available for each subject and only ten units of frequency to be 
assigned, in many cases both models of best response behavior predict the same action.
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to the CDF implied by random behaviour gives p-values of virtually zero. Table 10 
shows the percentage of best responses by game and player role. Overall, subjects best 
responded to their stated beliefs in 73.375% of the cases (75.625% for best response 
to the highest frequency belief). This percentage is much higher than the observed 
in the only other study with elicited beliefs we are aware of on one-shot behaviour in 
a similar setting (Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2004) with 50% of best responses). 
Furthermore, even if in our experiment there is no chance for learning, the percentage 
of best response behaviour is as high as the one observed in experiments that allowed 
for learning (Nyarko and Schott.er (2002), with 75% of best responses in their 2x2 
games).
Thus, we conclude:
Result 7: Subjects best responded to their stated, beliefs a high number of 
times (73% of the cases).
By comparing the percentage of best responses across games for all subjects using 
M cNemars test (5% significance level), we again observe the familiar pattern that the 
number of rounds of iterated dominance does not seem to affect in a clear way the 
percentage of best replies. However, it is true tha t the percentage of best responses 
was significantly lower in the two non-dominance solvable games (NR and NC) than in 
some of the other games. Both models of best response (BR and BR Max F) perform 
similarly, which may be due to stated beliefs not being too extreme.
R o w S u b j e c t s C o 1 u m S u b j e c t s A 11 S u b j e c t s
G a m e B R B R M a x B R B R M a x B R B R M a x
F F F
1 R 8 0 8 0 7 7 . 5 7 5 7 8 . 7 5 7 7 . 5
1 C 6 0 5 7 .5 9 0 9 0 7 5 7 3 . 7 5
2 R 9 0 9 2 . 5 7 7 . 5 7 5 8 3 . 7 5 8 3 . 7 5
2 C 8 0 7 2  .5 8 0 8 0 8 0 7 6 . 2 5
3 R 8 0 9 0 7 2  . 5 7 2 . 5 7 6 . 2 5 8 I . 2 5
3 C 7 7 .5 6 5 8 0 8 7 . 5 7 8 . 7 5 7 6 . 2 5
4 R 8 2  .5 8 2 . 5 8 5 7 5 8 3 . 7 5 7 8 . 7 5
4 C 5 7 . 5 S I  . 5 8 7 . 5 8 7 . 5 7 2 . 5 7 2  . 5
N R 6 0 5 2 . 5 4 0 8 0 5 0 6 6 . 2 5
N C 6 0 7 5 5 0 6 5 5 5 7 0
A » f r i f t 7 2 . 7 5 7 2 . 5 7 4 7 8 . 7 5 7 3 . 3 7 5 7 5 . 6 2 5
B R : B e s t  R e s p o n s e . B R  M a x  F :  B e s t  R c p o n s e t o t h e  a c t i o n a s s i g n e d h i g h e s t
f r e q u e n c y
Table 10: Average percentage of best responses.
Looking at the individual level, Figure 2 draws the empirical probability density 
function (PDF) of the number of games for which each subject best responded to their 
stated beliefs, overall and for each player role. Although only 3.75% of subjects best
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responded to their stated beliefs in all ten games. 70% of subjects best responded to 
their stated beliefs in seven or more games.
0,35
■  R o w  S  u b j e c t s
■  C o l u m  n S  u b j e c t s
■  Al l  S u b j e c t s
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
N u m b e r  o f B e s t  R e s p o n s e s t o  S t a t e d  
Be  l i e f s
Figure 2: Empirical PDF of the number of times subjects best responded to their
stated beliefs.
Although the proportion of non-best response behaviour is not insignificant, it 
is small. We look into the nature of non-best response behaviour by calculating how 
much subjects lost for not best responding to their stated beliefs. We use the monetary 
losses subjects made when non-best responding to their stated beliefs as a proxy for 
how important it was for subjects to best respond in each of the games.
We proceed by calculating, for each subject, the sum of his expected loss when not 
best responding to their stated beliefs averaged over the ten games each subject played. 
We find that Row subjects lost on average £0.3037 per game and Column subjects lost 
on average £0.3205 per game. Given that subjects were only paid for their actions in 
one game, these were the average losses per subject. Next, we calculate the average 
maximum feasible loss had subjects have played, in all games, the action that gave 
them the lowest possible expected payoff, given their stated beliefs. On average. Row 
subjects could have lost £3.05 per game while Column Subjects could have lost £2.69 
per game. Finally, we divide both numbers to calculate for each subject in each game, 
the percentage of the maximum loss they incurred by not best responding. Averaging 
over all games for each subject role we obtain that Row subjects lost on average 10.97% 
of the maximum losses they could have made, while Column subjects lost 15.96% of 
the maximum possible losses. To put things in perspective, Row subjects would have 
lost 40.21% of the maximum possible losses they could have made had they chosen the 
action that neither was a best response nor the worst response to their stated beliefs 
in all ten games. Column subjects would have lost 55.24% of the maximum possible 
losses had their chosen this action in all 10 games. Therefore, we conclude:
Result 8: As subjects best responded in most of the games, they did not 
lose much with respect to the maximum losses they could have made.
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Table 11 shows the percentage of average losses in each game for each subject 
role. Notice tha t these calculated losses are only hypothetical, as we obtain them 
using stated beliefs, not the actual matching of subjects in each game.48 Differences 
between average losses for Row and Column subjects were probably caused by a variety 
of factors, including the beliefs stated but also the design of the games, which created 
higher payoff differences for Column subjects than for Row subjects.
Game Row Subjects Column Subjects
1R 9.56 14.61
1C 22 .16 5.49
2R 8.73 3.74
2C 5.17 13.99
3R 6.12 21.60
3C 12.01 13.86
4R 6.72 10.33
4C 6.11 7.79
NR 16.81 46. 64
NC 16.32 21.52
Average 10.97 15.96
Table 11: Percentage of average loss per game and subject role.
Not best responding is not the only kind of mistake subjects could have made. 
Subjects could also err in the accuracy of their predictions of opponents’ play. Al­
though the monetary loss derived from this mistake would be minimal, as payments 
for stated beliefs have an upper bound of £ 2 , a bad prediction of how opponents play, 
even if it was a best response to stated beliefs, could result in taking a non-optimal 
action, given the frequencies with which opponents really played. We address whether 
both types of mistakes (bad predictions and non-best response behaviour) are related, 
by calculating the correlation between each subjects’ average mean square error of 
his predictions and the average percentage of maximum loss for not best responding 
each subject makes. We find tha t there is positive significant correlation between both 
series (Pearson’s coefficient of 0.559 with a p-value of 6.8e-08).49 This high correlation 
means tha t subjects who chose equilibrium actions, also expected a high proportion
4 8  An alternative way of calculating the hypothetical loses is to use the real frequencies of play by the 
opponents instead of the stated beliefs. Given that the percentage of best response to stated beliefs 
is similar to the percentage of best response to “real” play by the opponents, overall percentages by 
game differ only slightly.
4 9  We also calculated the correlation between each subject’s number of best responses with the 
mean square error of predictions and Pearson’s coefficient was, as expected, negative and significant 
(Pearson’s coefficient: 0.55, p-value 8.6e-08).
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of their opponents to choose equilibrium actions, and that this prediction was right. 
This suggests that subjects may have believed that their opponents would choose their 
actions in a similar way as they did. We thus conclude:
Result 9: Subjects who are better at predicting the frequencies of pla.y of 
their opponents are also the ones who lost, on average, less for not best 
responding.
Figure 3 draws the correlation between average losses and errors of predictions.
a> 10
0 0,1 0,2 0, 3 0, 4 0, 5 0, 6
Mean Square Error
Figure 3: Correlation Between Average Losses for Not Best Responding and Mean
Squared Errors of Predictions
4 .4  D iscu ssion
We have identified a class of non-trivial games for which game-theoretical predictions 
work reasonably well, even when games are played for the first time by subjects with 
no previous experience in laboratory games or knowledge of game theory. These games 
are constant sum games with unique equilibria in pure strategies. Our results imply 
that most subjects not only played according to the Equilibrium prediction but that 
they were reasonably good at predicting the actions that would be played with highest 
frequency by their opponents and they best responded to their beliefs on opponents 
play.
When surveying the experimental evidence in dominance solvable games. Camerer 
(2003, Chapter 5). claims tha t the joint hypothesis of game theoretic behaviour and 
social preferences that value only one's own payments is easily rejected. He then 
claims that the interesting question is whether the rejection is due to the pure self- 
interest piart of the joint hypothesis or to the game theoretic reasoning part or even 
to both. We have here designed a simple experiment in which by using a theoretically
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useful control for social preferences, we check if subjects play according to the game 
theoretic prediction, and thus, this may indicate whether subjects are able to reason 
in game theoretic terms. Notice tha t this procedure does not allow us to answer 
whether individuals have social preferences or not, but only helps us to identify a 
class of games in which whether they have social preferences or not, the equilibrium 
prediction is reasonably accurate. Therefore, for our simple but non trivial games, the 
game theoretic part of the hypothesis is not rejected in a context in which we would 
not expect social preference to influence behaviour.
The number of rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies to reach 
the equilibrium is not a straightforward measure of how complex games are for sub­
jects and thus we can not conclude that in games with more rounds of deletion, the 
percentage of equilibrium played was lower. W hether games are dominance solvable or 
not seems to have an effect on the predictive power of game theory over these games, 
specially for the percentage of best responses. However, notice that in those two games 
at least one of the subjects could obtain the same payoff by choosing some particu­
lar strategy no m atter the action chosen by their matched opponent. This, together 
with the impossibility of deleting dominated strategies, may have caused tha t subjects 
were worse able to predict how their opponents would play and, as a consequence, the 
percentage of equilibrium actions may have been lower in these games. We aim to 
conduct further research on non dominance solvable games in which this unfortunate 
characteristic is not present.
In any case, constant sum games seem like a good starting point to study how 
subjects reason in simple games as issues like fairness and efficiency concerns seem 
not to affect their choices. Equal splits neither influenced actions chosen nor beliefs 
stated about others’ behaviour, although this point requires further investigation as 
the payoff differences between equal and unequal splits were low in our experiment. 
Belief elicitation does not affect how subjects play games and how they think other 
subjects will play them, although comparing our results to previous experiments, the 
different belief elicitation procedure we used may be im portant.
Our results may have been influenced by procedural changes with respect to previ­
ous experiments and in particular, to Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2004). Apart from 
focusing on constant sum games, we used one-digit numbers to represent payoffs and 
there was no conversion rates between experimental payoffs and final monetary pay­
offs. The procedure for eliciting beliefs may be also of some importance when studying 
best response to stated beliefs. Given our results, it would be interesting to study how 
each of these changes affect results. It would also be interesting to estimate a model 
with noise, as they did, in which to jointly check the consistency between subjects’ 
actions and the beliefs they have about their opponents. However, our results already
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hint that whether games are constant sum or not and some of the procedural changes 
we made make a difference in the predictive value of game theory. It seems wrong to 
generally dismiss Nash equilibrium as a good predictor of behaviour in simple games 
even if they are played for the first time by subjects with no particular training in 
Economics. Once we have this evidence, further research should aim to identify rea­
sons for differences with previous evidence and ultimately, identify a possibly larger 
set of games for which game theory predictions work well.
Chapter 5
Equilibrium  Play and B est 
R esponse in Sequential Constant 
Sum Games
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we identified a class of non-trivial games for which Nash 
Equilibrium predictions work much better than in similar previous research .1 This 
occurred even if the games were played in the laboratory for the first time by non- 
Economics trained subjects with no feedback. These games were two-player 3x3 con­
stant sum normal form games with unique equilibria in pure strategies and with differ­
ent number of rounds of iterated deletion of (strictly) dominated strategies necessary to 
reach the Nash equilibrium. We here study how well the subgame perfect equilibrium 
prediction works in sequential games which share the same payoff matrix as the nor­
mal form games of the previous chapter and that were played again by Non-Economics 
trained subjects for the first time without previous experience in the laboratory. We 
check if the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction works as well for these games as 
the Nash equilibrium prediction did in the simultaneous move games of the previous 
chapter.
There are several reasons why this question is interesting. Notice tha t in constant 
sum games the Nash equilibrium outcome of the normal form games and the subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential games coincide. This is because, thinking 
in terms of backwards induction for a game with two players, when the last mover in
^ ee , for example, McCabe et al. (1994), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994)), Stahl and Wilson (1995), 
Broseta et al. (2001), Brown and Rosenthal (1990), Rapapport and Boebel (1992) and Mookherjee 
and Sopher (1997)).
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sequential games optimally chooses the action tha t maximizes his payoffs given the 
options left available, he minimizes the payoffs of the first mover and thus, a first 
mover optimally chooses the strategy that maximizes the minimum of his possible 
payoffs. This Maximin (or Minimax) strategy follows exactly the same logic as the 
Nash equilibrium strategy in normal form constant sum games. However, even if the 
theoretical outcome may coincide between the simultaneous and the sequential move 
games it is possible tha t when laboratory subjects actually play the sequential games 
the outcomes may differ.
A possible reason for differences in the outcomes of simultaneous and sequential 
games with the same payoff matrix may be tha t subjects may put greater weight 
on other regarding preferences in sequential games. This would seem particularly 
true for models of other regarding preferences tha t incorporate intentionality, as the 
sequentiality of the games makes clear that a second player’s decision is contingent on 
the first player’s choice and therefore, the way a second mover interprets the intentions 
of the strategy chosen by a first mover can clearly influence the outcome of the play. 
Anticipating this, a first mover may carefully select his own strategy in order to make, 
for example, the second mover interpret his intentions in a way tha t may induce him 
to reward supposedly kind behaviour by the first mover.
On the other hand, as we argued in the previous chapter, in constant sum games 
behaviour should not be affected by other regarding preferences tha t do not include 
concerns for intentionality, i.e., distributional preferences. The theoretical argument 
is tha t distributional preferences should not affect choices as long as subjects care 
more for their own payoffs than for those of other subjects .2 This is because subjects 
who care about opponents’ payoffs would have to give up the same units of payoffs 
tha t would go to their opponent in order to increase their opponents’ payoffs. We 
showed previously that this theoretical argument, although compatible with other 
possible explanations, is not proven wrong by laboratory play in simultaneous constant 
form games. However, if we want to be more general and study for which types of 
games theory predictions are not affected by other regarding preferences, both with 
and without intentions, we precisely need to study games in which we suspect that 
intentions may play a role, and tha t is why we choose sequential constant sum games.
There is at least one type of constant sum games in which there is evidence that 
other regarding preferences may affect laboratory play: dictator games.3 In them, a 
single subject has to allocate a fixed amount between him and another subject, with 
no strategic decision being taken by the receiver. When dictator games have been 
played in the laboratory strictly controlling for anonymity (both between subjects and
2Camerer et al. (1998) discuss this argument.
3See Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1999) and Roth (1995).
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with respect to the experimenter) there is a significant proportion of subjects who 
do not concord with the equilibrium prediction and allocate the minimum possible 
amount to the other player.4 In our experiment, the situation faced by second movers 
is similar to the allocators’ situation in dictator games. In fact, we could define second 
movers’ strategic situation as “mini-dictator” games, since second movers do not have 
a continuous choice but they can only choose between three actions. There is a differ­
ence however between mini-dictator games and our games: when second movers in our 
games have to choose their action, they are limited by the action taken by first movers 
and therefore, intentionality and willingness to reward kind behaviour may affect their 
choices. In dictator games, there is no possible response to the allocator’s strategy 
and thus, non equilibrium outcomes may be explained by distributional preferences by 
themselves, with no need of reciprocal or intentionally driven other regarding prefer­
ences. We are aware of two experiments with sequential constant sum games in which 
two players make decisions. In Falk and Kosfeld (2005) second movers decide an allo­
cation of a constant quantity between then and a first mover, after observing whether 
the first mover decides to restrict or not the interval in which the second mover can 
decide. Thus, second movers face a dictator game situation once first movers have 
restricted them or not. They observe that when first movers restrict second movers, 
they allocate less to first movers. Thus, although the subgame perfect equilibrium 
prediction is not fulfilled, the “intentions” 5 signalled by whether first movers restrict 
or not makes a difference on second movers. Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey (1996) carried 
out sequential constant sum centipede games in which, at the first round, payoffs are 
divided evenly and, as the players pass, the division gets more and more lopsided. 
They observe tha t the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in which the first mover 
takes in the first round works much better than in centipede games which are not 
constant sum. Therefore, we expect our results to be driven by the fact tha t games 
are constant sum and tha t both players can make decisions and thus, they may be 
signalling their intentions.
In terms of both subjects having an option to decide strategically, our games, also 
resemble ultimatum games, in which also non subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes 
are frequently observed (Giith et al. (1982)). A key difference with our games is tha t 
in ultimatum games, the second mover has the clear option to punish the first mover 
by rejecting his allocation and leaving both players with no payoffs. In ultimatum 
games, such a threat would not be credible if second movers are only concerned for 
own payoff maximization, but it has been observed tha t not only a significant pro­
portion of second movers exercise such threat, but tha t this threat is credible to first
4 See Bolton and Zwick (1995) and Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998).
5 Referred as “trust” by the authors.
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movers and they rarely allocate the minimum possible amount to second movers. The 
most frequent explanation for such behavior is that subjects have other regarding pref­
erences that include intentionality. Ultimatum games are not constant sum because 
of the possibility of rejecting offers and leaving both players with no payoffs. In the 
games studied in this chapter, this possibility does not exist and in fact, the maximum 
“punishment” a second mover can inflict on a first mover is by choosing his own payoff 
maximizing strategy. However, although in constant sum games there is no possibility 
of punishment, second movers’ intentionality driven other regarding preferences could 
manifest themselves in second movers rewarding kind behaviour by first movers and 
thus, giving up some units of payoffs in favour of first movers who have taken and 
action interpreted as kind by second movers. Notice tha t other explanations for sec­
ond movers non payoff maximizing behaviour are possible and we try  to discriminate 
between them using both the data and the results of an informal questionnaire.
There is a clear way in which subjects’ choices in our games could show that 
subjects have other regarding preferences. As in the previous chapter, we designed a 
treatm ent in which one of the outcomes in all the games would be tha t payoffs were 
exactly equally split. In such treatment, first movers choosing strategies tha t may 
lead to the equal split outcome could be signalling to second movers their intention to 
split the payoffs evenly. Therefore, second movers who also choose to equally split the 
payoffs may be responding reciprocally to first movers’ strategy. We compare whether 
the feasibility of exactly equally splitting the payoffs influenced subjects behaviour, 
by comparing choices in treatments tha t included the feasibility of equal splits in 
all ten games with choices in treatments in which such equal split was replaced by 
a less equal outcome, without affecting the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. 
Although the feasibility of exactly equal splits have been shown to have an important 
effect in ultimatum games (Gtith, Huck and Muller, (2001)), we find no such effects in 
our games.
The chapter studies how close subjects behaviour was to  the subgame perfect 
equilibrium prediction and enquires whether subjects were able to reason in game 
theoretic arguments. It also includes a comparison of the results in this chapter with 
the previous chapter. We observe tha t the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in 
sequential constant sum games works even better than the Nash equilibrium prediction 
in simultaneous constant sum games. This result indicates that even if the strategy 
space is more complex in sequential games, first movers seem better able to backward 
induct in our sequential games than to calculate Nash equilibria in the simultaneous 
ones. Additionally, second movers seem to be good at best responding once they 
observe first movers’ choices.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Sections 5.2 presents the
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experimental design and procedures. Section 5.i3 contains the results and the main 
descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 comments on thie answers given by subjects on a vol­
untary questionnaire. Section 5.5 concludes. T he Appendices contain the instructions 
and we also show the games.
5.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
5.2.1 Experim ental D esign
Subjects were presented with a series of ten 3x3 constant sum games with unique 
subgame perfect equilibria. The games had th<e same payoff matrix as the games 
in the previous chapter,6 but the games were now played sequentially. First movers 
chose, for each of the ten games, one of three actions (labelled “UP” , “MIDDLE” and 
“DOWN”). Then, second movers observed first movers’ choice and picked one of their 
three actions available (labelled “LEFT”, “CENTRE” and “RIGHT”).
We constructed a 2x2 design according to two criteria. The first criterion was 
whether first movers’ payoffs corresponded to the  payoffs assigned to Column or to 
Row subjects in the previous experiment. By having a treatm ent in which first movers’ 
payoffs corresponded to column subjects, but also another where first movers’ payoffs 
corresponded to Row subjects, we can compare our results with the previous experi­
ment with simultaneous play no m atter the sequence of actions in this new experiment.
The second criterion, as in the previous experiment, was whether an equal split of 
payoffs was feasible in each of the games. As the games were constant sum, there was 
always the same amount of payoffs (£12) to be distributed among the two players. In 
the “Fair” treatments (F) an equal split of payoffs was feasible in one of the terminal 
nodes of each of the games subjects played. Payoffs were designed such tha t both 
subjects would get £ 6  if they both took the action leading to this node being reached. 
In the “Unfair” treatments (U), the payoffs in this terminal node were substituted 
by a more unequal split, such that one subject would get a payoff of £7 and the 
other a payoff of £5. For example, in Game 4R below, payoffs when first movers 
chose MIDDLE (M ) and second movers chose LEFT (L) were £ 6  for both subjects 
in the Fair treatments, while they were £5 for first movers and £7 for second movers 
in the Unfair treatments. The location of this node and the changes in payoffs from 
the Fair to the Unfair treatments were designed such tha t in some games it was the 
first mover who got a better than equal split payoff in the Unfair treatm ents while 
in other games it was the second mover and such th a t subjects would get a higher 
payoff in this terminal node in some games (lower in other games) than when their
6 The games can be found in Appendix B.
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actions lead to the subgarne perfect equilibrium, referred to simply as “Equilibrium” 
from here onwards. Notice that the terminal node in which the equal split was feasible 
never coincided with the terminal node that would have been chosen as a result of 
both subjects playing according to the subgarne perfect equilibrium. Comparing the 
F and U treatments allows us to study whether the feasibility of an exact equal split 
influenced behaviour.
G a m e  4 R ( Fa i r )G a m e  4 R ( U n f a i r )
F irstF irst
S e c o n d S e c o n d i S e c o n dS e c o n d S e c o n d i S e c o n d
5.2.2 Experim ental Procedures
The experiment was carried out with pen and paper in the ELSE laboratory in Decem­
ber 2004. Subjects were recruited by e-mail using the ELSE database, which consists 
of UCL undergraduate and graduate students. As we are interested in behaviour 
without previous experience by non-Economics trained subjects, we made sure all our 
subjects had not participated in previous game experiments and had not taken courses 
in Economics or Game Theory.
Our experiment consisted of four sessions with twenty subjects per session. In each 
session, ten of the subjects were randomly assigned first mover roles in all ten games, 
while the other ten subjects were assigned second mover roles. Neutral language was 
used by calling subjects “You” and their opponents “Participants in the other group” .
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned seats and were asked to read some 
preliminary instructions, which described a strategic decision situation and a 3x3 pay­
off matrix associated with it..' Therefore, although the games were played sequentially, 
the games were presented in similar tables as the ones in the previous experiment,.8
' The strategic situations were called “Tables” in the instructions.
s See Appendix B for the actual presentation of the games.
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This allow us to compare our results without recurring to “Presentation effects” expla­
nations .9 Then subjects were required to pass an Understanding Test where they had 
to demonstrate tha t they knew how to map players’ actions in a game to outcomes, 
and outcomes to players’ payoffs. Subjects were told tha t those who failed the test 
would act as “assistants” in the experiment. However, no subject failed the test in any 
treatm ent and so the over-recruited subjects were asked to assist the experimenter. 10
Then, first movers chose their action in all ten games. After that, answer sheets 
were collected, reorganized and handed to second movers who could observe, for each 
game, the action taken by the first mover with whom they were matched in tha t game. 
Finally, second movers chose their actions in all ten games. All games were played with 
no feedback and the order in which each subject played the 1 0  games was randomized.
For each game subjects played, they were randomly and anonymously paired with 
a different participant from the other group. Subjects never learned who their matched 
participant in each game was.
Subjects were paid as follows. At the end of each session, a number from 1 to  10 
was selected from a bingo urn. This number indicated for which of the 10 games all 
subjects would be paid . 11 Subjects were paid exactly the amount of pounds indicated 
in the lower left corner of the cell chosen as a result of their action and the action 
chosen by their matched participant in the particular game selected with the bingo 
urn.
Subjects were paid the sum of a £5 fixed fee, plus their earnings in the game 
selected. Average payments were £ 1 1  (around $17 at the time) . 12 Each session lasted 
one hour and each subject was allocated twenty minutes to choose their action.
5.2.3 The Games
In all ten games, two subjects had to choose sequentially among three actions. First 
movers chose, for each of the ten games, one of three actions (labelled “UP” , “MID­
DLE” and “DOWN” ). Then, second movers observed first movers’ choice and chose 
one of their three actions (labelled “LEFT”, “CENTRE” and “RIGHT”). Payoffs were 
represented by the same matrix as for the games in the previous chapter. Notice that
9Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson (1994), argue for same games played simultaneously or sequentially 
that what matters for differences in behaviour is not the actual presentation of the game but whether 
the instructions are explained in simultaneous or sequential form. Here, our games are different, but 
still we presented payoffs similarly.
10 All subjects were informed of this.
11 We paid subjects for one random game instead of for an aggregated measure of their answers in 
all 10 games to be able to maintain a one to one relationship between outcomes and payoffs.
12 A British pound corresponded to 1.85 American dollars at the time of the experiment. Our design 
allowed us to provide reasonably high incentives while keeping one or two digit numbers to represent 
payoffs and avoiding conversion rates from experimental currency to monetary currency.
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the subgarne perfect equilibrium outcome for these games is the same as the Nash 
equilibrium outcome for the simultaneous games of the previous chapter.
We chose one-digit numbers to represent payoffs.1,1 The sum of Row and Column 
players’ payments in all cells of all games was 12.11 The ten games were designed such 
that the equilibrium did not correspond to the same combination of actions by two 
players in more than two games.
5.3 E xp erim en ta l R esu lts
5.3.1 D escriptive Statistics
Table 1 below presents the main descriptive statistics for each game when grouping 
all treatments and subject roles. We report, for each of the ten games, the percentage 
of times the combination of first movers’ and second movers’ choices reached an Equi­
librium outcome, as well as the percentage of first movers’ actions taken according to 
Equilibrium and the percentage of second movers’ actions that were best responses to 
their matched first mover’s choice. Results are clear. On average, 91.5% of times, the 
Subgarne Perfect Equilibrium was reached. First movers played Equilibrium 93.5% of 
the times, and second movers best responded to their matched first mover’s choice in 
94% of the times. Percentages were high and similar across all games.
G a m e E q ui l i br i u m 
P l a y e d
1st M o v e r  E q u i l i b r i u m  
A c t i ons
2 nd  M o v e r  
B e s t  R e s p o n s e s
1R 90 92.5 97.5
1C 92.5 92.5 92.5
2 R 85 92.5 87.5
2 C 97.5 97.5 100
3 R 90 95 92.5
3C 90 90 92.5
4 R 92.5 92.5 92.5
4C 92.5 92.5 95
N R 90 92.5 92.5
N C 95 97.5 97.5
A v e r a g e 91 . 5 93 . 5 94
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (percentages).
In the following sections we study these results with further detail.
11 We did so because if subjects really chose their actions as a best response to their beliefs, cal­
culating such best response in terms of expected payoffs may have been more difficult if numbers
representing payoffs were large, and we did not want to discourage such type of behaviour.
14 Numbers 10 and 11 were used in a few games to make it possible to  discriminate models of 
behavior. Number 0 was not used to avoid behavior being possibly caused by aversion to getting no 
payoff.
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5.3.2 Treatm ent Effects: Feasibility of Equal Splits
One of the main questions tha t motivated this follow-up experiment is whether in­
tentionally driven other regarding preferences affected subjects’ choices in sequential 
constant sum games, both when subjects played as first movers and when they played 
as second movers. As commented in the introduction to this chapter, our games are 
similar to ultimatum games, where the feasibility of equal splits has proved to affect 
how subjects play games (Giith et al. (2001)). In our games however, second movers 
do not have the option to reject proposals and thus leave both agents with no pay­
offs, but they have to choose between three possible allocations of payoffs between 
both subjects, all adding up to the same amount. In those circumstances, a choice 
of strategy leading to an equal split of payoffs may be an indication of concerns for 
the other subject’s payoffs. For example, when second movers observe first movers’ 
choices, they may want to reward an action taken by a first mover leading to an equal 
split with an action that gives both agents the same payoff, even if this is not optimal 
for payoff maximizing second movers. At the same time, first movers may anticipate 
this and choose actions leading to equal splits in the first place. If we observed this 
type of behaviour when equal splits are feasible but not when it is not, it would be 
an indication tha t subjects may have some concern for being “fair” or for how fair 
other subjects interpret that their own choices are. We thus study if the feasibility of 
equal splits affected how subjects played the games by comparing choices by first and 
second movers between treatments in which it was feasible to splits payoffs equally 
and treatm ents in which it was not.
Following the same procedures as in the previous experiment, we first use Fisher’s 
Exact Probability Test (FEPT) for count data . 15 This test allows us to check if 
differences in observed proportions of actions chosen between a game containing equal 
splits ( “Fair” treatment) and a game where equal splits are not feasible ( “Unfair” 
treatm ent) might be expected by chance. The null hypothesis (two-tailed) is tha t 
there is no difference in the probability of playing each strategy generating the observed 
proportion of play of each strategy in each treatm ent. 16 As with all statistical tests in 
this thesis, we used the free software R (2003) to perform FEPTs.
We conduct FEPT separately for each game. We first compare subjects’ aggregate 
actions for each player role (first or second movers) in each of the ten games between 
the Fair and Unfair treatments. Out of the 40 possible comparisons, we can never
15Developed by Fisher (1935), Irwin (1935) and Yates (1934).
16 Although less common than the Chi-square test, Fisher’s test requires less data in each category 
to be correctly calculated. Chi-square tests would require at least five subjects playing each action 
in each treatment which, given that most subjects chose the same actions, was not satisfied in our 
games. The main assumption required for both of these tests is independence between observations 
of the games in each treatment.
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reject the null hypothesis of the underlying probability of each subject playing each of 
the three strategies available being equal at the 5% significance level.17 18 Notice in 
table 2 that the total number of actions taken not according with Equilibrium by first 
movers is very similar between the Fair and Unfair treatm ents and of these, the number 
of actions that coincided with the strategy leading to the equal split ( “Fair Action” ) 
is also very similar between treatments. The same happens with the number of best 
responses for second movers. We finally performed Mann-Whitney tests under the null 
hypothesis tha t the median of the distribution of the number of games in which first 
movers chose the strategy containing the equal split was not different between the F 
and U treatments. We could never reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance 
level.19
First Movers Second Movers
Non-Equilibrium
Actions
Fair Actions Percentage Non-Best 
Responses
Fair Actions Percentage
Fair Treatment 32 2 2 68.75% 31 7 22.58%
Unfair Treatment 29 2 0 68.96% 29 7 24.14%
Table 2: Percentages of Non-Equilibrium Actions and Fair Actions
Thus, we conclude the following:
Result 1: Behaviour was not affected by the feasibility o f equal splits.
Small payoff differences between the equal and unequal split might explain Result 1 . 
It would be worthwhile to study robustness to higher payoff differences. An alternative 
explanation is tha t the equal split was feasible (or not) in all the games subjects played. 
As subjects were only paid for one of the games, our experiment shares characteristics 
with experiments carried out under the strategy method, in which a weakening of the 
“equal split effect” has previously been observed (Gtith et al. (2001)). In any case, 
and admitting these caveats, our results show tha t there are circumstances in which 
subjects do not change their behaviour whether equal splits are feasible or not when
1' Although FEPT is specifically designed for small samples it is still not a very powerful test with 
only ten observations in each treatment. For example using this test, we cannot reject that distribution 
of answers (3,2,5) in one treatment is the same as the distribution (1,7,2) in another treatment at the 
5% significance level. However, we can reject that it is the same as (1,8,1). The power of the test 
increases with the number of observations.
18Results of all FEPTs in this section are the same at the 10% signicance level.
19 Same results were obtained for the null hypothesis that treatment effects did not affect the median 
of the distribution of the number of games in which first movers played the equilibrium strategy and 
also for the distribution of second movers’ best responses to first movers’ actions.
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deciding how to share pies of given sizes, even if one of the subjects moved previous 
to the other.
Using these results, we will pool the data from “Fair1' and “Unfair treatm ents to 
report the following statistics.
5.3.3 A ctions
We here look at individual behaviour. We find tha t theory predictions translate well 
into individual behaviour. On average, first movers played according to Equilibrium 
in 8.5 of the 10 games, while second movers best responded to first movers’ choices in 
8.65 of the games. 97.5% of first, movers played the Equilibrium action in 7 or more 
games, while 95% of second movers best responded in 8 or more games. Table 3 below 
shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the number of games for which 
at least first, movers played according to Equilibrium predictions and the number of 
games for which at least second movers best responded.
N u m b e r  o f  G a m e s 1st  M o v e r  E q u i l i b r i u m  A c t i o n s 2 n d  M o v e r  B e s t  R e s p o n s e s
1 0 1 0 1 2 . 5
9 5 7 . 5 7 5
8 8 5 9 5
7 9 7 . 5 9 7 . 5
6 9 7 . 5 1 0 0
5 1 0 0 1 0 0
4 1 0 0 1 0 0
3 I 0 0 1 0 0
2 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Table 3: Cummulative Distribution Function.
As we did in the previous chapter, we compared subjects’ choices across games for 
both players’ roles. We performed McNemar’s tests comparing proportions of equilib­
rium play by first movers between each pair of games under the null hypothesis that 
the proportion of first movers who played equilibrium actions was the same between 
all pairs of games, both when grouping the F and U treatm ents and when not. We 
do not find statistically significant differences at the 5% significance level between any 
pair of games. The same occurs when we performed McNemar’s tests under the null 
hypothesis that, the proportion of second movers who played best responses to their 
first movers was not different between all pairs of games. Our results clearly differ 
from what we obtained in the previous chapter where the non dominance solvable 
games (NR and NC) showed much lower percentages on concordance to equilibrium 
predictions than the other games. Notice that in games NR and NC, when played
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in sequential form, best responding for the second mover is almost trivial as in most 
cases, once the first mover has chosen an equilibrium strategy, second movers would 
be playing the subgarne perfect equilibrium no m atter what they chose. This is due 
to the fact that in game NR once the first mover plays Equilibrium, payoffs for the 
second mover are exactly the same no m atter what he chooses.20
We now compare the results of this experiment with the previous one to check if the 
Equilibrium prediction works better in the sequential games than in the simultaneous 
games. Given that in the sequential games we have first and second movers, we 
compare the actual percentage of times the equilibrium prediction was correct in each 
of the two experiments, which is the combination of both paired subjects choosing 
the Equilibrium action in each game. Table 4 reports the percentage of times the 
Equilibrium prediction was right by game, where we observe that the subgame perfect 
equilibrium prediction in the sequential games works better than the Nash equilibrium 
prediction in the simultaneous ones, for all games.21 Chi-square tests for differences in 
proportions of equilibrium play between games with the same name confirm the null 
hypothesis that the proportions of play were different between the two experiments in 
all games with the same name at the 5% significance level. This result is important 
because, together with the results of the following section, it provides evidence that 
subjects may be better able to backward induct in our simple sequential games than 
to calculate Nash equilibria in the simultaneous ones. Although this result is partially 
caused by second movers observing first movers’ choice and the high percentage of best 
responses, it seems that first movers are able to anticipate second movers’ behaviour, 
even if the strategy space is more complicated in sequential games than in simultaneous 
ones.
G a m e S e q u e n t i a l  P l a y S i m  a l t a n e o n s  P l a y
1 R 9 0 5 7
1 C 9 2  .5 5 4
2 R 8 5 6 6 . 5
2 C 9 7  .5 6 5  . 6 3
3 R 9 0 6 7
3 C 9 0 7 4 . 3 8
4 R 9 2 . 5 7 6 . 5 7
4 C 9 2 . 5 6 0 . 7 5
N R 9 0 4 8 .5 6
N C 9 5 5 4 .3 7 5
A v e r a g e 9 1 .5 6 2 . 4 8
Table 4: Percentage of Times the Equilibrium Prediction was Right.
"' in game NC this only happens for one of the subject roles.
- ‘N otice that the the data in the “Simultaneous Play” colum n, differs from data in Chapter 4, as 
here we com pute the percentage of tim es the unique Nash equilibrium was reached, not the equilibrium  
actions.
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Therefore, we conclude:
Result 2: The Equilibrium prediction works well in constant sum games. When
the games are played sequentially, the prediction is even more accurate.
5.4 Questionnaire Answers
Given tha t experimental results were so close to equilibrium predictions, we wanted to 
check if the reasoning process subjects claimed they used to choose their actions was 
also close to the subgame perfect equilibrium reasoning process tha t Game Theory 
would predict. Notice that, contrary to the experiment in the previous chapter, in this 
experiment we did not elicit subjects’ beliefs about opponents’ choices. The reason was 
that to elicit beliefs would be more complicated in sequential games as first movers’ 
beliefs would be conditional on their own choice. Thus, to reward the accuracy of stated 
beliefs conditional on first movers’ choice, would require using a quadratic scoring rule 
in which nine probabilities had to be stated, which could be meaningless for subjects. 
Therefore, to investigate how subjects’ reasoned when choosing their actions, we use 
the answers to a questionnaire distributed after the experiment in which there were 
no monetary incentives for truth-telling. Therefore, we cannot make a strong point of 
whether subjects really used the reasoning process they claimed when making their 
decisions, but only tha t at least they were able to reason in those terms in our simple 
games since they provided coherent explanations. Contrary to what happened in 
the questionnaire of the previous experiment, here subjects’ answers were much less 
vague and it was easy to classify the. The evidence presented in this section may be 
useful in the ongoing debate on whether subjects are able to arrive at game theoretic 
arguments without previous teaching ,22 Let us remind the reader tha t subjects were 
not Economics students, nor had they previously taken any training in Game Theory.
We classified first movers’ answers into four categories. “Equilibrium” corresponds 
to subgame perfect equilibrium reasoning. “Minimax” is self explanatory. “Fairness” 
corresponds to any argument in which distributional concerns were mentioned. Finally, 
“Other” corresponds to explanations tha t we were not able to classify. Second movers’ 
answers were classified between “Best Responses” , “Fairness” , when they provided 
some argument for distributional concerns and “Not Answer” as two subjects did not 
fill in the voluntary questionnaire. Results are reported in Table 5.
22 See Camerer (2003).
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1st Movers 2nd Movers
Equilibrium 65% Best Response 87.5%
Minimax 22.5%
Fairness 5% Fairness 7.5%
Other 7.5% Not Answer 5%
Table 5: Classification of Questionnaire Answers
For first movers, notice that even if both “Equilibrium” and “Minimax” would 
lead to the same choice and ultimately they both rely in expecting the second mover 
to choose their payoff maximizing strategy given the first mover’s choice and then 
maximize against it, we distinguish between both kind of explanations. In total, 
87.5% of first movers’ explanations could be classified under one of these reasons. 
The criterion to separate both reasons was whether the subject’s answer included a 
statement referring to the “maximum of the minima” . For example, subject FCC2, a 
Medicine student in his third year, offered the following explanation :23
“I  assumed that B  participants would choose the column in which they would gain 
most money, so I  chose the row where I  would get the most i f  they chose their maximum  
strategy given my choice”.
We classified this and similar statements as “Equilibrium” . However subject 
FRR10, a Russian History student in her second year claimed:
“Compared the three rows. Looked for the lowest number in each row. Then chose 
which one o f these was highest, which is the amount I  would get paid”.
We classified this statement as “Minimax”. There were some cases in which the 
classification between the two was not so clear. For example subject FRR9, a second 
year Geography student, claimed:
“J  know that the B  participant will pick the column where they stand to make the 
most so I  have to pick the row where the minimum I  can get is higher than other rows”.
This statement seems to contain both reasons, although following the criterium 
mentioned above we classified it as “Minimax” .
In any case, what it is surprising is the small number of statements tha t made 
reference to distributional arguments. There were only two statements by first movers
23Subjects referred to first movers as “A participants” and to second movers as “B participants”.
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to distributional concerns, both of them in “Unfair” treatments, and thus, in cases 
where the equal split of payoffs was not feasible. These are the following:
11 Try to choose the most equal amount”, and
“Try against ‘my better judgment ’ to be fair in my choice of row, so that a fair  
amount would also be allocated to B ”.
W ith respect to second movers, 87.5% of subjects claimed they chose best responses 
to the action taken by first movers. Here we show a couple of such answers:
“For each table, there were only three options. I  chose the option that would give 
me most money”, and,
“Based on A ’s selection, I  made mine with the highest number reflected in the top 
right com er”.
There were only three second movers who made reference to distributional con­
cerns. Of these, we here reproduce the explanation given by subject FCR9, a Linguis­
tics student in his fourth year, who seemed to hint on intentions driven reciprocity 
guiding his choices:
“/  tried to make a balance between the amount I  could get and the money ‘A ’ person 
could make. I  rewarded as well and paid back ‘A ’ ’s decision”.
Therefore, we conclude that subjects’ claims axe in line with the results of the 
experiment and, in particular the percentage of subjects who claimed to have worried 
for the distribution of payoffs was low (only 6.25% of the total of subjects).
5.5 Discussion
We have confirmed tha t sequential constant sum games with unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium in which two consecutive players have three possible choices are a class of 
non-trivial games for which game-theoretical predictions work well, even if the games 
are played for the first time by subjects not trained in Economics and without previous 
experience in laboratory games. Comparing our results with normal form games which 
share the same payoff matrix we find tha t theory predictions work even better in the 
sequential games. This is most likely caused by the fact tha t in the sequential games 
second movers have the advantage of observing first movers’ choices, and given that 
the games are constant sum, payoff maximizing for second movers is straightforward. 
Even if the strategy space is more complicated, and aided by the results of the informal 
questionnaire, we can conclude tha t subjects seem well able to backward induct in the 
sequential games while in the simultaneous games we only concluded tha t the Nash
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equilibrium prediction works well and tha t subjects behave strategically and believed 
opponents would play strategically, although the reasoning process they followed is 
unclear.
Contrary to our expectation, the feasibility or not of equal splits does not affect 
how first movers or second movers choose. This, together with the high percentages 
of subgame perfect equilibrium observed, provides some reassurance tha t in our ex­
periment, subjects’ behaviour was not affected by other regarding preferences, with or 
without intentions, as opposed to what has been observed in dictator and ultimatum 
games. Differences with respect to these games seem caused by first movers having 
the option to decide and by the non possibility of punishment.
Aided by the results from our informal questionnaire we conclude tha t it seems 
wrong to generally dismiss the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome as a good pre­
dictor of behaviour in simple sequential games, as subjects’ claims about how they 
reasoned were in line with standard game theoretic arguments. The results of the two 
experimental chapters of this dissertation suggest further research to help identify a 
broader class of games for which we can have some confidence tha t Game Theory is a 
good predictor of players’ behaviour.
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P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  2.1
Rewards paid in the equilibrium of the game played by the agents (w\, uf-) appear 
in ICC]nd. By (R2) the value of the right hand side of IC C \nd is zero and both agents 
obtain the same utility when they both do not work. By (U l) o  and (3 are positive. By 
choosing w\ — Ci = Wp the terms tha t compare direct utilities in ICC'lnd are equal to 
zero and do not subtract utility in the Left Hand Side of the condition. The principal’s 
objective is to maximize qt — w\ — w1-. By setting w\ =  q  and wr- — 0 the principal 
maximizes profits with ICC™ 1 holding.
For individual production by agent i to be an equilibrium, ICCnJnd needs also 
to hold. The following inequalities define the off-equilibrium rewards for /C C jT,d, 
ICC'iruiu and IC C )ndu to hold, with Wj = 0 , which is the lowest possible reward 
paid to agent j  in equilibrium. The restrictions shown are the result of rearranging
conditions IC C Jld, IC C lndU and ICC.i-fldu and simplifying the terms tha t compare
direct utilities. There are four cases depending on whether Wi — Cj ^  Wj — Cj and 
— Cj. Of these four cases, the combination w7 — q  < w3 — Cj and tcj > w3- — Cj 
violates IC C jld if IC C lndiI and IC C 1™111 hold and thus this case is removed, and we 
are left with afy, a.2 ) and b):
a) If ur^  — Cj > rnj then: wj — Cj > and
afy If Wj -  Cj >Wi -  cj then: Wi -  Ci > wj +  ~ Cj)
and Wj -  Cj < jzrp{ci -  Wi), 
a2) If Wj  - C j  < W i ~ C i  then: W i - C j  >  j ^  [ (1  + a ) u r j  —(3(wj -  Cj) -  a ( i u j  -  C j)]
and Wj -  Cj < -  q ) .
b) If u'j > u j  -  Cj then: wt -  q  > wj 4- -  C j ) ,  Wj -  Cj < -  q )  and
93
A p p e n d ic e s 94
P  > ci  +  1+5*4 ■
P ro o f  of P ro p o s itio n  2.2
Agent z’s utility when he does not work, given that agent j  works is:
a  max up- -  Cj  -  Up,  0 -  f3 max wj -  wj +  Cj ,  0
Notice that inequity aversion imposes that an agent obtains disutility either from 
being better off or worse off than the other agent, but not from both at the same time.
a) If agent i is worse off than agent j , the effect of envy dominates and 
vP — Cj — wj > 0 . Thus, to minimize the utility of agent i when he does 
not work, wj = 0 , as the derivative of agent z’s utility with respect to the 
reward offered to agent j  equals 1 +  a  > 0, by assumption (Ul).
b) If agent i is better off than agent j , the effect of guilt dominates and 
uP{ — up- +  Cj > 0 . Thus, to minimize the utility of agent i when he does 
not work, wj = 0 , as the derivative of agent z’s utility with respect to the 
reward offered to agent j  equals 1 — (3 > 0, by assumption (U2).
P ro o f  of P ro p o s itio n  2.3
By Proposition 2.2, the reward that maximizes agent f  s punishment when agent 
i individually works is Wj = 0 .
The utility of agent j  when agent i individually works is thus equal to:
—a  max \w\ — Cj, 0] — (3 max [—w\ + Cj, 0]
where by (Rl) and (R2),
w\ € [0, qi\ ,
and by (C),
0 <  Ci < ft.
Thus, minimizing agent j 's utility implies:
Wj  = Qi if a(qi -  a ) >  pCi
and
w\ = 0 if a(qi -  Ci) < /Scj.
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P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  2.4
First, from Proposition 2.2 it is optimal not to reward agents when they shirk, in 
order to create incentives for both agents to work.
wj =  wlj = 0 .
We now show the remaining rewards in each of the three cases referred in Propo­
sition 2.4.
Case a,): If a(qj — c, ) >  f3ci for i = 1,2, it is optimal to choose w\ = qj. Conditions 
(IC C '111 )s hold using results in Proposition 2.2. The principal maximizes 1 — w\ — W2 
subject to both (IC C JP)s. Using the slopes of the indifference curves given by (Ul) 
and (U2), the conditions optimally hold with equality and profits are maximized at the 
unique point at which the indifference curves intersect. Let j  be the agent for whom
Qj ~  cj > Qi — Cj) then:
or2(g, — c,;)—a ( / 3 — l)(g , — c 7) j
Wi =  C i    a + jY -W  <C i w i =  q i ’
w 3  a + ( l  —/3) <  3 j  ~  V  ’
Case b): If a{qr — q )  < (3ci and a(qj — Cj )  > (3cj for ?', j  =  1,2, i ^  j , it is optimal 
to choose w\ = 0 and wj = qj The two cases are created by whether the intersection 
of both indifference curves occurs at a point where Wi — c\ = Wj — cy
- Let a(qi — q ) < (5ci and a(q3 — Cj) > (3cj: Then
w \=  0 wj = qjt and:
- For a(qj — C j )  > /3cj then:
a f i c i  +  a (  1  -  ( 3 ) ( q j  -  Cj )  a / 3 ( q j  -  C j )  -  (3(1  +  a ) a  >
W i ~ C i  Q +  (l - 0 )  *
- For a ( q j  — C j )  <  (3ci then:
/?2Ci -  a ( l  +  a ) ( q j  -  C j )  _  a 2 ( q j  -  cj) +  0 ( 1  -  0 ) a  _
Wi~ Ci+ a + (1 — 0) ^ Wj~ Cj <* + (1-0) j '
Case c): If — Cj) < pcj for i = 1,2, inequity off equilibrium would be
maximized by setting w\ =  0 and u j = q j . However the equilibrium of the game played 
by the agents would not be unique. Inequity off-equilibrium has to be the maximum 
possible subject to one of the agents obtaining higher utility when he individually works 
than when he does not. Thus, one of the agents is offered a reward equal to all available
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output when he individually works instead of no reward. Therefore, off-equilibrium 
one agent suffers the maximum effect of guilt when he shirks while the other suffers 
the maximum effect of envy (w) = 0 and wj = q0 for i , j  = 1,2, i ^  j) .  Thus, one 
of the indifference curves is satisfied at the “optimal” level (for the agent who suffers 
guilt, when he shirks) while the other is satisfied at the “suboptimal” level (for the 
agent who suffers envy when he shirks). The optimal rewards paid are obtained at the 
intersection of one of the “optimal" and one of the “suboptimal” indifference curves.
The conditions indicate for which of the four possible cases, profits are maximized.
- Let a(qi — Ci) < (3cj. , a(qj — Cj) < (3cj. Then for cj > c* :
- For a(qj — C j )  > (3cj :
- if (1 -  2(3)[a(qj -  Cj) -  (3cj\ > (1 +  2a)[a(qi -  c») -  (3cj\, then:
^ q —a^ +: v ^ - c^  < Ci o,
w . = c . + ^  c . - J  -  a-
W J ~  CJ ~ r  a + ( l - / 3 )  >  3  ~
- if (1 -  2(3)[a(qj -  C j )  -  (3cj] < (1 +  2a)[a(qi -  a ) -  (3ci], then:
a 2 ( q i — Cj)+/3(1—(3)cj i
W i  =  C i  o + ( l - < > )   <  ° i  w i  =  « '
w . -  c ., <a2Cj-a(l+a)h.-Ci) <
W j  —  Cj  i  a+(l-0) > c3 U j -  U-
- For a '.(qj -  Cj )  < (3a :
- if a ( l  +  2a) (qj — Cj — qi 4- Ci) > (3(1 — 2(3)(cj — q ) , then:
Wi =  q  +  g a = P ^ ? ^ t - 9 )  > Q <  =  0,
U,J =  wj =
- if ai(l +  2a)(qj — Cj — qi + q ) < (3(1 — 2(3)(cj — q ) , then:
a 2 ( q i — C j ) + / 3 ( l — (3)cj  _ {
Wi  = C i    ^’ } < C i  w\ = q i ,
_  i P C j - a t l + a K q i - g )  < i _  Q
W J ~  CJ ^  a + ( l - / 3 )  >  ^  —  U -
P ro o f  o f C o ro lla ry  2.1
From Proposition 2.4, there are three possible cases:
T f    a '(/? -  “  Cj )  -  a 2(qr -  a) _  _   ^ a / %  -  C j )  -  a ( l  +  a )(qi -  a)
- I I  LL'i —  Cj  , W j  —  Cj  n  l I lG ll(3 -  I -  a  J J f3 -  I -  a
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a ( l  -  2(3)(qj — Cj) +  a ( l  +  2a)(qj -  a )  , . /TT^ xWi+iCj =  Cf+Cj------------------ -— ~ —    - < Ci+cj by( C), (U l) and (U2).
- If Wi =  C i -
1 +  a  -  j3
0 { 1  +  a ) c i  -  a / 3 { q j  -  Cj )  ^
' J  ~  V7 l  +  Q - / 3  th e n ’
Wi  +  W j  =  C f +  Cj  + - v  < Ct+Cj. by (C), (Ui) and (u 2).
(3 — 1 — a
WJ?, +  W j  =  Ci +  C j  +
n ( l +  2a)(g^ -  q ) +  /3(1 -  2(3)cj  
(3 — \  — a
< cj +  Cj by (C), (U l) and (U2).
P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  2.5
Rewards paid in the equilibrium of the game (w*, wj) appear in ICC]n(i and 
ICC™*1. By (R2) the value of the right hand side of IC C \Tld is zero and both agents 
obtain the same utility when they both do not work. As a  > 0, the only possible 
way to make condition ICC]nd hold under a lower total reward cost is by setting 
w\ — Cj > Wj. However, by (R l), Wj > 0, and thus, w\ > Cj. The minimum reward 
needed to be paid in equilibrium are thus w) =  cj and wl- = 0 .
P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  2.6
As /3 < 0, agents only obtain disutility from envy. To maximize the effect of envy 
off the joint production equilibrium, the agent who does not work off equilibrium is 
offered no reward (wj = 0 for i ,  j  = 1,2  and i  ^  j )  and the agent who works is offered 
all available production (w\ = qi for i  = 1,2). The expression for the equilibrium 
rewards paid follows calculations in case a) in Proposition 2.4.
P ro o f  o f P ro p o s itio n  2.7
Assume agent i individually works off the equilibrium of the game. Efficiency 
concerns implies that agents care for the weighted sum of direct utilities, putting more 
weight on each own’s direct utility than on the other agent’s direct utility:
a) If Uj > Ui, agent i ’s utility can be written as (1 + a)Ui — aU 2 , which is a weighted 
sum since a  < 0 and |o| < ^.
b) If Uj < Ui, agent z’s utility can be written as (I — (3)Ui + /3U2, which is a weighted 
sum since f3 € [0, ^).
For IC C lnd to hold, agent i must obtain non-negative utility when he works given 
that agent j  does not work. Assume w\ < q , then it is necessary that wlj > Ci — w\
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as |«| < 7;. Obviously, given (R l), this implies w) +  w* > Cj. Finally, w\ > q  cannot 
be optimal as it implies w\ +  ui1- >  q . Notice that w\ =  q  and Wj =  0 is not the only 
possible combination such that the condition holds.
P ro o f  of P ro p o s itio n  2.8
To maximize the effect of inefficiency off-equilibrium, all agents should be offered 
no reward off-equilibrium, no m atter whether they work or not. However, by doing so, 
no production would be an equilibrium as I C C f pl for i = 1,2 would not hold. Thus, 
working has to be a dominant strategy for one of the agents (agent i). For I C C f 1 >l 
to hold but at the same time not provide incentives for agent j  to shirk when agent i 
individually works, it is optimal to set w) =  q  and =  0. When agent j  individually 
works, maximum inefficiency is generated by setting wj = w3- — 0. The remaining 
two equilibrium rewards are obtained at the intersection between the minimum lines 
defined by both IC C (p's for i =  1,2 :
Wi -  Ci -  /3(wi -  Ci -  wj + Cj) > 0,
W j  — Cj — a ( w i  — Cj — Wj  +  Cj )  >  - f a ,
which yields: Wi = Cj +  and Wj = Cj -
Notice that the sum of rewards paid in equilibrium equals W{ +  w3 =  q  +  Cj — 
°i• As a  <  0, /? 6  [0,1/2), and |a | <  \/3\ then > 0 and thus, it is
optimal to set wJ- — Cj for the agent for which the cost of effort is lowest, i.e., for 
Cj > q  and i, j  = 1, 2 , i ±  j.
2 N u m erica l exam p les o f  C hap ter 2
2 . 1 C h a n g e  o f  o p t im a l  p r o d u c t io n  leve l
Assume a  = 0.9,/? =  0.1, <71 =  0.7, C\ =  0.5,92 =  0.5 and C2 =  0.4.
The condition for individual production by agent 1 to be optimal, 1 — C2 <
Qi i f  (<7i ~ ci) > (<?2 ~  C2), holds as 1 — 0.4 < 0.7 with (0.7 — 0.5) > (0.5 — 0.4). 
Therefore, in the equilibrium of the game when agents are standard rewards paid are 
w\ = 0.5 and w\ = 0, and profits (91 — re]) are equal to 0.2.
Now we look at joint production with inequity averse agents. From Proposition 
2.3, it is optimal to offer w\ = w\ =  0 to the agent who does not work when the other 
agent individually works. Notice also that a(qi — q ) > /?q for i =  1,2, as:
0.9(0.7 — 0.5) >0.1(0.5) 
0.9(0.5 — 0.4) > 0.1(0.4).
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Thus, it is optimal to offer all output to the agent who individually works off 
equilibrium: w\ =  q\ =  0.7 and — <?2 — 0.5.
Finally, notice that a{q\ — c\) > a{q2 — C2) as 0.18 > 0.09. Thus, in equilibrium
w\ — ci > W2 — C2 and the IC C fp s are:
w\ — 0.5 — 0.1(?ni — 0.5 — W2 + 0.4) >  —0.09
W2 ~  0.4 — 0.9(it;i — 0.5 — W2 +  0.4) >  —0.18.
Solving these two inequalities with equality, we obtain the optimal equilibrium 
rewards for joint production, w\ =  0.415 and W2 =  0.265. Thus, profits when joint 
production is implemented are equal to 1 — w\ — W2 = 0.32, which are higher than 
profits with individual production by agent 1 as 0.32 > 0.2. Therefore, joint production 
is optimal when agents are inequity averse while individual production by agent 1 is 
optimal when agents are standard.
2.2 Principal’s loss w hen joint production is not optim ally im ple­
m ented
Assume qi = q2 — 0.5 and ci =  C2 =  0.4.
The condition for joint production to be optimal when agents are standard, 1 — q\ > 
C2 if (<71 — ci) >  (q2 — C2 ) holds, as 1 — 0.5 >  0.4 with (0.5 — 0.4) > (0.5 — 0.4).
Thus, with standard preferences the total cost of implementing joint production 
equals the sum of both agents’ costs of effort: w\ +  W2 =  ci +  C2 =  0.8.
When agents are inequity averse, the agent who individually works off equilibrium 
is offered a reward equal to total individual production, w\ =  qi if a(qj — Cj )  > f3cj iov 
i , j  =  1,2, i 7^ j . Thus, there are two cases:
a) If a(0.5 — 0.4) >  /?(0.4) a  > 4(3 then: w \ =  w \ =  0.5,
b) If a(0.5 — 0.4) < (3(0A) => a  < 4/3 then: w\ =  w\ =  0.
a) Assume a  > 4j3. The no deviation conditions for each agent to work 
when the other agent works are:
w\ — 0.4 — a  m&x[w2 — 0.4 — w \+  0.4,0] — f3 max[u;i — 0.4 — W2 + 0.4,0] > — o:[0.5 — 0.4], 
W2 — 0.4 — am axfw i — 0.4 — W2 +  0.4,0] -/?m ax[w 2 — 0.4 — w\ + 0.4,0] > —o:[0.5 — 0.4].
As the productivity parameters are the same for both agents, in equilibrium there 
is no inequity and equilibrium rewards are:
w \  =  W2 =  0.4 — 0 .1a.
A p p e n d ic e s 100
b) Assume a  < 4(3. The 110 deviation conditions for each agent to work 
when the other agent works are:
w\ — 0.4 — o max[u>2 — 0.4 — w\ +  0.4,0] — (3 max[u>i — 0.4 — wo +  0.4,0] >  —/?(0.4), 
u ’2 — 0.4 — a  max[i{q — 0.4 — W2 +  0.4,0] — (3max[iC2 — 0.4 — w\ +  0.4,0] >  — (3(0.4).
As the productivity parameters are the same for both agents, in equilibrium there 
is no inequity and equilibrium rewards are:
w\ = W2 = 0.4(1 — (3).
We calculate the principal’s possible loss as the difference between the principal’s 
profits (production minus rewards) with and without inequity aversion. As production 
when both agents work is normalized to 1, this loss is expressed in terms of the total 
production exerted.
Thus, the loss function is
[1 -  2(0.4 -  0.lev)] -  [1 -  0.8] when a  >  4(3,
[1 -  2(0.4)(1 -  (3)} -  [1 -  0.8] when a  <  4(3.
The figure below displays this loss function for a  E [0,1) and (3 E [0, ^].
Principal’s loss when q\ = <72 =  0.5 and c\ = C2 = 0.4.
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3 Proofs of Chapter 3
In this appendix we sketch the equilibrium solutions of the game with exogenous 
sequential moves and incomplete information and the game with endogenous timing 
and incomplete information.
The game with exogenous sequential moves can be solved by simple backward 
induction (since the first mover only influences the second mover’s payoff via his action 
and not via his type). The low type (6 =  0) will simply choose
x% = k
in the second period regardless of what the first mover did. The high type (6 =  b) 
would instead react to the leader’s decision and choose his effort according to
H k + bxi
.............................................................X3^ l) =  T 7 T -  ....................................................
As first movers both types would utilize the commitment effect. Specifically, the low 
type would choose
L _  j l  +  6 ( l + p )
1 1 + 6
and the high type
H _  1 +  36(1 +  6) + bp( 1 — b) +  63(1 — p )
Xl 1 +  36(1 +  6) — 2b2 p  +  63(1 — p)
This also describes what would happen in one of the asymmetric equilibria of the 
game with endogenous timing, where one of the agents becomes leader because of his 
“name” .
We conclude this appendix by mentioning the first-period effort tha t a high type 
would choose deviating from a proposed symmetric outcome where low types move 
first and high types second. The optimal deviation would then be to choose
+ _  . 1 +  36(1 +  b) +  bp( 1 -  bp) +  b3( l  -  p2)
X l ~  l  +  36(l +  6 ) - 2 6 2p + 6 3( l - p )
4 Instructions for Chapter 4 (BABA Treatments)
WELCOME TO OUR EXPERIMENT!
This is a serious scientific experiment and, as such, no talking, looking around or walking 
around will be permitted. If you have any questions or need any assistance, please raise 
your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc, YOU 
WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE AND YOU WILL NOT BE PAID. Thank you.
This is an experiment on individual decision making. The ESRC Centre for Evolutionary 
Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) has provided the funds for this experiment. You 
will be paid £5 (five pounds) for having arrived on time. Additionally, if you follow the 
instructions and pass an Understanding Test you will be allowed to continue in the 
experiment. Once in the experiment, depending on your decisions you may earn a 
considerable additional amount of money. This additional amount will be determined 
both by your decisions and by those of other participants in the experiment. Before 
making your decisions, you will be informed about how your earnings and the other 
participants’ earnings depend on your and their decisions. All that you earn is yours to 
keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after today’s session.
We need 20 people for this session. Thus, if more than 20 people pass the Understanding 
Test, some of you will be asked not to participate in the experiment but to help the 
experimenter as “assistants”. These assistants will check that everything is done as 
explained in the instructions. The assistants will be paid the average of the payments of 
the 20 participants in the experiment.
For each decision you take in the experiment, You will be anonymously matched with 
one of the other participants. We will refer to the other participants as “S / HE”. You and 
s/he will be presented with a TABLE. For this table, You and S/HE separately and 
independently will make a DECISION. Together, the two decisions determine the 
number of POUNDS each of you earns, which may be different.
The table in the next page shows an illustrative example. IT IS ONLY AN 
ILLUSTRATION. The tables you will see during the experiment will be different from 
this one. AS YOU LOOK AT THIS TABLE, PLEASE CONTINUE READING THIS 
HANDOUT FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE TABLE:
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S / H E
LEFT CENTRE RIGHT
UP
YOU MIDDLE
DOWN
In the actual experiment, you will be shown tables like this one (but with different 
numbers), and asked to choose one of your decisions (“UP”, “MIDDLE” or “DOWN”). 
The participant to whom you are matched for each table will be asked, independently, to 
choose one of her/his decisions (“LEFT”, “CENTRE” or “RIGHT”).
The combination of your decision and her/his decision determines the cell of the table 
chosen. The number of pounds you and s/he receive for the cell chosen is a whole number 
ranging from 1 to 11.
The number of pounds you receive appears in the lower left comer of each cell of the 
table.
The number of pounds s/he receives appears in the upper right comer of each cell of the 
table.
To interpret the table, consider the results of the possible combinations of decisions.
-If you choose UP and S/HE chooses LEFT, you earn 1 Pound and S/HE earns 9 Pounds. 
-If you choose UP and S/HE chooses CENTRE, you earn 2 Pounds and S/HE earns 8 
Pounds.
-If you choose UP and S/HE chooses RIGHT, you earn 3 Pounds and S/HE earns 7 
Pounds.
-If you choose MIDDLE and S/HE chooses LEFT, you earn 4 Pounds and S/HE earns 6 
Pounds.
-If you choose MIDDLE and S/HE chooses CENTRE, you earn 5 Pounds and S/HE earns 
5 Pounds.
-If you choose MIDDLE and S/HE chooses RIGHT, you earn 6 Pounds and S/HE earns 4 
Pounds.
-If you choose DOWN and S/HE chooses LEFT, you earn 7 Pounds and S/HE earns 3 
Pounds.
-If you choose DOWN and S/HE chooses CENTRE, you earn 8 Pounds and S/HE earns 2 
Pounds.
-If you choose DOWN and S/HE chooses RIGHT, you earn 9 Pounds and S/HE earns 1 
Pound.
Please be sure you understand this table. Raise your hand if you would like further 
explanation. Otherwise, please start with the Understanding Test in the next page. Please 
raise your hand once you have finished the Understanding Test.
9
1
8
2
7
3
6 5 4
4 5 6
3 2 1
7 8 9
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UDERSTANDING TEST
You will now take a short UNDERSTANDING TEST. After you have finished the 
TEST, it will be graded and you will ONLY be allowed to continue in the experiment if 
you have answered ALL the QUESTIONS CORRECTLY. If one or more of your 
answers is not correct, we will ask you to be our assistant and to check that everything 
proceeds as explained in the instructions. Notice that even if all your answers are correct, 
you may be asked to be our assistant.
This test has 5 questions. After you have answered all 5 questions, please re-check your 
answers. Please raise your hand when you are finished so as we can grade this test.
S / H E
LEFT CENTRE RIGHT
UP
6
2 7
3
5
4
8 9 2
YOU MIDDLE
9 6 4
1 5 7
DOWN
1 3 3
Using the table above, please answer the following questions.
Questions:
1. If you choose MIDDLE and S/HE chooses RIGHT, how many Pounds will you earn?
2. If you choose UP and S/HE chooses LEFT, how many Pounds will S/HE earn?
3. If you choose UP and S/HE chooses RIGHT, how many Pounds will you earn?
4. If you choose DOWN and S/HE chooses CENTRE, how many Pounds will you earn?
5. If you choose DOWN and S/HE chooses LEFT, how many Pounds will S/HE earn?
YOU HAVE JUST COMPLETED THE TEST.
Please re-check your answers and raise your hand when you are done.
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INSTRUCTIONS
There are 20 participants in this experiment. We have randomly divided the 20 
participants in two groups of 10 participants. Everyone has been recruited for this 
experiment using the same procedure and everyone is receiving the same 
instructions.
In this experiment we are going to show you 10 different tables, similar to the one 
you have already seen.
For each table, you will have to answer two questions. One question asks you to 
choose a decision and the other question asks you about what you THINK other 
people’s decisions are. Below we explain how to answer these questions and how 
you will be paid for your answers.
For each table, you have to choose between “UP”, “MIDDLE” and “DOWN”. 
The 10 participants in the other group, choose between “LEFT”, “CENTRE’ 
“RIGHT” in each of the 10 tables.
and
For the first question, you will have to write down how many of the 10 participants 
in the other group YOU THINK have chosen each of their 3 options (LEFT, 
CENTRE and RIGHT) in each of the 10 tables.
For the second question, you have to circle your decision (UP, MIDDLE or 
DOWN) in each of the 10 tables.
Notice that for each of the 10 tables, you have been anonymously and randomly 
matched with one of the 10 participants in the other group (who chooses between 
“LEFT’, “CENTRE” and “RIGHT”).
YOU HAVE BEEN MATCHED WITH A DIFFERENT PARTICIPANT IN 
EACH TABLE.
None of the participants will know who they are matched with in each table.
Lets see an example on how to answer the 2 questions:
In the table below I have written down that out of the 10 participants in the other 
group, I THINK 4 will choose “LEFT”, I THINK 1 will choose “CENTRE” and I 
THINK 5 will choose “RIGHT'. (Notice that guesses about how others play must 
always add up to 10).
Also, I have circled “MIDDLE” to indicate that “MIDDLE” is my decision. 
Example:
Out of the 10 participants in the other group I think they will choose:
TOTAL
10
MIDDLE
DOWN
LEFT  
__ 4___ I
CENTRE  
_ 1 ___
RIGHT
__5___  |
LEFT
S/HE
CENTRE RIGHT
5
2
4
8
3
4
Is  7
4
11
3
7
9
3
11
1
8
5
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Caution: The numbers used in this example were selected arbitrarily.They are 
NOT intended to suggest how anyone might respond in any situation.
Below we explain how we will pay you according to your answers and the answers 
of your matched participant to each of the 2 questions.
PAYMENT FOR YOUR ANSWERS TO QUESTION 1
You will be paid an amount of money according to the difference between the 
number of participants in the other group you have guessed have chosen each 
option (“LEFT”, “CENTRE” or “RIGHT”) and the actual number of participants in 
the other group who have in fact chosen each decision.
We will pay you according to a formula that we explain below. Do not worry if the 
formula seems complicated as it is not important that you understand the workings 
of the formula completely. However, notice that with this formula, the closer the 
numbers you write down (your “guesses”) to the actual number of participants who 
have chosen each decision in each table, the more money you will get.
For example, if 6 participants have chosen LEFT and you guessed that 6 
participants would choose LEFT, you would get more money than if you guessed 
that 5 or 7 participants would choose LEFT for that table.
Here is the formula:
P a y m e n t  = 2 - 0 . 0 1  * [ (a  - X)~ +  (b  -Y )2 +  (c  - Z ) :]
Where:
a : N u m b e r  o f  p a r t i c ip a n ts  y o u  th in k  h a v e  c h o se n  L E F T  X :  N u m b e r  o f  p a r t ic ip a n ts
w h o  h a v e  c h o se n  L E F T  
b : N u m b e r  o f  p a r t i c ip a n ts  y o u  th in k  h a v e  c h o se n  C E N T R E  Y: N u m b e r  o f  p a r t i c ip a n ts
w h o  h a v e  c h o se n  C E N T R E  
c :  N u m b e r  o f  p a r t ic ip a n ts  y o u  th in k  h a v e  c h o se n  R IG H T  Z : N u m b e r  o f  p a r t ic ip a n ts
w h o  h a v e  c h o se n  R IG H T
Please follow the next examples to see how the formula works.
Examples:
-In some table, you write that you think 7 participants have chosen LEFT, 0, 
participants have chosen CENTRE and 2 participants have chosen RIGHT. If, in 
fact, 7 participants have chosen UP, 0 participants have chosen CENTRE and 2 
participants have chosen RIGHT, you get:
P a y m e n t  = 2 - 0 . 0 1 *  [ (7 -7 )  2 +  (0 -0 )  2 +  (2  -2 )  2J  = 2 -  0 .0 1  * [0J  =  2 Pounds.
- In some other table, you write that you think, 5 participants have chosen LEFT, 2 
participants have chosen CENTRE and 3 participants have chosen RIGHT. If, in 
fact, 1 participant has chosen UP, 8 participants have chosen CENTRE and 1 
participant has chosen RIGHT, you get:
P a y m e n t  = 2 - 0 . 0 1  [ (5 -1 )  2 +  (2 -8 )  2 +  ( 3 - l ) 2]  =  2 -  0 .0 1  [42 + 6 2 + 2 2]  =
=  2 -  0.01 * [5 6 ]  =  1.44 Pounds
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Finally, in some other table, you write that you think, 0 participants have 
chosen LEFT, 10 participants have chosen CENTRE and 0 participants have 
chosen RIGHT. If, in fact, 10 participants have chosen UP, 0 participants have 
chosen CENTRE and 0 participants have chosen RIGHT, you get:
Payment = 2 -0 .0 1  [(0-10) 2 + (10-0) 2 + (0 -0 )2]  = 2 -  0.01 [0] = 0 Pounds
Caution: The numbers used in this example were selected arbitrarily. They 
are NOT intended to suggest how anyone might respond in any situation.
These examples should illustrate that with this formula you will always receive a 
payment of at least £0 and at most £2 for question 1 and that you will earn more 
money the more accurate your written guesses are.
PAYMENT FOR YOUR ANSWERS TO QUESTION 2
You will be paid a number of pounds equal to the number that appears in the lower 
left comer of the cell that you and your matched participant in that table have 
chosen. Your matched participant in the table will be paid the amount of pounds 
that appears on the upper right comer of the cell that you and her/him have chosen.
FINAL INSTRUCTIONS
We will wait until all participants have finished answering the 2 questions in the 10 
tables. Please take some time to think and check your answers. We will allow a 
maximum of 40 minutes to answer all questions. Please, if you finish before time 
raise your hand and we will collect your answers. However, you are asked to 
remain in your seat quiet until all participants have finished.
After all participants have finished, we will randomly select ONE table from which 
all payments to all participants will be done. This table will be selected using a 
bingo um with 10 numbered balls. The number on the ball selected determines for 
which of the 10 tables all participants are paid for both question 1 and question 2. 
You will be paid the sum of three things:
£5 for arriving on time
The result of applying the formula explained in question 1 to the selected table. 
The amount of pounds indicated in the lower left comer of the cell that you and 
your matched participant in the selected table have chosen.
You have been given an identification number. Please write this number at the top 
of each of your answer sheets and keep the number. You will need this number to 
be paid.
While we calculate the payments you will be asked to fill in an anonymous 
questionnaire. After we have done the calculations, you will be asked to 
come with the questionnaire and your identification number to a room where 
you will be paid your earnings in cash and in private.
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO START 
(Please raise your hand if there are any doubts with these instructions, and we will 
answer them privately)
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5 The Gam es in Chapter 4
Below  we show each o f  the ten games subjects played in treatments BABA U  and A BU . Below  
each game we indicate the cells that were changed to create treatments BABA F and ABF. 
Additionally, we indicate the predictions o f  each o f  the six models studied (“Eq” for Equilibrium, 
“M ax” for Maximax, other names are identical), the percentage o f  subjects who played each action 
(“Act” ), the percentage o f  beliefs assigned to that action (“Bel” ) and the round o f  iterated strict 
dominance in which a strategy would be deleted (“D o / ”, “D o2  ”, “D o3 ” and “D o4 ”) .
Game 1R Column
Ecft Do2 Centre Right
Up 9 8 7
D ol 3 4 5 Act: 0 Bel: 3
Row 7 5 5
Middle
D ol 5 7 7
Act: 20 Bel: 15.25
LI 3 3 Eq 4
Down Max
9 9
L2
8 L3 D1
Act: 80 Bel: 81.75
Act: 22.5 Bel: 40.75 Act: 5 Bel: 24 Act: 72.5 Bel: 35.25
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Middle-Left Payoff 
was changed by (6,6).
G am e 1C
Column
Left
D ol
Centre
D ol
Right
Up
Do2
2
10
10
2
11
Max
1
Act: 5 Bel: 16
Row 3 4 10
Middle
Do2 9 8
LI
2
Act: 35 Bel: 34
5 8 Eq 9
Down
7 4
L2
3 L3 D1
Act: 60 Bel: 50
Act: 2.5 Bel: 11.5 Act: 7.5 Bel: 19.75 Act: 90 Bel: 68.75
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Down-Left P ayoff 
was changed by (6,6).
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Game 2R
Left
Do3
Column
Centre
D ol
Right
Up 7
L2
7 8
Eq
5 D1 5 4 L3 Act: 95 Bel: 66.5
Row 10 1 9
Middle
LI
Do2
Max
2 11 3 Act: 5 Bel: 20.25
11 2 9
Down
Do2 1 10 3 Act: 0 Bel: 13.25
Act: 30 Bel: 45.75 Act: 0 Bel: 9 Act: 70 Bel: 45.25
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Up-Left Payoff was
changed by (6,6).
G am e 2C
Column
Left
Do2
Centre Right
Do2
Up
Do3
1
11
8
LI
4 D1
5
Max
7
Act: 25 Bel: 42.25
Row 8 8 11
Middle
D ol 4 4 1
Act: 0 Bel: 12.75
5 Eq 7 5
Down
7
L2
5 L3 7
Act: 75 Bel: 45
Act: 5 Bel: 11.75 Act: 87.5 Bel: 57.25 Act: 7.5 Bel: 31
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Down-Left P ayoff
was changed by (6,6).
109
Gam e 3R
Left Do3
Column
Centre Right
D ol
Up 7 Eq 8 7
5
L2
4 L3 D1 5
Act: 92.5 Bel: 66.25
Row 9 11 8
Middle
D ol 3 1 4 Act: 2.5 Bel: 8.25
Down
Do2
9
3
9
LI
Max
3
1
11 Act: 5 Bel: 2.55
Act: 15 Bel: 27.25 Act: 72.5 Bel: 63.25 Act: 12.5 Bel: 9.5
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Up-Left P ayoff was 
changed by (6,6).
G am e 3C
Column
Left
D ol
Centre
Do2
Right
Up 3 11 4
D ol 9 1 8
Act: 0 Bel: 6.25
Row 2 LI 2 Eq 3
Middle
10 10
L3
9 D1
Act: 85 Bel: 73.25
Down
Do3
4
8
Max 1
11
5
L2
7
Act: 15 Bel: 20.5
Act: 0 Bel: 20.35 Act: 12.5 Bel: 26.39 Act: 87.5 Bel: 53.27
In treatments BABA F and ABF, the Down-Right P ayoff 
was changed by (6,6).
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G am e 4R
Left
Column
Centre
Do2
Right
Do4
Up 8 !0 1!
D ol 4 2 1
Row 7 1 Max 8
Middle
Do3 5 11 4
Eq 5 4 LI 2
Down L2
7 L3 D1 8 10
Act: 0 Bel: 6
Act: 12.5 Bel: 28.25
Act: 87.5 Bel: 66.25
Act: 87.5 Bel: 53 Act: 0 Bel: 14 Act: 12.5 Bel: 33
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Middle-Left Payoff 
was changed by (6,6).
G am e 4C
Column
Row
Left Centre
Do3
Right
D ol
Up Eq 5 
L2
4 3
7 L3 8 9
Middle
LI 7 Max 1 3
Do4
D1
5 11 9
9 11 2
Down
Do2 3 1 10
Act : 90 Bel: 67.75 Act: 2.5 Bel: 21.75 Act: 7.5 Bel: 10.
Act: 67.5 Bel: 50.25
Act: 32.5 Bel: 40.75
Act: 0 Bel: 9
In treatments BABA F and ABF, the Middle-Left P ayoff 
was changed by (6,6).
I l l
G a m e  N R Column
Left Centre Right
Up 4
8
7
5
11
Max
1
Act: 2.5 Bel: 18.25
Row
Middle
7
5
Eq 7
5
LI 7 
D1
5
Act: 92.5 Bel: 60.25
L3 10 7 L2 5
Down
2 5 7
Act: 5 Bel: 21.5
Act: 7.5 Bel: 16.75 Act: 52.5 Bel: 45.5 Act: 40 Bel: 37.75
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Down-Right Payoff 
was changed by (6,6).
G a m e  N C
Column
Left Centre Right
Up 11
1
5
L3
7
9
3
Act: 2.5 Bel: 16.25
Row
Middle
8
4
8
L2
4
Eq 8
4
Act: 72.5 Bel: 53.5
Max 4 10 LI 9
Down
8 2
D1
3
Act: 25 Bel: 9
Act: 5 Bel: 22.5 Act: 20 Bel: 28 Act: 75 Bel: 49.5
In treatments BABAF and ABF, the Up-Centre P ayoff 
was changed by (6,6).
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6 Instructions for Chapter 5
WELCOME TO OUR EXPERIMENT!
This is a serious scientific experiment and, as such, no talking, looking around or walking 
around will be permitted. If you have any questions or need any assistance, please raise 
your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loud, etc, YOU 
WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE AND YOU WILL NOT BE PAID. Thank you.
This is an experiment on individual decision making. The ESRC Centre for Evolutionary 
Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) has provided the funds for this experiment. You 
will be paid £5 (five pounds) for having arrived on time. Additionally, if you follow the 
instructions and pass an UNDERSTANDING TEST you will be allowed to continue in 
the experiment. Once in the experiment, depending on your decisions you may earn a 
considerable additional amount of money. This additional amount will be determined 
both by your decisions and by those of other participants in the experiment. Before 
making your decisions, you will be informed about how your earnings and the other 
participants’ earnings depend on your and their decisions. All that you earn is yours to 
keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after today’s session.
We need 20 people for this session. Thus, if more than 20 people pass the 
UNDERSTANDING TEST, some of you will be asked not to participate in the 
experiment but to help the experimenter as “assistants”. These assistants will check that 
everything is done as explained in the instructions. The assistants will be paid the average 
of the payments of the 20 participants in the experiment
In this experiment, 10 participants will belong to group A (to whom we will refer as “A”) 
and 10 participants will belong to group B (to whom we will refer as “B”). All 
participants have to take decisions from a table they will be presented. For each table, 
each participant in group A will be anonymously matched with one participant in group 
B.
Participants in group A will be presented with a TABLE. For this table, participants in 
group A will take a decision. Afterwards, participants in group B will be presented with 
the same table and, knowing what their matched participant in group A decided, they will 
make another decision. Together, die two decisions determine the number of POUNDS 
each of you earns, which may be different.
The table in the next page shows an illustrative example. IT IS ONLY AN 
ILLUSTRATION. The tables you will see during the experiment will be different from 
this one. AS YOU LOOK AT THIS TABLE, PLEASE CONTINUE READING THIS 
HANDOUT FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE TABLE:
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UP
A MIDDLE
DOWN
In the actual experiment, A will be shown tables like this one (but with different 
numbers), and asked to choose one decision (“UP”, “MIDDLE” or “DOWN”). After A 
takes his/her decision, the participant from B with whom they are matched for each table 
will learnt what decision A took in that table and will be asked to choose his/her decisions 
(“LEFT”, “CENTRE” or “RIGHT”).
The combination of A's decision and B’s decision determines the number of pounds they 
receive. These numbers are whole numbers ranging from 1 to 11.
The number of pounds A receives appears in the lower left comer of each cell of the 
table.
The number of pounds B receives appears in the upper right comer of each cell of the 
table.
To interpret the table, consider the results of the possible combinations of decisions.
-If A chooses UP and then B chooses LEFT, A earns 1 Pound and B earns 9 Pounds.
-If A chooses UP and then B chooses CENTRE, A earns 2 Pounds and B earns 8 
Pounds.
-If A chooses UP and then B chooses RIGHT, A earns 3 Pounds and B earns 7 Pounds. 
-If A chooses MIDDLE and then B chooses LEFT, A earns 4 Pounds and B earns 6 
Pounds.
-If A chooses MIDDLE and then B chooses CENTRE, A earns 5 Pounds and B earns 5 
Pounds.
-If A chooses MIDDLE and then B chooses RIGHT, A earns 6 Pounds and B earns 4 
Pounds.
-If A chooses DOWN and then B chooses LEFT, A earns 7 Pounds and B earns 3 
Pounds.
-If A chooses DOWN and then B chooses CENTRE, A earns 8 Pounds and B earns 2 
Pounds.
-If A chooses DOWN and then B chooses RIGHT, A earns 9 Pounds and B earns 1 
Pound.
Please be sure you understand this table. Raise your hand if you would like further 
explanation. Otherwise, please start with the Understanding Test in the next page. Please 
raise your hand once you have finished the Understanding Test.
B
LEFT CENTRE RIGHT
9 8 7
1 2 3
6 5 4
4 5 6
3 2 1
7 8 9
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UDERSTANDING TEST
You will now take a short UNDERSTANDING TEST. After you have finished the 
TEST, it will be graded and you will ONLY be allowed to continue in the experiment if 
you have answered ALL the QUESTIONS CORRECTLY. If one or more of your 
answers is not correct, we will ask you to be our assistant and to check that everything 
proceeds as explained in the instructions. Notice that even if all your answers are correct, 
you may be asked to be our assistant.
This test has 5 questions. After you have answered all 5 questions, please re-check your 
answers. Please raise your hand when you are finished so as we can grade this test.
UP
A MIDDLE
DOWN
Using the table above, please answer the following questions.
Questions:
1. If A chooses MIDDLE and afterwards B choosess RIGHT, how many Pounds will A 
earn?__
2. If A chooses UP and afterwards B choosess LEFT, how many Pounds will B earn?
3. If A chooses UP and afterwards B choosess RIGHT, how many Pounds will A earn?
4. If A chooses DOWN and afterwards B choosess CENTRE, how many Pounds will A 
earn?__
5. If A chooses DOWN and afterwards B choosess LEFT, how many Pounds will B 
earn?____
YOU HAVE JUST COMPLETED THE TEST.
Please re-check your answers and raise your hand when you are done.
B
LEFT CENTRE RIGHT
6 3 4
2 7 5
8 9 2
9 6 4
1 5 7
1 3 3
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INSTRUCTIONS
There are 20 participants in this experiment. We have randomly divided the 20 
participants in two groups of 10 participants (“group A” and “group B”). Everyone 
has been recruited for this experiment using the same procedure and everyone has 
been assigned to one of the two groups randomly.
We are going to show you 10 different tables, similar to the one you have already 
seen.
For each of the 10 tables you receive a different answer sheet. In each answer sheet 
you will have to make a decision. Below we explain how to make your choices and 
how you will be paid for them.
First, participants of group A will circle their decision (UP, MIDDLE or DOWN) 
in each of the 10 tables.
After A have made all their choices, their answers sheets will be collected.
Then, participants in group B will receive 10 answer sheets, each one 
corresponding to a different table and coming from a different participant from 
group A.
Therefore, participants in group B will know what the participant from group A 
with whom they are matched in each table has chosen for each table.
After receiving the answer sheets, participants in group B will choose between 
“LEFT”, “CENTRE” and “RIGHT” in each of the 10 tables. These choices, 
together with the choice by the participant in group A, will select a cell in each of 
the 10 tables.
Notice that for each of the 10 tables, you will be anonymously and randomly 
matched with one of the 10 participants from the other group.
YOU HAVE BEEN MATCHED WITH A DIFFERENT PARTICIPANT IN 
EACH TABLE.
NO PARTICIPANT IN THIS EXPERIMENT WILL KNOW WHO THEY ARE 
MATCHED WITH FOR ANY PARTICULAR TABLE.
NO PARTICIPANT IN THIS EXPERIMENT WILL KNOW THE CHOICE 
MADE BY PARTICIPANTS WITH WHOM THEY ARE NOT MATCHED.
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Example
In the table below A circles “DOWN” to indicate that DOWN is his choice. After 
observing A’s choice, B circles “RIGHT” to indicate that RIGHT is his choice:
UP
MIDDLE
^ D O W ^
LEFT CENTRE L RIGHT
5 4
2 8 4
7 4 3
5 11 7
, 9 11 8
) 3 1 5
Caution: The numbers used in this example were selected arbitrarily. They 
are NOT intended to suggest how anyone might choose in any situation.
Below we explain how we will pay you according to your choices.
PAYMENTS
After the experiment is finished, we will randomly select ONE table from which all 
payments to all participants will be done. This table will be selected using a bingo 
urn with 10 numbered balls. The number on the ball selected determines for which 
of the 10 tables all participants are paid.
Participants from group A will be paid a number of pounds equal to the number 
that appears in the left down comer of the cell chosen by them and their matched 
participant from group B in the selected table.
Participants from group B will be paid the amount of pounds that appears in the 
upper right comer of the cell chosen by them and their matched participant from 
group A in the selected table.
YOU BELONG TO GROUP A (B)
You (Your matched participant in the table selected) will be paid the sum of two 
things:
- £5 for arriving on time.
- The amount of pounds indicated in the lower left comer in the chosen cell of the 
selected table.
Your matched participant in the table selected (You) from group B will be paid: 
- £5 for arriving on time
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- The amount of pounds that appears in the upper right comer in the chosen cell of 
the selected table.
FINAL INSTRUCTIONS
We will wait until all participants in group A have finished choosing in the 10 
tables, to give the answer sheets to participants in group B. Please take some time 
to think and check your answers. We will allow each participant a maximum of 20 
minutes to answer all questions. Please, if you finish before time raise your hand 
and we will collect your answers.
You are asked to remain in your seat quiet until the experiment is finished.
You have been given an identification number. Please write this number at the 
top of each of your answer sheets (where it says “GROUP A (B) 
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER”) and keep the number. You will need this 
number to be paid.
While we calculate the payments you will be asked to fill in an anonymous 
questionnaire. After we have done the calculations, you will be asked to come with 
the questionnaire and your identification number to a room where you will be paid 
your earnings in cash and in private.
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO
START
(Please raise your hand if there are any doubts with these instructions, and we will
answer them privately)
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7 The G am es in Chapter 5
Below we show each o f  the ten games subjects played in “Unfair” treatments. Below  each game 
we indicate the cell that was changed to create the “Fair” treatments. Additionally, we indicate the 
percentage o f  subjects who played each action, both for first movers (“First”) and second movers 
(“Second”).
G am e 1R
Left Centre Right
Up 9 8 7
3 4 5 First: 0 Second: 0
7 5 5
Middle
5 7 7
First: 5 Second:0
3 3 4
Down
9 9 8
Equilibrium
First: 95 Second:100
First: 10 Second: 10 First: 0 Second: 0 First: 90 Second: 90 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Middle-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6).
G am e 1C
Left Centre Right
Up 2 10 11
10 2 1
3 4 10
Middle
9 8 2
5 8 9
Down Equilibrium
7 4 3
First: 0 Second: 0
First: 10 Second: 0
First: 90 Second: 100
First: 5 Second: 0 First: 0 Second: 10 First: 95 Second: 90
In the “Fair” treatments, the Down-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6).
119
G am e 2R
Up
Middle
Down
Left Centre Right
7 7 8
Equilibrium
5 5 4
10 1 9
2 11 3
11 2 9
1 10 3
First: 100 Second: 95
First: 0 Second: 5
First: 0 Second: 0
First: 10 Second: 15 First: 5 Second: 0 First: 85 Second: 85 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Up-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6).
G am e 2C
Left Centre Right
Up 1 8 5
11 4 7
8 8 11
Middle
4 4 1
5 7 5
Down Equilibrium
7 5 7
First: 5 Second: 0
First: 0 Second: 0
First: 95 Bel: 100
First: 0 Second: 0 First: 100 Second: 100 First: 0 Second: 0
In the “Fair” treatments, the Down-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6).
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G am e 3R
Up
Middle
Down
Left Centre Right
7 8 7
Equilibrium
5 4 5
9 11 8
3 1 4
9 9 1
3 3 11
First: 100 Second: 100
First: 0 Second: 0
First: 0 Second: 0
First: 5 Second: 10 First: 90 Second: 90 First: 5 Second: 0 
In the “Fair” treatments, the Up-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6).
G am e 3C
Left Centre Right
Up 3 11 4
9 1 8
First: 0 Second: 0
2 2 3
Middle
10 10 9
Equilibrium
First: 85 Second: 100
4 1 5
Down
8 11 7
First: 15 Second: 0
First: 0 Second: 0 First: 5 Second: 10 First: 95 Second: 90
In the “Fair” treatments, the Down-Right Payoff was changed by (6,6).
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G am e 4R
Left Centre Right
Up 8 10 11
First: 0 Second: 0
4 2 1
7 1 8
Middle
First: 10 Second: 0
5 11 4
5 4 2
Down Equilibrium
First: 90 Second: 100
7 8 10
First: 100 Second: 95 First: 0 Second: 0 First: 0 Second: 5
In the “Fair” treatments, the Middle-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6).
G am e 4C
Left Centre Right
Up 5
Equilibrium
4 3
First: 90 Second: 100
7 8 9
Middle
7 1 3
First: 5 Second: 0
5 11 9
9 11 2
Down
First: 5 Second: 0
3 1 10
First: 95 Second: 95 First: 0 Second: 0 First: 5 Second: 5
In the “Fair” treatment, the Middle-Left Payoff was changed by (6,6).
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G am e NR
Left Centre Right
Up 4 7 11
8 5 1
First: 0 Second: 10
7 7 7
Middle
5
Equilibrium
5 5
First: 100 Second: 35
10 7 5
Down
2 5 7
First: 0 Second: 55
First: 0 Second: 25 First: 85 Second: 55 First: 15 Second: 20
In the “ Fair” treatments, the Down-Right Payoff was changed by (6,6).
Gam e NC
Left Centre Right
Up 11 5 9
1 7 3
First: 0 Second: 5
8 8 8
Middle Equilibrium
4 4 4
First: 100 Second: 90
4 10 9
Down
8 2 3
First: 0 Second: 5
First: 5 Second: 20 First: 0 Second: 60 First: 95 Second: 20
In the “ -air” treatments, the Up-Centre Payoff was changed by (6,6).
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